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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION 
POLITICS AT THE WATER’S EDGE: 
THE PRESIDENCY, CONGRESS, AND THE NORTH KOREA POLICY 
OF THE UNITED STATES 
by 
Taehyung Ahn 
Florida International University, 2010 
Miami, Florida 
Professor Paul A. Kowert, Major Professor 
For all their efforts to avoid a nuclear North Korea, the Clinton and Bush 
administrations failed to achieve this goal, the most important policy objective of the 
United States in its relations with North Korea for decades, mainly because of 
inconsistencies in U.S. policy. This dissertation seeks to explain why both 
administrations ultimately failed to prevent North Korea from going nuclear. It finds the 
origins of this failure in the implementation of different U.S. policy options toward North 
Korea during the Clinton and Bush administrations. 
To explain the lack of policy consistency, the dissertation investigates how the 
relations between the executive and the legislative branches and, more specifically, 
different government types—unified government and divided government—have 
affected U.S. policy toward North Korea. It particularly emphasizes the role of Congress 
and partisan politics in the making of U.S. policy toward North Korea. 
This study finds that divided government played a pivotal role. Partisan politics 
are also central to the explanation: politics did not stop at the water’s edge. A divided U.S. 
vii 
 
government produced more status quo policies toward North Korea than a unified U.S. 
government, while a unified government produced more active policies than a divided 
government. Moreover, a unified government with a Republican President produced 
more aggressive policies toward North Korea, whereas a unified government with a 
Democratic President produced more conciliatory policies. This study concludes that the 
different government types and intensified partisan politics were the main causes of the 
inconsistencies in the United States’ North Korea policy that led to a nuclear North Korea. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
The denuclearization of North Korea (officially, the Democratic People’s 
Republic of Korea, or DPRK), the most important policy objective in U.S.-North Korea 
relations during the Clinton and Bush administrations, ultimately turned out to be a 
failure when Pyongyang conducted its first nuclear test in 2006.1
                                                 
1 North Korea also conducted a second nuclear test during the Obama administration in May, 2009. 
 
 Both the William J. 
Clinton administration (1993-2000) and the George W. Bush administration (2001-2008) 
worked hard in an effort to avoid a nuclear North Korea. In so doing, they adopted a 
variety of policies toward North Korea, ranging from a possible use of military force to a 
negotiated settlement. Despite many years of hard work, however, their efforts did not 
prevent North Korean nuclearization. 
During the first nuclear crisis between the United States and North Korea in 1993-
94, President Clinton decided to negotiate with Kim Il Sung, the North Korean leader, 
after seriously considering a surgical air strike against to Yongbyon, the suspected 
nuclear site in North Korea. Clinton’s decision to negotiate with North Korea resulted in 
the conclusion of the Geneva Agreement in 1994 that temporarily defused the crisis. 
Although Clinton continued to try to solve the North Korean nuclear issue diplomatically, 
he failed to fully live up to the 1994 Geneva Agreement, and to take further steps 
necessary for the improvement in the U.S.-North Korean relations including the 
normalization of the relationship between the two countries. 
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President Bush, especially after the September 11 terrorist attacks and during the 
second nuclear crisis between the United States and North Korea, took a more hostile 
stance toward the North Korean regime in general, and on the North Korean nuclear issue 
in particular. This confrontational position lasted for most of President Bush’s time in 
office. Despite U.S. participation in the multiple rounds of the Six-Party Talks, the basic 
tenet of the Bush administration was not to negotiate with a member of “the axis of evil” 
until it dismantled all nuclear weapons and programs first, and not to reward bad 
behavior by “a rogue state.” Such confrontational policy eventually led to a nuclear North 
Korea. 
The central goal of the dissertation is to explain why, despite all their efforts to 
avoid the nuclearization of North Korea, both administrations failed to prevent 
Pyongyang from going nuclear. This is a crucial issue in U.S. foreign policy:  
 
It is the story of an American foreign policy failure whose themes resonate well 
beyond North Korea: the breakdown of the global system of nonproliferation, the 
challenge of dealing with the nuclear ambitions of so-called rogue states, the 
fraying of American relations with key allies like South Korea and Japan, the 
erosion of the U.S. position in Asia, the emergence of China as a major player on 
the international stage, and the political manipulation of intelligence (Chinoy, 
2008, xxi). 
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To explain this failure, this dissertation examines the main causes of the 
implementation of different U.S. policy options toward North Korea during the Clinton 
and Bush administrations. 
There are different—and often contrasting—views of the U.S. foreign and nuclear 
policy failure toward North Korea. Some argue that Clinton’s appeasement policy has 
ultimately led to policy breakdown, while others argue that Bush’s confrontational policy 
has eventually resulted in a nuclear North Korea. Most such criticisms, unsurprisingly, 
come from political or partisan interests. However, an understanding of the failure in U.S. 
North Korea nuclear policy should not be simply a matter of assigning blame. 
Some argue that the policy inconsistency or incoherence between the Clinton and 
Bush administrations is a real culprit in the breakdown in U.S. North Korea policy. This 
view argues that whereas Pyongyang’s policy toward Washington was consistent, 
Washington’s policy toward Pyongyang was inconsistent, and that such inconsistency 
was a main cause of the failure of the US North Korea policy.2
There are, however, some problems with this explanation. Although the Clinton 
and Bush administrations took different policy approaches, both shared common policy 
goals toward North Korea. It is true that President Clinton preferred constructive 
 They attribute the failure 
to contrasting policy approaches between the two administrations: nonproliferation vs. 
regime change, negotiation vs. confrontation, and constructive engagement vs. coercive 
diplomacy. 
                                                 
2 Leon V. Sigal (1998), for example, argues that North Korea’s policy toward the United States has been 
consistent and easy to predict because it is based on a tit-for-tat strategy. Tong Kim (2010) also argues that 
North Korean “fundamental strategy has been consistent in pursuing the protection of their independence, 
the survival of their system, and the improvement of their economy.” Furthermore, Charles K. Armstrong 
(2006, 19) argues that even during the Bush administration, “Pyongyang’s negotiating position remained 
consistent.” 
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engagement to coercive diplomacy, while President Bush took a more confrontational 
stance.  Both, however, embraced the denuclearization of North Korea as the most urgent 
and important policy goal. In addition, although both administrations viewed North 
Korean regime change as the best scenario, neither pursued this directly, because they 
considered it either undesirable or unattainable. Instead, both set nonproliferation of 
nuclear weapons as a realistic goal in North Korea policy. 
This dissertation seeks to find out why the Clinton administration and the Bush 
administration chose different policy options toward North Korea, despite their common 
goal. It investigates how the relations between the executive and the legislative branches 
and, more specifically, the different government types—unified government where the 
same party controls both the executive and legislative branches and divided government 
where different parties control the executive and legislative branches—have affected the 
U.S. policy making process toward North Korea.3
Although there is a large literature on the processes and outcomes of U.S. policy 
toward the North Korean nuclear issue from the presidential perspective and the 
executive branch’s perspective (Sigal, 1998; Harrison, 2002; Cha & Kang, 2003; Wit, 
Poneman, & Gallucci, 2004; Lee, 2006; Pritchard, 2007; Chinoy, 2008), there have been 
relatively few efforts to understand the influence of different government types, and 
Congress in particular, on the making of U.S. policy toward North Korea. The few 
studies that have addressed those issues were limited to the Clinton administration or 
 In other words, it centers on the 
interbranch relationship between the president and the Congress and its impact on U.S. 
policy toward North Korea. 
                                                 
3 For more detailed discussions on the definitions, see the chapter II. 
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dealt only with specific policy issues (Barilleaux & Kim, 1999; Hathaway & Tama, 2004; 
Lee & Miles, 2006). This project aims to provide a far more comprehensive perspective 
on the issue. 
Different government types played a pivotal role in the United States’ North 
Korea policy making process during the Clinton and Bush administrations, and the 
increase and the intensification of partisan politics during this period facilitated different 
policy outcomes. Politics did not stop at the water’s edge, at least with regard to the U.S. 
policy toward North Korea. Different government types produced different policy 
choices, moreover, even though the two presidencies shared the same policy goal. The 
different government types and intensified partisan politics were the main causes that 
contributed to inconsistencies in U.S. North Korea policy and the ultimate policy failure. 
 
1.1. U.S. Policy on Nuclear Nonproliferation in General 
 
Nuclear nonproliferation has been one of the most important foreign policy goals 
of the United States since the end of the Second World War. The issue took precedence 
over many other U.S. foreign policy priorities. All postwar U.S. administrations made 
substantial efforts to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and to strengthen the 
international nuclear nonproliferation regime. Since the United States used two nuclear 
bombs against Japan—the only such cases in world history—at the end of the Second 
World War, the nuclear nonproliferation policy has never lost its status as a top priority 
among U.S. foreign policy objectives. Whether it is to maintain nuclear domination or to 
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make the world a safer and more secure place, it has never been questioned that nuclear 
nonproliferation is in the U.S. national interest.4
Since the end of the Cold War, however, loose nukes, nuclear smuggling, and 
nuclear terrorism began emerging as new threats to the United States.
 
The spread of nuclear weapons is not in the U.S. national interest, because no 
states are immune from the threat of deliberate or accidental war. Moreover, states with 
weak civilian governments are especially likely to lack the positive constraining 
mechanisms of civilian control.  Washington should thus stop the spread of nuclear 
weapons both by unilaterally exerting its influence over countries with nuclear ambitions 
and by multilaterally strengthening the global nuclear nonproliferation regime to reduce 
the possibility of the use of nuclear weapons against the United States. 
During the Cold War, U.S. nuclear weapons policies consisted of nuclear 
deterrence toward nuclear powers and nuclear nonproliferation for all other states (Bunn 
& Chyba, 2006, 298-99; Walker, 2000, 704-08). Non-state actors, such as terrorist groups, 
were not a focus of U.S. policy at the time. 
5
                                                 
4 For more detailed descriptions on the history of US nuclear policy, see Freedman, 2003. 
 
5 For a contemporary concern on a revolutionary change in nuclear nonproliferation environment since the 
end of the Cold War, see Simpson, 1994. 
 Washington was 
afraid that nuclear weapons, weapons materials, or weapons technologies could be 
transferred to rogue states and terrorist groups. Although nonproliferation was always an 
important consideration in U.S. foreign policy, since the end of the Cold War, “it has 
achieved top billing on almost all lists of foreign policy and defense priorities (Mazarr, 
1995, 4).” The fear that terrorist groups would acquire weapons of mass destruction was 
highlighted by the September 11 terrorist attacks. After the attacks, the Bush 
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administration strengthened its nonproliferation policy, and even extended 
counterproliferation actions by implementing the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), 
under which merchant ships at sea could be stopped for inspection if suspected to carry 
weapons of mass destruction. 
 
1.2. U.S. Policy on North Korean Nuclear Nonproliferation 
 
For the past two decades, the most important goal in U.S. policy toward North 
Korea has been the denuclearization of Pyongyang. Successive U.S. administrations have 
clearly indicated that their top priority was the complete elimination of North Korean 
nuclear weapons and programs. In order to achieve this goal, Washington has gone to 
great lengths to prevent North Korea from going nuclear by adopting a variety of policies 
both bilaterally and multilaterally. These policies have included bilateral negotiation, 
multilateral negotiation, bilateral economic sanctions, multilateral economic sanctions, 
coercive diplomacy, and the threat to use force. 
The United States has seen a nuclear North Korea as a fatal failure of the nuclear 
nonproliferation regime.  Because of U.S. efforts and leadership, most states have 
subscribed to the regime. The United States had three major fears about a nuclear North 
Korea. The first fear was that Pyongyang might use nuclear weapons to threaten 
American security and interests, especially installed and delivered by North Korean 
ballistic missiles. The second fear was that “if the North is not stopped, a terrible 
precedent for violating the nonproliferation regime will have been set and another 
possible source for transfers of nuclear technology that promote proliferation, or even the 
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terrorist use of nuclear weapons, will have emerged” (Morgan, 2007, 25). The third fear 
was that the North would destabilize the balance of power in Northeast Asia and increase 
the level of tensions by creating a regional nuclear arms race. 
The North Korea nuclear proliferation issue was initiated in 1989, when the CIA 
reportedly obtained evidence proving North Korea’s capability of developing nuclear 
weapons on its own. The U.S. fears reached a peak in 1993-4, when Pyongyang 
threatened that it would withdraw from the NPT (the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of 
Nuclear Weapons or Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty), decided to pull the fuel rods 
from a reactor, and announced that it would withdraw from the IAEA (the International 
Atomic Energy Agency). By signing the Agreed Framework in Geneva, Switzerland, on 
October 21, 1994, however, North Korea temporarily defused the issue. During this first 
nuclear crisis, the Clinton administration pursued a policy of constructive engagement 
with North Korea for the purpose of nuclear nonproliferation. “This conciliatory posture 
was based on the classic liberal assumption that even with dictatorial countries, mutually 
beneficial discussions could be conducted and reasonable compromises could be reached 
in good faith” (Lee, 2006, 160). Despite its conclusion with the Agreed Framework in 
1994, however, the Clinton administration was either unable or unwilling to fully 
implement it due mainly to the resistance of the Republican majority in Congress.6
The North Korea nuclear proliferation issue was revived in October, 2002, when 
North Korea reportedly admitted its covert nuclear development. The Bush 
administration then asserted that North Korea violated the 1994 Agreed Framework. 
President Bush argued, “The United States honored its side of the agreement. North 
 
                                                 
6 The Republican Party won the 1994 mid-term elections and became majorities in both houses of Congress. 
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Korea didn’t. While we felt the agreement was in force, North Korea was enriching 
uranium” (The White House, 2003). The Geneva Agreement was nullified. The 
September 11 terrorist attacks, without a doubt, also greatly influenced the Bush 
administration’s North Korea policy. The Bush administration became more 
confrontational toward North Korea. The 2001 Nuclear Posture Review identified North 
Korea as a state that might be attacked by U.S. nuclear weapons in an immediate 
contingency (Department of Defense, 2001, 16). The Bush administration demanded 
CVID—complete, verifiable, irreversible dismantlement—as a precondition for a 
negotiation with North Korea. Five years later, despite the intermittent negotiations 
between the United States and North Korea through the Six-Party Talks, Pyongyang 
finally conducted a nuclear test in October, 2006. 
The Bush foreign policy team criticized the 1994 Agreed Framework as an 
appeasement or a reward for bad behavior. They denounced Clinton’s policy toward 
North Korea as “deeply, profoundly misguided and wrong” (as cited in Martin, 2007, 85). 
The 2001 Nuclear Posture Review developed contingency plans for using nuclear 
weapons on the Korean peninsula, and the 2002 National Security Strategy emphasized 
the possibility of preemptive military strikes against countries with WMD. In his 2003 
State of the Union speech, President Bush labeled North Korea part of the “axis of evil”. 
Furthermore, the Bush administration was opposed to providing any political and 
economic incentives that would help to maintain this “evil” regime in exchange for 
denuclearization. 
The Clinton and Bush administrations, nevertheless, had in common two core 
strategic objectives on the Korean peninsula and in the East Asian region: nuclear 
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nonproliferation and the peace and security of the region. The first goal of the Clinton 
and Bush administrations was to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons by a rogue state 
in the region, North Korea. When Clinton took office in the early 1990s, his 
administration expressed “its firm commitment to halting the spread of nuclear weapons 
and other weapons of mass destruction, to strengthen the functions of the International 
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and to enforce strong sanctions against governments that 
violated international agreements” (Lee 2006, 159). 
In the 2002 National Security Strategy of the United States of America (The 
White House, 2002b, 14), President Bush also stated that a new comprehensive strategy 
requires “strengthened nonproliferation efforts to prevent rogue states and terrorists from 
acquiring the materials, technologies, and expertise necessary for weapons of mass 
destruction (emphasis added).” In addition to the use of nuclear weapons against the 
United States or the sale of nuclear weapons to other states or terrorist groups, 
Washington did not want the domino effect of the nuclear arms race in Asia. A nuclear 
North Korea would trigger nuclear arms race in the region involving Japan, South Korea, 
China, Taiwan, even India and Pakistan. 
The second strategic goal in common was the maintenance of the stability and 
peace in the East Asian region, especially considering the geopolitical and economic 
strategic significance of a region including China, Taiwan, Japan, and two Koreas. As 
Carpenter & Bandow (2004) point out: 
 
The nations of East Asia have a large population, significant military forces, and 
an impressive (and growing) array of economic and technological capabilities…. 
11 
 
East Asia is now the most significant region for U.S. international commerce, 
having surpassed Western Europe in the 1990s. Ten of America’s 24 largest 
trading partners are located in the region (Japan, third; the People’s Republic of 
China [minus Hong Kong], fourth; the Republic of Korea, seventh; Taiwan, 
eighth; Singapore, tenth; Malaysia, twelfth; Hong Kong, sixteenth; Thailand, 
nineteenth; the Philippines, twenty-third; and Australia, twenty-fourth). Many of 
those same entities also provide important arenas for American investment. 
Maintaining, indeed strengthening, that array of economic ties constitutes an 
interest that Washington cannot ignore (148). 
 
In addition, according to the World Development Indicators database, in 2008, the 
aggregate of GDPs of only three East Asian countries, China, Japan, and South Korea—
even without including Taiwan and North Korea— was 16% of the total GDP of the 
World (The World Bank, 2009). 
The Clinton administration thus argued that the United States should actively 
engage the region to promote both its political stability and its economic prosperity (Nye, 
1995). In 1994, Secretary of Defense William Perry said that North Korea was the 
biggest threat to the stability and peace in the region because of its “excessive military 
force.” He specifically stated, “An unchecked nuclear capability—coupled with North 
Korea’s large conventional military forces—could put North Korea in a position to 
subject South Korea to extortion in establishing its terms for unification. It could 
undermine the security of the whole Northeast Asia region and tempt other countries to 
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seek their own nuclear weapons in self-defense” (as cited in Lee, 2006, 170).7
                                                 
7 In 1994, General Gary Luck, commander of U.S. Forces Korea, also projected that “a war in Korea would 
kill or would as many as 52,000 U.S. troops and 490,000 South Korean military forces and would cost $61 
billion in the first ninety days; a prolonged full-scale war would kill or wound about a million people, 
including 80,000 to 100,000 U.S. troops as a cost of $100 billion—about one-third of the annual U.S. 
defense budget” (Lee, 2006, 171). 
 During the 
Bush administration, the U.S. Department of State also stated that Washington’s 
“interests in the East Asia-Pacific region concern promoting regional stability, fostering 
democracy and human rights, encouraging economic prosperity, furthering cooperation 
on fighting transnational issues and international crime, and preventing the proliferation 
of weapons of mass destruction (Department of State Regional Topics, 2005).” To stop 
the nuclearization of North Korea, therefore, was regarded as the most pivotal policy goal 
both for the Clinton administration and for the Bush administration in achieving their two 
core strategic objectives on the Korean peninsula and in East Asia. 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW AND RESEARCH DESIGN 
 
Different institutional settings react differently to international affairs. Regarding 
U.S. foreign policy, one of the most important institutional settings is different 
government types: unified government and divided government. The struggle for control 
over foreign policy making between Congress and the president is most evident in the 
divided government. To understand how different government types impact U.S. foreign 
policy, many studies have examined the consequences of different government types on 
foreign policymaking process. This chapter will review key debates on the role of 
different government types in the making of U.S. foreign policy and delineate research 
design of this dissertation. 
 
2.1. The Debate on Unified Government vs. Divided Government 
 
The tension between the executive and the legislative branches is a recurring 
theme in the study of the U.S. political system. The U.S. Constitution invites a struggle 
for power both in the domestic policymaking and in the foreign policy making (Corwin, 
1957; Franck, 1981; Spanier & Nogee, 1981; Tower, 1981/2; Christopher, 1983; Crabb & 
Holt, 1989; Mezey, 1989; Warburg, 1989; Neustadt, 1990; Cox & Kernell, 1991; Lindsay 
& Ripley, 1992; Rosner, 1995; Campbell, Rae, & Stack, 2003; Kelley, 2005; Thurber, 
2006; Fisher, 2007; Lindsay, 2007). With particular regard to U.S. foreign policy, 
Hersman (2000) states that: 
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Few aspects … are more contentious or controversial than the respective roles and 
responsibilities of Congress and the executive in the foreign policy process. 
Despite the voluminous efforts of scholars to understand and explain the perpetual 
conflict and confusing processes that drive executive-legislative relations over 
foreign policy, the debate persists (1). 
 
Some topics have attracted more attention than others. One that has received 
particular attention is the question of which branch makes U. S. foreign policy.8
Although many studies show that Congress has become more active, assertive, 
and aggressive in U.S. foreign policy making since Vietnam (Franck & Weisband, 1979; 
Sundquist, 1980; Ripley & Lindsay, 1993; Scott & Carter, 2002), the large picture is that 
interbranch relations have rather been “fluid and dynamic, with neither Congress nor the 
president always predominant” (Rosati & Scott, 2007, 313). Many other studies confirm 
Rosati and Scott’s (2007) judgment that Congress has long played an important role in 
 Some 
argue that Congress prevails (Cutler, 1980; Szamuely, 1987; Jones & Marini, 1988; 
Crovitz & Rabkin, 1989; Cheney 1990), while others argue that Congress has lost its 
willpower in the competition with the President, especially in the foreign policy decision 
making process (Schlesinger, 1973; Berkowitz, Bock, & Fuccillo, 1977; Koh, 1988; 
Hinckley, 1994; Peterson, 1994b; Peterson, 1994c; Weissman, 1995; Wolfensberger, 
2002; Ornstein & Mann, 2006; Ohaegbulam, 2007; Fisher, 2008; Cooper, 2009; Hansen 
& Friedman, 2009). 
                                                 
8 “Since World War II, Congress has been characterized as acquiescent, resurgent, deferent, assertive, 
subservient, coequal, and imperial” (Carter & Scott, 2010, Web). 
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the U.S. foreign policy making process, competing with the Presidency sometimes, 
cooperating with it at other times (Manning, 1977; Lindsay, 1992/3; Henkin, 1996; 
Burgin, 1997; Martin, 2000; Cater & Scott, 2004; Howell & Pevehouse, 2005; Howell & 
Pevehouse, 2007; Carter & Scott, 2009). LeLoup & Shull (2003) identify four different 
policy outcomes: presidential leadership in the Persian Gulf War in 1991, congressional 
leadership in Cuba sanctions legislation in 1996, consensus/cooperation in the Panama 
Canal treaties in 1978, and deadlock/extraordinary resolution in aid to the Nicaraguan 
contras in 1982-89. 
A second interesting topic is whether politics stops at the water’s edge. A major 
finding is that partisan politics in Congress has begun to increase as bipartisan support on 
a variety of foreign policy issues has significantly decreased since the Vietnam War. 
Such partisanship has continued and even increased since the end of the Cold War (Bond 
& Fleisher, 1990; McCormick & Wittkopf, 1990; Meernik, 1993; Sinclair, 1993; Rohde, 
1994, Cooper & Young, 1997; McCormick, Wittkopf, & Danna, 1997; Carter, 1998; 
Wittkopf, & McCormick, 1998; Pleisher, Bond, Krutz, & Hanna, 2000; Delaet, Rowling, 
& Scott, 2005; Pfiffner, 2006; DeLaet & Scott, 2006). Such partisan politics may 
facilitate or hinder the different choices in U.S. policy toward North Korea. 
In the meantime, since the 1990s, particularly after Sundquist (1988/9) raised the 
question on which type of government should be “the superior model for America” (634), 
because “the country passed from a long era of party government, when either the 
Republican or the Democratic Party controlled both the presidency and the Congress 
almost all of the time, to an era when the government was divided between the parties 
most of the time” (614), numerous studies on the consequences of different government 
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types—unified government and divided government—both on domestic policymaking 
process and on foreign policymaking process have been followed to address the issue. 
 Lindsay and Ripley (1992) also encouraged political scientists to fill the gap 
between the increasing popular interest in divided government and the lack of analytical 
study of it. The intense ideological struggle and violent partisanship between the 
Republican Party and the Democratic Party in the 1990s also contributed significantly to 
the emergent discussion on the role of congress and of the divided government in U.S. 
foreign policy making. 
There has been, however, no consensus with regard to the effect of the different 
government types on U.S. foreign policy. Some argue that whether the government is 
divided or unified does not make much difference in foreign policy making process. 
Mayhew (2005) suggests that “it does not seem to make all that much difference whether 
party control of the American government happens to be united or divided” (198). Fiorina 
(1996a; 1996b) also argues that there were no significant differences between years of 
unified government and years of split control, and that claims that divided government 
leads to policy stalemate or policy gridlock are unfounded. 
In a similar vein, Jones (2005) points out that the United States has been skillfully 
governed “under the strikingly diverse constitutional arrangements of single- and split-
party control” (32), and that the U.S. political system of “mixed representation and shared 
powers” (359) has competently functioned. Finally, Menefee-Libey (1991), Thurber 
(1991), Paul E. Peterson (1994a), Alesina & Rosenthal (1995), Gowa (1998), Krehbiel 
(1998), Binder (2001), Fordham (2002), and Auerswald & Maltzman (2003), all find 
little or no evidence for the negative impact of divided government on U.S. foreign policy 
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making processes and outcomes. To quote Menefee-Libey (1991), “divided government 
is not the real problem” (643). 
Others, however, argue that divided government makes difference, that it has 
significant impacts both on domestic and on foreign policymaking, and that it has a 
tendency to lead to more partisan politics and ideological conflicts in Congress. Ware 
(2001) argues that “as much substantive legislation appears to have been passed under 
divided government as under unified government. Nevertheless, it is only in particular 
kinds of circumstances, that the relationship between the two branches under divided 
government can be described as being one of constructive engagement” (33). Kelly (1993) 
concludes that “divided government does make a difference” (emphasis in original, 483). 
LeLoup & Shull (2003) note, “While divided government does not always paralyze 
policymaking… it does make a difference” (10). Conley (2003) suggests divided 
government “does matter for the legislative presidency” (emphasis in original, 3). Carter 
& Scott (2004) also conclude that the implications of their study reflect “the obvious 
importance of divided government” (59). 
Secondly, some argue that divided government has significant impacts on U.S. 
policymaking. Lohmann & O’Halloran (1994) claim that “partisan control… significantly 
affected presidential and congressional policymaking” (628). Howell & Pevehouse 
(2005), in their study, suggest that divided government “critically affects presidents’ 
proclivity to use military force” (228). O’Halloran (1994) concludes that “divided 
government has a subtle but important effect on policy through the willingness of 
Congress to design procedures that delegate authority to the president” (180). 
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Others further argue that divided government has negative impacts on the US 
policymaking. Mezey (1989) argues that “the political system has become increasingly 
disposed toward stalemate” (147). Kernell (1991) claims that “a divided government will 
require the president to draw heavily upon his constitutional prerogatives as he defends 
his party’s positions against the designs of the opposition-controlled Congress” (108). 
Binder (1999) also finds that “[Policy] deadlock is more likely when the two major 
parties split control of Congress” (527). Edwards, Barrett, & Peake (1997) point out that 
“divided government inhibits the passage of important legislation” (562). Destler (2001) 
concludes that divided government has been detrimental to U.S. foreign policy. 
Finally, divided government intensifies congressional activism and violent 
partisan politics. Meernik (1995) argues that Congress is more likely to attempt to restrict 
the presidential use of force under divided government. Scott & Carter (2002) also argue 
that divided government has affected levels of congressional activity in the post-World 
War II era, leading to a decline in congressional activity. McCormick, Wittkopf, & 
Danna (1997) argue that “divided government contributed to the decline in bipartisanship 
by accentuating the rise of ideological differences…, while [u]nified government 
contributes to bipartisan decline in a different way, by fostering partisan divisions, 
especially as the experience of the Clinton administration in the House during the 103rd 
Congress reveals” (146). Many studies also show that divided government escalates the 
tendency of partisanship and ideological disputes on a variety of foreign policy issues. 
Carter (1998) concludes that “the phenomenon of divided government further escalates 
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the impact of an increasingly partisan and ideological policy making process” (128).9
As discussed briefly earlier, another important discussion on the nature of the 
interbranch relations between the Presidency and the Congress in U.S. history is the 
increase and intensification of party politics and partisanship in Congress. It is commonly 
assumed that politics stops at the water’s edge and Congress supports the president on 
foreign policy issues (Wildavsky, 1966). Partisan politics in Congress has begun to 
increase, however, as bipartisan support on a variety of foreign policy issues and a Cold 
War consensus in American politics have decreased since the Vietnam War.
 In 
sum, different government types evidently influence a variety of U.S. foreign policy 
issues in a different way (Mann, 1990: McCormick, Wittkopf, & Danna, 1997; Martin, 
2000). 
10
                                                 
9 In the meantime, Silbey (1996) interestingly argues, “What we really have now is not divided but 
fragmented government,” because “divided government can exist only when there is a clear and dominant 
pattern of national two-party competition and when each party stands for different policies, so that when 
the government becomes divided along party lines, there will be a predictable, clear-cut policy conflict. 
Fragmented government, in contrast, exists when the parties are weak and voters and legislators do not 
receive or welcome sustained and meaningful partisan cues and are extremely volatile in their behavior 
most of the time, whatever their occasional deviations from that anarchic norm” (20). 
 
10 “Gosh, I miss the Cold War,” said President Bill Clinton in late 1993” (as cited in Scott & Crothers, 1998, 
1). The utterance very amusingly reflects the difficult situation of presidential leadership on foreign policy 
issues with increased partisanship and the decreased foreign policy consensus in Congress since the end of 
the Cold War. 
 This issue 
is particularly important because such partisan politics may make possible or impossible 
the specific choices in U.S. policy toward North Korea. 
Divided government since the Vietnam War and especially since the end of the 
Cold War has become fertile soil for intensified party politics and partisanship in 
Congress, as a Cold War consensus diminished that was a crucial element in minimizing 
the impact of divided government on U.S. foreign policy making in the 1950s and 1960s. 
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However, some argue that, even during the Cold War era, congressional 
partisanship was often apparent on a variety of issues, including the direction of U.S. 
foreign policy (Howell & Pevehouse, 2007). McCormick & Wittkopf (1990) also 
examine two contrasting perspectives on the nature of congressional-executive relations 
in U.S. foreign policy making: the bipartisan perspective, which argues that politics stops 
at the water’s edge, and the political perspective, which claims that foreign policy is 
subject to partisan and ideological disputes. They conclude that “the bipartisan 
perspective applies best to the first two decades of the postwar era, but that it has not 
been replaced by the political perspective…” because “the political perspective applies 
throughout the postwar era” (1097). 
Numerous studies show, on the other hand, since the Vietnam War, partisanship 
has significantly increased and started to affect not only congressional decisions such as 
the choices of party leaders, the voting of rank-and-file members, and the behavior of 
individual members of Congress, but also presidential decisions such as the use of 
military force, making executive agreements and treaties, enacting economic sanctions, 
and providing food assistance. 
To refute MaCormick & Wittkopf (1990)’s argument that the Vietnam War did 
not play a significant role in congressional bipartisan support of the presidency and that 
congressional bipartisan Cold War consensus was not as prominent as many had assumed, 
Meernik (1993) develops “a comprehensive model of bipartisan congressional support of 
presidents from 1947 through 1988, examining foreign policy and defense roll-call votes 
to determine what factors lead Republicans and Democrats to overcome their political 
differences on these issues” (570). 
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Meernick (1993) concludes that “there was a strong degree of bipartisanship in 
congressional support of presidents on foreign policy and defense issues before 
America’s involvement in Vietnam. After this conflict, consensus broke down and was 
replaced with much more conflictual voting behavior” (585). With regard to the argument 
by McCormick and Wittkopf that partisanship existed even during earlier years, Meernik 
points out that “such conflict was not nearly as visible, frequent, and deep as it has been 
in later times” (585). He predicts that “without any strong incentives for stopping politics 
at the water’s edge, the president and the Congress will in all probability continue to 
shape foreign policy according to their own political needs” (586). 
In a similar vein, Rohde (1994) argues that although, until the mid-1960s, 
“bipartisanship on matters related to international affairs was both a goal and a fact of 
presidential-congressional politics…, [t]his pattern of consensus and deference was 
broken by conflict over the Vietnam War and other international affairs issues during the 
Johnson and Nixon administrations in the late 1960s and early 1970s” (76). Carter (1998) 
also argues, “since the Vietnam War, no consensus regarding the preferred ends and 
means of U.S. foreign policy and defense policy has existed to dampen the effects of 
ideology and partisanship. These factors have increasingly reinforced each other, making 
the parties more ideological” (128). 
Many studies argue such partisanship has further intensified with the end of the 
Cold War. Cooper & Young (1997) examine three basic voting patterns—partisanship, 
bipartisanship, and crosspartisanship—to see “whether the strength of party voting has 
incrased or declined in the twentieth century” (247). They conclude that the Congress—
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both the House and the Senate—has become more partisan in the post-Cold War period, 
even if it remains to be seen whether the country has truly entered a partisan era. 
McCormick, Wittkopf, & Danna (1997) also extend their earlier study of the 
nature of congressional-executive relations in U.S. foreign policy making (McCormick & 
Wittkopf, 1990) to the Bush and Clinton administrations. They conclude “that 
bipartisanship has continued to wane in the post-Cold War era and that the political 
perspective is an increasingly powerful interpretation of congressional-executive relations 
in foreign policymaking” (146). The level of bipartisanship during the Bush and Clinton 
administrations has reached new low points, while the partisan gap on foreign policy 
votes remained very wide. 
One apparent consequence of increased partisanship since the end of the Cold 
War is that Congress has become more assertive and aggressive. Carter (1998) argues 
that in the post-Cold War era, members of Congress “were more assertive” (emphasis 
original, 110). According to him, it is not surprising since: 
 
Partisanship is a major component of a member’s reaction to the internal political 
environment in which that legislator works. Both chambers of Congress are 
organized along partisan lines, and members tend to interact and socialize with 
their chamber colleagues along partisan lines. Moreover, party organizations 
control access to both committee and subcommittee assignments and to personal 
and committee staff resources. Party leaders control the legislative schedule and 
service the needs of their respective party members. In addition, there may be 
costs to resisting party leaders’ requests and rewards for “doing the right thing” in 
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party leaders’ eye. Thus partisanship affects just about every aspect of the human 
setting within Congress, and so it impacts the foreign policy-making process as 
well (127-28). 
 
Carter thus concludes that “the cold war’s end brought another escalation in the 
level of congressional assertiveness in foreign policy making” (129). Scott & Carter 
(2002) also argue that Congress has become more assertive since World War II. They 
examined congressional foreign policy activity from 1946 to 1997 to gauge the 
competing claims between the resurgence school (which argues that presidential 
leadership on foreign affairs has been eroded by increased congressional activity: Franck 
& Weisband, 1979; Destler, Gelb, & Lake, 1984; Holsti & Rosenau, 1984; Melanson, 
1996), and the acquiescence school (which holds that congressional activity declined: 
Hinckley, 1994).11
Many studies show that both members of Congress (Wittkopf & McCormick, 
1998; Carter & Scott, 2004; Delaet & Scott, 2006; Layman, Carsey, Green, Herrera, & 
Cooperman, 2010) and congressional party leaders have been ideologically polarized 
(Sinclair, 1993; Smith 1994). The increased partisanship noted by so many scholars can 
also be observed in congressional voting behavior (Fleisher, Bond, Krutz, & Hanna, 2000; 
Delaet, Rowling, & Scott, 2005). 
  Scott & Carter (2002) conclude that “Congress has become less 
active but more assertive in its foreign policy behavior since World War II” (163). 
                                                 
11 Hinckley (1994) argues that the assertive role of Congress in the making of U.S. foreign policy is a myth 
and that a struggle for influence between the two branches is an illusion. According to her, the underlying 
trends are masked by a host of surface activities of Congress such as the increase number of bills and the 
number of hearings, the proclamations and symbolic resolutions, steadily mounting number of 
congressional reports, and symbolic struggle between the Congress and the president with filibusters, veto 
threats, and last-minute compromises. For more details, see Hinckley, 1994. 
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In the meantime, many studies show that presidential success in Congress 
depends on the factors such as partisanship and ideology, because “all other things being 
equal, members of the president’s party will look for reasons to support his foreign policy 
requests and members of the opposition party will look for reasons to oppose them” 
(Carter, 1998, 128). Bond & Fleisher (1990), by analyzing presidential success in 
Congress and the conditions that contribute to success by dissecting roll votes in 
Congress between 1953 and 1984, conclude that “presidential success on roll call votes 
from 1953 to 1984… support the Congress-centered thesis rather than the one 
emphasizing presidential variables” (222). Their findings thus indicate that during this 
period, “members of Congress provide levels of support for the presidents that are 
generally consistent with their partisan and ideological predispositions” (223). Fleisher, 
Bond, Krutz, & Hanna (2000) argue that “in the American system of separation of 
powers, elevated partisanship makes majority presidents more successful and minority 
presidents less successful” (6). They show that “the level of success for minority party 
presidents on foreign and defense votes has declined” (21). These arguments consist of 
important theoretical foundations of the hypotheses which will be developed and 
delineated in the next section of this chapter, and will be applied and discussed in more 
detail in the chapters IV and V of this dissertation. 
Finally, there have been many studies examining the major causes of the 
decreased bipartisanship and the increased partisanship in the post-Vietnam War period 
and in the post-Cold War period (Pfiffner, 2006). Destler (2001) argues that “the most 
durable cause of Congress’s willingness to challenge the president… is the polarization 
of party politics in the United States (328).” According to him, “American political 
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leaders have been spending less time seeking a viable consensus in the center, and more 
time fighting for partisan and ideological advantage” (328). Carter (1998) argues that 
“the lack of a foreign policy consensus in society, the phenomenon of divided 
government, the increasingly ideological and partisan nature of foreign and defense 
policy debates on Capitol Hill, the decreasing influence of standing committees and the 
increasing influence of party leaders on both sides of the aisle combine to present a 
formidable challenge to presidents” (131). Theriault (2008) argues that “only when the 
changes within the constituency interact with the legislative process does the complete 
picture of party polarization in the U.S. Congress come into clearer focus” (6). 
In sum, whether the major causes of the decreased bipartisanship and the 
increased partisanship are individual, structural, or procedural, it is undisputable that 
partisan politics has contributed to nearly every foreign policy clash between Capitol Hill 
and the White House for the past five decades. Partisan politics in Congress has begun to 
increase since the Vietnam War, and it dramatically intensified since the end of the Cold 
War. As we have seen above, indeed, the influence of the increased and intensified 
partisanship in Congress is to be found almost everywhere: presidential decisions, 
individual members of Congress, congressional party leaders, the congressional voting 
behaviors, and so on. Divided government since the Vietnam War and since the end of 
the Cold War as well has become a fertile ground for more intensified party politics and 
partisanship in Congress. The lack of consensus on foreign policy issues, the accelerated 
process of globalization and the subsequent increase of intermestic issues, the frequent 
divided party control of government, and polarized ideological separation between the 
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Republicans and the Democrats, all contributed the increase and intensification of 
partisan politics in Congress. 
This dissertation will focus attention on the role of different government types on 
U.S. foreign policy, and specifically at the impact of different government types on the 
U.S. North Korea nuclear policy. In so doing, it will ask which thesis—“politics stops at 
the water’s edge” or “politics proceeds past the water’s edge”—is more persuasive during 
the Clinton and Bush administrations, and how much partisanship and ideological politics 
affected and were responsible for the case. The weight of previous research shows a clear 
trend toward the latter perspective. Yet North Korea is a hard case, since even partisans 
might be expected to share negative views of this so-called pariah state.12
For analytic purposes, the domestic sources of U.S. foreign policy can be divided 
into three categories, the societal factors, the institutional factors, and the individual 
factors. Societal influences on U.S. foreign policy include political culture, elite and 
public opinion, political parties, the media, and interest groups. Institutional factors 
involve the executive and legislative branches of government and the executive 
 It is evident 
that not only members of Congress from both parties, but also presidents from both 
parties have shared similar critical perceptions on the North Korean regime under Kim Il 
Sung and Kim Jong Il. 
 
2.2. Research Design 
 
                                                 
12 For example, the North Korean Human Rights Act in 2004 passed the Senate by unanimous consent, and 
the House by voice vote (The Library of Congress, 2004). 
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departments and other agencies dealing with foreign policy issues. Finally, individual 
factors comprise the personal characteristics of individuals and the role responsibilities of 
foreign policy decision makers (Wittkopf and McCormick, 2008; See also Scott and 
Crothers, 1998, 2-13.). 
Among these three domestic sources of foreign policy, this project focuses on the 
institutional factors. This is not because the other sources are not important, but because 
institutional factors are the most persistent influences on foreign policy. Societal and 
individual factors seem to be more changeable. Secondly, different institutional settings 
react differently to foreign affairs. In the United States, the struggle for control over 
foreign policy making between Congress and the president is most evident in the divided 
government. Thirdly, societal factors are less important than institutional factors because 
there is no strong interest group in the United States to publicly represent North Korea. 
Lastly, although individual factors could have played an important role, they do not 
explain the phenomenon in which this dissertation is interested. Individual factors explain 
neither the changes in Clinton’s North Korea policy nor the differences in Bush’s North 
Korea policy during their terms, respectively. In other words, institutional factors “have 
more effects on foreign policy, they tend to influence actors more than actors influence 
them, and their impact is independent of the regime type or the decision making actors” 
(Carter & Scott, 2010, Web).13
                                                 
13 Institutional factors—more specifically, governmental structures—“generate specific roles that would be 
likely to occur irrespective of the idiosyncrasies of the role occupants” (J. N. Rosenau, 1966, 43, as cited in 
Carter & Scott, 2010, Web). However, Rosenau does not underestimate the importance of individuals in 
international affairs. According to him, “it is misleading to think of world affairs as being driven 
exclusively by large collections… Such macro organizations are surely central to the course of events, but 
so are people at the micro level” (J. N. Rosenau, 2008, 2). 
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With regard to U.S. policy toward North Korea, interbranch relations between 
Congress and the president during the Clinton and Bush administrations have become 
more important than before. This dissertation limits its time period to the Clinton and 
Bush administrations (1993-2008), because the North Korean nuclear crisis began in 
earnest in 1993 during the Clinton administration and North Korea ultimately conducted 
its first nuclear test in 2006 during the Bush administration. Moreover, these two 
administrations provided a nice paired comparison with every permutation of divided and 
unified party control. 
To understand why the Clinton administration and the Bush administration chose 
different policy options toward North Korea in spite of their common policy goals of the 
denuclearization of Pyongyang, it is instructive to consider Robert Putnam’s (1988) 
theory of two-level games. 
According to the two-level game model, it is wrong to ignore or underestimate the 
role of Congress in the foreign policy making process in the United States, because many 
foreign policy outcomes come as a result of the interaction between international factors 
and domestic factors and, among many other domestic factors, the interbranch 
relationship plays the most significant role. Robert Putnam (1988) suggests two-level 
games as a model for domestic-international interactions to make sense of the process 
and outcome of the international bargaining. Putnam (1988) notes that: 
 
At the national level, domestic groups pursue their interests by pressuring the 
government to adopt favorable policies, and politicians seek power by 
constructing coalitions among those groups. At the international level, national 
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governments seek to maximize their own ability to satisfy domestic pressures, 
while minimizing the adverse consequences of foreign developments. Neither of 
the two games can be ignored by central decision-makers, so long as their 
countries remain interdependent, yet sovereign (434). 
 
Many agree that in order to understand international negotiation, one should take 
in consideration both the international and intranational factors. Bruckman (1978) argued 
that a negotiator has dual responsiveness or boundary-role conflict (BRC) with 
bargaining and representation, described as two-track negotiating—i.e., negotiating 
simultaneously with the bureaucracy and with the other side. Negotiators as bargainers 
respond to their counterparts; negotiators as representatives respond to their own 
constituents. Whereas the former emphasizes international interactions, the latter focuses 
on intranational interactions. However, these two types of activities together constitute 
international negotiation. 
Smith (1998) also argued, “when forming foreign policies, leaders simultaneously 
balance these internal and external constraints. Hence, international events and domestic 
political survival are intrinsically linked, not through a simple unidirectional causal 
pathway, but via a serious of strategic interactions at both the international and the 
domestic level” (633). Moravcsik (1999) also held that the most distinctive feature of the 
two-level game model from other theories is the fact that “the statesman’s strategies 
reflect a simultaneous ‘double-edged,’ calculation of constraints and opportunities on 
both the domestic and international boards” (17). 
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In the two-level game model, the size of the win-sets, which are defined as “the 
set of all possible agreements that would win” (Putnam, 1988, 437), is crucial for an 
international negotiation to reach a mutual agreement.  To examine the size of the win-
sets, Putnam decomposed the negotiation process into two stages, Level I and Level II: 
bargaining between the negotiators and separate discussions within each group of 
constituents. To understand Level I negotiations, it is essential to recognize the 
implications of the Level II win-sets, the necessary majority among the constituents when 
simply voted up or down” (Putnam, 1988, 437). The size of the win-set depends on the 
distribution of power, preferences, and possible coalitions among Level II constituents, 
on the Level II political institutions or ratification procedures, and finally on the 
strategies of the Level I negotiators.14
For chief negotiators, there are two ways to help reach an agreement in 
international negotiations. One way is to expand the win-set range in Level I, because the 
more the win-sets overlap, the easier agreements can be reached. Another is to expand the 
domestic constituents’ win-sets in Level II, for agreements in Level I still need to be 
ratified or approved in Level II. In two-level bargaining, however, the chief negotiator 
will particularly be perceptive and careful with the domestic constituents’ constraints and 
demands.
 
15
                                                 
14 “Ratification” may entail a formal voting procedure at Level II, such as the constitutionally required two-
thirds vote of the U.S. Senate for ratifying treaties, in this dissertation, however, the term generally refers to 
any decision-process at Level II that is required to endorse or implement a Level I agreement, whether 
formally or informally (Putnam, 1988, 436). 
 
 In the case of the United States, presidents as chief negotiators cannot ignore 
15 Expectation effects are also remarkably significant in this sequential decomposition into a negotiation 
phase and a ratification phase, because there are likely to be prior consultations to hammer out an initial 
position for negotiations. In fact, the need for Level II ratifications seriously influences the Level I 
bargaining. Furthermore, expectations of rejection at Level II may abort negotiations at Level I even 
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or underestimate the pressures from Congress, both because that they also have to 
function as politicians to acquire, maintain, and strengthen their own political authorities, 
and because that the Congress is the most powerful domestic political organization 
mandated by American Constitution to share powers on foreign policy with the presidents. 
Putnam also argues that “the chief negotiator will normally give primacy to his 
domestic calculus, because his own incumbency often depends on his standing at Level II. 
Hence, he is more likely to present an international agreement for ratification, the less of 
his own political capital he expects to have to invest to win approval, and the greater the 
likely political returns from a ratified agreement” (Putnam, 1988, 457). In a similar vein, 
Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003) introduce a theory of political survival to examine policy 
outcomes of political leaders. They (2003) argue that: 
 
Every political leader faces the challenge of how to hold onto his or her job. The 
politics behind survival in office is, we believe, the essence of politics. The desire 
to survive motivates the selection of policies and the allocation of benefits; it 
shapes the selection of political institutions and the objectives of foreign policy; it 
influences the very evolution of political life. We take as axiomatic that everyone 
in a position of authority wants to keep that authority and that it is the 
maneuvering to do so that is central to politics in any type of regime (8-9). 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
without any formal action at Level II before the Level I negotiations. More often than not, the constituents’ 
views may themselves evolve in the course of the negotiations (Putnam, 1988, 436). 
32 
 
Regarding U.S. negotiations with North Korea on the nuclear issue, Washington 
had a very limited win-set at Level I, as a result of Pyongyang’s uncompromising 
attitudes that offered few or no concessions. Washington also failed to expand the win-
sets at Level II, not least because of its domestic partisan politics. As a result, “the United 
States has had a frequent mismatch between what was negotiable internationally and 
what could be suitably ratified domestically with respect to North Korea” (Morgan, 2007, 
29). 
 To understand why the negotiation with Pyongyang failed, therefore, it is 
imperative to examine the role the Congress had performed in the negotiation with the 
North, and the role the different types of government – the unified government and the 
divided government – had played in U.S. foreign policy making toward the North. In this 
regard, the two-level game model and the theory of political survival have significant 
implications, which will be delineated in more detail in the chapters IV and V. 
The government types during the Clinton and Bush administrations can be 
classified into four different stages: united government under the presidency of Clinton 
(1993-1994), divided government under the presidency of Clinton (1995-2000), united 
government under the presidency of Bush (2001-2006), and divided government under 
the presidency of Bush (2007-2008). Although this dissertation deals with all four stages, 
it focuses more on the period of the divided government under the Clinton presidency 
from 1995 through 2000 and the period of the unified government under the Bush 
presidency from 2001 through 2006, because it clearly represent how different 
government types resulted in different U.S. policies toward North Korea. 
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We must clarify the definition of ‘divided government,’ since there are two 
separate uses of the term. The first refers to “the absence of simultaneous same-party 
majorities in the executive and legislative branches of government” (Elgie, 2001, 2). In 
this sense, the concept is understood in an arithmetic sense, and especially valid for the 
United States with a two-party system. The second usage concerns a certain type of 
political behavior: “Divided government corresponds to the situation where there is 
conflict between the executive and legislative branches of government” (Elgie, 2001, 7). 
In this sense, divided government can occur even when there is unified government in an 
arithmetical sense. However, there are problems with adopting the behavioral 
interpretation of the term. Most notably, it makes the criteria for identifying the various 
periods of unified government and divided government far more subjective. Thus, the 
following discussion adopts the arithmetical definition of divided government as a 
situation where: “the executive fails to enjoy majority support in at least one working 
house of legislature” (Elgie, 2001, 11). 
 
Table 1 shows 4 differently categorized types of the U.S. government between 
1993 and 2008 according to the arithmetic definition of divided government. 
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Table 1. The Types of the U.S. Government, 1993-2008 
 
United Government Divided Government 
Democratic President/ 
Democratic Congress 
(1993-1994) 
Democratic President/ 
Republican Congress 
(1995-2000) 
Republican President/ 
Republican Congress 
(2001-2006) 
Republican President/ 
Democratic Congress 
(2007-2008) 
 
Note: The Senate of the 107th Congress (2001-2002) started with Republicans in control with 
Vice President Dick Cheney’s tie-breaking vote under the even split of 50 Republicans and 50 
Democrats. The defection of Senator James M. Jeffords (R-VT) turned the control of the Senate 
over to the Democrats with 50 Democrats, 49 Republicans, and one independent. As a result of 
the 2002 midterm elections, however, Republicans recaptured the Senate. 
 
The hypothesized relationship between government type and the United States’ 
North Korea policy during the Clinton and Bush administrations can now be stated more 
formally, as follows: 
 
Hypothesis #1: A divided U.S. government produces more status quo policies toward 
North Korea than a unified U.S. government. 
 
It is expected that because of partisan politics, a President in a divided 
government is hard-pressed to get strong support from Congress when taking more 
aggressive policies or more conciliatory policies. Conversely, in a unified government, 
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Congressional support is available for a more adventurous foreign policy, should the 
President embrace one. 
Partisan politics or partisanship, in this dissertation, is defined as political 
behavior of members of Congress “as motivated to protect or advance the collective 
interests of their party organizations” (Lee, 2009, 24). “It rests, fundamentally, on 
partisans’ widespread and willing cooperation in pursuit of collective goals and on the 
inherent zero-sum conflicts between the two parties’ political interests as they seek to win 
elections and wield political power” (Lee, 2009, 18). Political opposition stems not only 
from different individual ideologies, but also for collective party interests.16
                                                 
16 See Carl Schmitt (2007) for a philosophical discussion on the origins of partisan politics based on the 
“friend-enemy” distinction. 
 
 
Hypothesis #2: A unified U.S. government with a Democratic President produces more 
conciliatory policies toward North Korea, whereas a unified U.S. government with a 
Republican President produces more aggressive policies toward North Korea. 
 
 It is expected that because of partisan politics, a Democratic President in a 
unified government finds it easier to get strong support from Congress when advocating 
more conciliatory policies. This is also a matter of party ideology. And for the same 
reasons, a Republican President in a unified government will find it easier to get strong 
support from Congress when taking an aggressive stand. 
 
Thus, the main argument of this dissertation can be summarized as follows: 
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Different Government Types + Party Politics = Different Policy Choices (or Policy 
Inconsistency) 
 
Table 2 shows the relations between U.S. government types—divided government 
and unified government— and the hypothesized outcomes of United States’ North Korea 
policy during the Clinton administration (1993-2000) and the Bush administration (2001-
2008). 
 
Table 2. The Government Types and North Korea Policy Outcomes, 1993-2008 
 
          Government type 
Presidency 
United Divided 
Republican Aggressive Confrontation/ 
Deadlock 
Status Quo/ 
Passive Engagement 
Democratic Conciliatory Engagement/ 
Negotiated Settlement 
Status Quo/ 
Crisis Management 
 
Chapter III outlines the structural foundations and the historical trends of the 
rivalry and power struggle between the presidency and the Congress in U.S. foreign 
policy making. To make sense of the role and influence of the different government types 
on U.S. North Korea policy during the Clinton and Bush administrations, it is essential to 
study the interbranch power struggle in the area of American foreign policy both 
structurally and historically. This chapter consists of two sections. The first section of the 
Chapter III outlines the constitutional and institutional foundations of U.S. foreign policy. 
37 
 
The second section looks at a historical overview of divided government in the United 
States. This chapter will show that Congress constitutionally has a variety of means to 
exert influence on U.S. foreign policy. It will also show that divided government has 
historically had a great impact on U.S. foreign policy. 
Chapter IV examines the role of different types of the U.S. government in the 
United States’ North Korea policy making during the Clinton administration (1993-2000). 
It is comprised of two sections: the Clinton Administration under unified government 
(1993-1994) and the Clinton Administration under Divided Government (1995-2000). 
This chapter will show that Clinton’s North Korea policy changed from conciliation to 
status quo because of changes of different government types. While Clinton embraced a 
more appeasing policy toward Pyongyang under a unified government in 1993-1994, he 
adopted a status quo policy under a divided government in 1995-2000. 
Chapter V examines the role of different types of the U.S. government for North 
Korea policy making during the Bush administration (2001-2008). It is also comprised of 
two sections: the Bush administration under unified government (2001-2006), and the 
Bush Administration under divided government (2007-2008). This chapter will show that 
Bush’s North Korea policy changed from an  aggressive one to a status quo policy as the 
government type changed . Bush espoused a more hostile policy toward Pyongyang 
under a unified government in 2001-2006, while he accepted a status quo policy under a 
divided government in 2007-2008. 
Chapter VI concludes that the different government types during the Clinton and 
Bush administrations did make significant differences with regard to the U.S. policy 
choices and outcomes toward North Korea. It also concludes that a divided U.S. 
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government produced more status quo policies toward North Korea than a unified U.S. 
government. Finally, it argues that a unified U.S. government with a Republican 
President produced more aggressive policies toward North Korea, while a unified U.S. 
government with a Democratic President produced more conciliatory policies. 
 
2.3. Conclusion 
 
Institutional factors are crucial to make sense of U.S. foreign policy because they 
affect policy makers irrespective of social or individual factors. Different institutional 
settings respond differently to foreign affairs. In U.S. foreign policy, one of the most 
notable institutional settings is different government types, unified government and 
divided government. The power struggle between Congress and the presidency is most 
evident in  divided governments, and different government types produce different 
foreign policies. Partisan politics have dramatically increased since the Vietnam War and 
particularly since the end of the Cold War. This study seeks to contribute to the existing 
literature by providing a hard case study by confirming the consequential role of different 
government types and partisanship on U.S. North Korea policy. 
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III. FOREIGN POLICY AND AMERICAN POLITICS 
 
If you ask most Americans who makes foreign policy in the United States, they 
will answer it is the president. And to a point they are right. Foreign policy decisions are 
often made by a small number of individuals. Abraham Lincoln once told his cabinet, 
“Gentlemen, the vote is 11 to 1, and the 1 has it (as cited in Hermann, Preston, Korany, & 
Shaw, 2001, 84). Harry S. Truman even went so far as to say, “I make American foreign 
policy” (as cited in Wittkopf & McCormick, 2008, 277). Because presidential power on 
foreign policy looks preeminent, it is tempting to think of foreign policy as determined 
exclusively by president and his executive branch officials. But this is not the case. 
According to the U.S. Constitution, powers over foreign policy are shared between the 
presidency and the Congress.17
Henkin (1996), in his classic book, Foreign Affairs and the US Constitution, 
argued, “the foreign relations of the United States cannot be understood without that law 
[the US Constitution], for it continues to shape the institutions and the actions that 
determine those relations” (4). The American Constitution broadly defines the 
distribution of power in the government of the United States and provides the primary 
foundation for understanding legislative-executive interbranch relations in the making of 
 
 
3.1. The Constitutional and Institutional Foundation of U.S. Foreign Policy 
 
                                                 
17 On the role of the third major branch of government in the United States, the judiciary, in foreign affairs, 
see Henkin, 1996, 131-148. 
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foreign policy. While Article I of the Constitution enumerates the powers of the 
legislative branch (general legislative power in the Congress), Article II enumerates the 
powers of the president (the general executive power). Article I states that Congress shall 
“provide for the common Defense and general Welfare … regulate commerce with 
foreign nations … define and punish piracies and felonies … declare wars … and make 
rules … [and] provide for calling forth the militia to execute the laws of the Union, 
suppress insurrections, and repel invasions.” Furthermore, key diplomatic powers of the 
president are subject to the advice and consent of the Senate. Finally, Congress shall have 
the power “to make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into 
execution the foregoing powers, and all other powers vested by this Constitution in the 
government of the United States, or in any department or officer thereof (Rosati & Scott, 
2007, 307-08).”18
Article II states, on the other hand, that the president as “commander in chief of 
the army and navy of the United States, and of the militia of the several States … shall 
have power, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, to make treaties, provided 
two-thirds of the Senators present concur; and he shall nominate, and by and with the 
advice and consent of the Senate, shall appoint ambassadors, other public ministers and 
consuls.” The president also “shall receive ambassadors and other public ministers; he 
shall take care that the laws be faithfully executed, and shall commission all the officers 
 
                                                 
18 For more detailed explanations on congressional power on foreign affairs, see Henkin, 1996, 63-82. For a 
variety of formal or informal tools the Congress has used since the end of the Cold War, see Carter, 1998, 
110-116. 
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of the United States.” Finally, the president has the power to veto legislation (Rosati & 
Scott, 2007, 307).19
In sum, the Constitution distributes power between the legislative and executive 
branches and clearly delineates a balanced interbranch relationship between the president 
and the Congress in U.S. foreign policy making.
 
20 But many important foreign policy 
matters fall in “twilight zone,” where the president and Congress have concurrent 
authority or the distribution of power is uncertain. The two branches are, to quote 
Neustadt (1990), “separated institutions sharing power” (29). The form of their 
partnership, the balance of institutional interests and prerogatives, therefore, is still 
subject to constant competition and negotiation in the practice of U.S. foreign policy 
making (Mann, 1990, 5-6), especially when democracy requires a strong Congress, while 
security requires a strong President (Nogee, 1981, 199).21
Neustadt, Rosati & Scott (2007) also argue that it is a mistake to “understand the 
distribution of power between Congress and the president as a ‘separation of powers,’ for 
the Constitution did not create separate institutions with separate powers but separate 
 
                                                 
19 For more detailed explanations on presidential power on foreign affairs, see Henkin, 1996, 31-62. 
 
20 Even if the conventional wisdom sees the president and the executive branch as a dominant actor in the 
making of U.S. foreign policy, the question of which branch the framers of the Constitution really wanted 
to be more preeminent in foreign policy is still subject to discuss. While, for example, Louis Fischer (2007: 
8) maintains that “at the national level, [the framers of the American Constitution] vested greater powers in 
an executive… the inefficiency of the Continental Congress convinced the framers of the need for a 
separate and independent executive, Mann (1990) claims that “the Constitution favors Congress, the first 
branch of government” (4). Koh (1990) holds that the Constitution “expressly divided foreign affairs 
powers among the three branches of government, with Congress, not the president, being granted the 
dominant role (emphasis original, 75),” and Rosati & Scott (2007) argue that “the founders intended and 
expected that the legislature be the preeminent branch in the government” (308). Morgenthau (1993), 
meanwhile, argues that “the American government is the outstanding modern example of a governmental 
system whose stability is maintained by an equilibrium among its component parts” (186). 
 
21 For more detailed explanations on concurrent authority between the president and the Congress, see 
Henkin, 1996, 83-130. For presidential power on foreign affairs after the Cold War, see Rosati & Twing, 
1998, 29-56. 
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institutions sharing power – which is what is meant by ‘checks and balances.’”22
While the Constitution delineates a number of important powers for the 
legislature, the way Congress influences foreign policy is more complex than the roles 
enumerated in the document. In fact, members of Congress have a wide variety of options 
to exert an influence on foreign policy. We should distinguish between two dimensions of 
power, giving rise to four congressional avenues of influence. First, Congressional power 
can be either legislative or non-legislative. Legislative actions involve formal 
congressional activities such as passing laws, approving treaties, and authorizing and 
appropriating funds, while non-legislative actions include congressional activities not 
 They 
state:  
 
While the Congress provides military funding and declares war, the president is 
the commander in chief. Congress may pass bills, but the president may veto them, 
and Congress may then override the veto. The president is able to make treaties 
and appointments, but the Senate must provide its advice and consent. As students 
of the Constitution such as Edwin Corwin have indicated, the result was an 
invitation to struggle, which has fostered recurring conflicts between Congress 
and the president in the making of foreign policy throughout American history 
(308). 
 
                                                 
22 Fisher (2007), however, argues, “The separation doctrine … still retains vitality” (13). For more details 
on the question of “separation of power” vs. “sharing of power”, see Fisher, 2007, 1-20. 
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related to specific legislative documents.23
Path 
 Second, there are both direct and indirect 
powers as well. Members of Congress may take direct action targeting specific foreign 
policy issues, or they may take indirect action, taking aim at the broader context, process, 
or policy climate to signal preferences or condition policy (Rosati & Scott, 2007, 311-12). 
 
Table 3 presents diverse congressional paths to exert an influence on foreign 
policy. 
 
Table 3. Congressional Paths to Foreign Policy Influence 
 
Direct Indirect 
 
 
Legislative 
(1) 
Issue-Specific Legislation 
Treaties (Senate) 
War Power 
Appropriations 
Foreign Commerce 
(3) 
Non-Binding Legislation 
Appointments (Senate) 
Procedural Legislation 
 
 
Non-Legislative 
(2) 
Informal Advice/Letters 
Consultations 
Oversight/Hearings 
Use of Courts 
(4) 
Framing Opinion 
Foreign Contacts 
 
SOURCE: Adapted from J. M. Scott, “In the loop: Congressional Influence in American Foreign 
Policy.” Journal of Political and Military Sociology, 25 (Summer 1997): 61. 
 
The first cell in table 3 includes the most obvious powers available to members of 
Congress: direct-legislative paths. These paths include powers to declare war, to pass 
                                                 
23 See also Burgin, 1997, 296-302. 
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substantive legislation, to appropriate funds, and to regulate international commerce. The 
Senate also has the power to approve treaties. The second cell shows direct-non-
legislative paths available for members of Congress to affect policy through consultations 
and various communications with the president and other administration officials by 
holding hearings, issuing reports on specific issues, and even bringing lawsuits against 
the president or administration. The third cell shows indirect-legislative paths: the use of 
formal legislative powers that are not targeted at particular issues, but rather signal 
preferences or condition the policy process or environment by appointing administration 
personnel, creating institutions of foreign policy (like the creation of the Department of 
Homeland Security), establishing policymaking procedures and reporting requirements, 
and taking other actions that affect the participants and processes of decision. The last 
cell presents indirect-non-legislative paths that are neither legislative nor issue-specific. 
In these approaches, members of Congress typically reach outside of the government to 
attempt to “change the climate of opinion surrounding the policy,” by relying on public 
activities and events for the media exposure or by having direct meetings with foreign 
officials. Through these various paths, members of Congress shape foreign policy in a 
number of ways (Rosati & Scott, 2007, 311-13). 
To understand congressional activity, influence, and legislative-executive 
relations in U.S. foreign policy, however, it is also crucial to examine four general areas 
in more detail: (1) the war powers, (2) advice and consent, (3) the power to appropriate 
funds and to make laws, and (4) the power of oversight and investigation. The war 
powers have been the most important factor for the growth of presidential power. 
Although Congress has the constitutional authority to declare war, it has done so just five 
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times in American history, while presidents have committed military forces abroad in 
over two hundred instances. The president’s war power has grown remarkably over time, 
particularly during times of conflict (Rosati & Scott, 2007, 328). 
From 1789 to 1950, all major military activities by the United States were decided 
by Congress, either by a formal declaration of war or by a statute authorizing the 
president to use military force. Since then, however, the situation has changed 
dramatically. Presidents over the past half century have increasingly acted in a unilateral 
way when using military force against other countries without any approval or consent 
from Congress. Instead of seeking congressional authority, presidents justify military 
actions either on the commander in chief or based on decisions by the UN Security 
Council and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (Fisher, 2008, 169). 
There have been substantial efforts from Congress to redress the historical growth 
of presidential war power, one of which is The War Powers Act (WPA). The WPA 
represented a major symbolic effort aiming at congressional restoration and reassertion 
on the issue of use of force abroad, but it has not fundamentally limited the presidential 
war power. Since 1973, despite the WPA, the president has continued to use U.S. forces 
abroad in numerous situations, not least because members of Congress have still been 
extremely cautious in challenging presidential war power (Rosati & Scott, 2007, 328-31). 
Louis Fisher (2008) argues that this concession by Congress on presidential war power 
does not only “weaken Congress and the power of the purse”, it also “undermines public 
control, the system of checks and balances, and constitutional government” (183). 
The Senate has the constitutional authority to advise the president on and consent 
to his appointments and treaties, and this gives members of Congress opportunities to 
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shape foreign policy by exerting influences over personnel. In deference to presidential 
leadership, international agreements and commitments are usually ratified or approved 
with bipartisan support. Treaties have been “routinely passed by overwhelming majorities” 
(Meernik, 1993, 579). Between the end of World War I and the end of the Cold War, the 
Senate only rejected three treaties (Wittkopf, Kegley, & Scott, 2003, 412). 
Among international agreements made since World War II, furthermore, most 
were executive agreements – not requiring Senatorial advice and consent. By the end of 
the century, more than 90 percent of the international agreements of the United States 
were in the form of executive agreements. In response, Congress has used four methods 
in an effort to restore and reassert its advice-and-consent authority in the agreement-
making process: laws forcing the president to provide it with basic information when 
agreements are signed, laws forcing the president to submit executive agreements to the 
Senate as treaties, the power of the purse withholding funds necessary to implement 
executive agreements, and the power to approve or disapprove executive agreements24
Although Congress has not been very effective either in wielding its war power or 
in exercising its advise-and-consent authority, its budgetary and legislative powers have 
been a strength of members of Congress in the foreign policy making process. 
Congressional budgetary power or spending power provides regular opportunities for 
influence, since presidents cannot do what is not funded. A good illustration of this fiscal 
power is foreign assistance. A good example is the decision of Congress to end all U.S. 
 
(Rosati & Scott, 2007, 331-335). 
                                                 
24 The power to approve or disapprove executive agreements has had limited success because of the 
likelihood that such requirements are unconstitutional (Rosati & Scott, 2007, 334). 
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military assistance to South Vietnam and Cambodia in February 1975, which accelerated 
the end of the Vietnam War in April of that year (Rosati & Scott, 2007, 335-336).25
 
 
Congressional legislative or law-making power provides big opportunities for authority, 
since Congress can directly make laws which it thinks are necessary to engage in foreign 
policy issues. The War Powers Act in 1973 is a good example of law-making power of 
Congress (Rosati & Scott, 2007, 335-337). 
Finally, Congress also has the power to oversee and investigate foreign affairs. 
With respect to legislative oversight in foreign policy, three main approaches can be 
identified: (1) regular oversight, (2) event-driven oversight, and (3) crisis-driven 
oversight. Together, these may result in proactive supervision of the executive branch or 
in a more reactive crisis-driven approach. Two additional characteristics of oversight are 
also noteworthy: (1) reporting requirements and (2) special commissions to conduct 
investigations. Reporting requirements are a congressional instrument that promotes 
oversight. Such requirements are a very effective way to extract information from the 
executive branch, because they obtain information through both regular reports and 
special reports. So-called “blue-ribbon” commissions, generally drawn from key experts 
and former policy-makers from both political parties can be another efficient way to 
oversee and investigate the foreign policy issues conducted by the president and the 
executive branch. A good illustration of congressional oversight and investigation powers 
was the Iran-Contra hearings and subsequent report by a joint congressional committee 
(Rosati & Scott, 2007, 337-341). 
                                                 
25 For more examples of congressional fiscal power, see Rosati & Scott, 2007, 336. 
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3.2. A Historical Overview of Divided Government 
 
Because foreign policy is made and implemented by “the actions officials take on 
behalf of the nation,” government structures considerably influence the “conduct and 
content of foreign affairs” (Wittkopf & McCormick, 2008 141). In U.S. politics, one of 
the most influential government structures that affect foreign affairs is divided 
government. Divided government in U.S. politics has occurred about two-thirds of the 
time since 1945. Now they seem to be the norm rather than the exception. But divided 
governments are nothing new in American history. There were many instances of divided 
governments throughout the history, and they can be traced back to as early as 1820s. 
One of the most obvious characteristics of interbranch relations between the Presidency 
and the Congress has been the cyclical pattern of power over U.S. domestic and foreign 
policy. Throughout American history, the pendulum of power has fluctuated, swinging 
back and forth between Congress and the president (Hamilton, 2006). To understand how 
divided governments have practically affected U.S. foreign policy, it is necessary to 
examine the historical pattern between the presidency and the Congress on foreign policy 
and the history of divided government. 
 
The Historical Pattern between the Presidency and the Congress on Foreign Policy 
 
Thurber (2006) traces the causes of the historical pendulum swing between the 
president and Congress to the structural setting of American politics (7-20). According to 
Thurber (2006), the root causes of the cyclical pendulum swing or permanent rivalry 
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between the president and Congress lie in “the constitutional design with its formal 
presidential and congressional powers; different electoral constituencies for the president, 
the House, and the Senate; varying terms of office; increased partisanship and 
polarization of Congress; the ongoing competition for power between Congress and the 
president; the permanent election campaign; narrow majorities in both houses; 
congressional individualism, the impact of the media in the twenty-four-hour, seven-
days-a-week news cycle; and the nature of interest groups and American pluralism” (7). 
Therefore, “intense rivalry between the president and Congress is inevitable in an 
electoral system that can produce divided party control of the two branches (emphasis 
added, 21). 
Lindsay (2008), on the other hand, attributes interbranch rivalry to political 
environments rather than the structure of U.S. politics. According to him, the reason for 
these ebbs and flows does not lie in the Constitution, but in politics. Perceptions of threat 
and presidential success in foreign policy have been the two most important factors 
affecting Congressional behavior. When Americans feel secure, Congress becomes 
aggressive. In comparison, when Americans feel threatened, Congress becomes 
deferential. When presidential policies are seen to be successful, presidents can push 
Congress to the sidelines, while struggling presidents are severely challenged by 
Congress. In sum, in times of national emergency, crisis, or war, power tends to flow 
toward the president, while in times of peace, power tends to flow back to Congress. Put 
another way, while times of crisis favor congressional acquiescence and deference, times 
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of peace favor congressional activism and assertiveness (200).26
In the second half of the nineteenth century, the United States was as secure from 
outside threat at any time in American history. This was a time of congressional 
domination in its foreign policy issue areas, so that it has been called the era of 
 Rosati & Scott (2007) 
also state: 
 
With the end of war and national emergency, the conditions that gave rise to the 
expansion of presidential power disappear. Periods of normalcy or relative 
stability result in congressional reassertion of power. Hence, the president 
experiences greater constraints on his ability to exercise power in foreign policy. 
Such cutbacks occurred after all of the major wars, but most noticeably following 
World War I, when the Senate rejected the Treaty of Versailles and the League of 
Nations. Also, during the interwar years, Congress passed legislation that 
increasingly affected the conduct of U.S. foreign policy and constrained 
presidential power, culminating in the neutrality legislation that tied the hands of 
President Franklin Roosevelt as World War II approached (313). 
 
                                                 
26 Rosati & Scott (2007) acknowledge that “the distribution of foreign policymaking power between 
Congress and the president has fluctuated, sometimes dramatically, with changes in the political 
environment” (313), but they have a different view than Lindsay on the accumulation of presidential power 
in foreign policy. While Lindsay emphasize a kind of pendulum (or cyclical) effect, Rosati & Scott (2007) 
argue, “Yet the increase in presidential power during periods of conflict tend to be so extensive that the 
balance seldom returns to prewar levels, so presidents have accumulated greater power overtime” (313)….  
“Thus, times of war and national emergency are likely to be times of presidential preeminence, while times 
of peace are likely to result not in congressional ascendance but in political struggles between the 
legislative and executive branches over foreign policy” (emphasis original, 314). Rosati & Twing (1998) 
also claim that “while Congress tends to reassert its constitutional authority and power following war, 
increases in presidential power during periods of conflict tend to be so extensive that it seldom returns to 
prewar levels. Thus, the cyclical ebb and flow in executive-legislative relations in foreign policy has 
enabled a president to accumulate greater power over time” (31). 
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“congressional government,” “congressional supremacy,” “government-by-Congress,” 
and “senatorial domination” (Lindsay, 1994, 15). Between 1871 and 1898, the Senate did 
not approve major treaty, with the partisan votes. In the presence of U.S. victory in the 
Spanish-American War, “the soon-to-be secretary of state John Hay wrote that he ‘did 
not believe another important treaty would ever pass the Senate’ and that ‘the man who 
makes the Treaty of Peace with Spain will be lucky if he escapes a lynching’” (as cited in 
Lindsay, 2003, 15). 
When the United States engaged in World War I, the pendulum of power began to 
shift to the president. Woodrow Wilson was not challenged by Congress many times 
during his presidency. But once the war ended, Congress challenged and fought the 
president, reasserting itself in U.S. foreign policy decision making. A good example is 
the rejections of the League of Nations by Congress. Congressional activism persisted 
and even intensified into the 1930s. Franklin Roosevelt suffered attacks from an 
aggressive Congress before Japan’s bombing of Pearl Harbor. World War II saved him 
from the assertive congressional challenge, and Roosevelt expanded his power on foreign 
policy (Lindsay, 2008, 203). 
Growing concerns about the threat of the Soviet Union and the expansion of 
communist countries after World War II forced the Congress to be deferential to strong 
presidential leadership. This congressional deference finally led to what Arthur 
Schlesinger called the “imperial presidency” in the 1960s (Schlesinger, 1973). Yet the era 
of “imperial presidency,” the domination of presidential leadership on foreign policy, 
again gave way to congressional reassertion with the Vietnam War. With the public more 
willing to question administration foreign policy, and convinced that the Vietnam War 
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and communist revolutions in the Third World posed no direct threat to core U.S. security 
interests, members of Congress were free to reassert control. In the 1970s and 1980s, 
“presidents Carter and Reagan did not get the acquiescence from Capitol Hill that 
Presidents Eisenhower and Kennedy did” (Lindsay, 2008, 204). 
The end of the Cold War accelerated and exacerbated the congressional activism 
and assertiveness that Vietnam triggered. The collapse of the Soviet Union dramatically 
reduced the perception of threat of communism. According to Scott & Crothers (1998), 
the post-Cold War era has had the following consequences for U.S. foreign policy 
making:  
 
1. The ambiguity in the threat-interest-cost equation intensifies the tendency in the 
American public toward ambivalence (or reluctance) concerning international 
involvement. 
2. Expanding globalization, interdependence, and transnationalism have raised the 
stakes for domestic interests, making foreign policy making more like domestic 
policy making – subject to conflict, bargaining, and persuasion among competing 
groups within and outside the government – in part due to the increasingly 
important link between domestic interests and international events, which has 
given risen to the expansion of “intermestic” issues. 
3. Agenda change (from traditional security to economic and others) has 
expanded the elements of the bureaucracy with foreign policy concerns 
(especially the “economic complex”) and increased the scope of the intermestic 
arena (thereby promoting more activity by Congress and nongovernmental actors), 
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making both White House management (of the bureaucracy) and leadership (of 
policy) more difficult. 
4. The lack of consensus makes policy leadership by any element of the U.S. 
government more difficult, and encourages elements of many parts of the 
government to press for their policy preferences (emphasis original, 19). 
 
Since the end of the Cold War, as a result, congressional aggressiveness increased, 
while its deference decreased just as in the post-Vietnam period. In addition, the increase 
in intermestic issues and the decline in public consensus on foreign policy issues have 
offered “greater incentive and opportunity for members of Congress to be less deferential 
and more assertive in the post-Cold War era” and “led to greater congressional challenges 
to presidential leadership on a variety of issues” (Rosati & Scott, 2007, 325). Clinton had 
to witness his four major international agreements—the comprehensive test ban, land 
mines, global warming, and international criminal court agreements—to become victims 
of congressional assertiveness and ideological partisanship (Rosati &Scott, 2007, 326). 
After the September 11 terrorist attacks, however, foreign policy again became a 
top priority with the public. The impact of September 11 on American public opinion was 
dramatic as the public started to feel less secure and more threatened by events outside 
America’s borders. Bush’s public approval ratings soared to 90 percent. Congress also 
immediately rallied behind presidential leadership in the name of state emergency and 
national security. Three days after the terrorist attack, Congress granted the president 
open-ended authority to retaliate against those who are responsible for it. The pendulum 
of power between the president and the Congress again swung back toward White House. 
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In 2002, furthermore, Congress voted to authorize President Bush to wage war in Iraq. 
The resolution also meant authorizing a war against any country even before the United 
States had been attacked, in the name of preemptive action, which President Bush 
publicly announced in the 2002 National Security Strategy of the United States of 
America (Lindsay, 2008, 206-208). 
 
History of Divided Government 
 
Divided government has occurred about two-thirds of the time since 1945—just 
over six out of every ten years. Before the 1990s, Republican presidents faced a 
Democratic Congress. Republican presidents won five of six elections from 1968 to 1988, 
while the Democrats had permanent control of the Congress with majorities in one or 
both houses from 1955 to 1995. From 1995 to 2001, however, a Democratic president 
faced a Republican Congress (LeLoup & Shull, 2003, 8; Conley, 2003, 3). Table 4 shows 
the cases of divided government since 1825. 
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Table 4. Divided Government since 1825 
 
President Party Congress House Control Senate Control 
Adams 
Jackson 
Tyler 
Polk 
Taylor 
Fillmore 
Pierce 
Buchanan 
Grant 
Hayes 
Hayes 
Arthur 
Cleveland 
Cleveland 
Harrison 
Cleveland 
Taft 
Wilson 
Hoover 
Truman 
Eisenhower 
Eisenhower 
Eisenhower 
Nixon 
Nixon 
Nixon 
Ford 
Ford 
Reagan 
Reagan 
Reagan 
Reagan 
Bush 
Bush 
Clinton 
Clinton 
Clinton 
Bush 
Bush 
NR* 
D 
NP** 
D 
W 
W 
D 
D 
R 
R 
R 
R 
D 
D 
R 
D 
R 
D 
R 
D 
R 
R 
R 
R 
R 
R 
R 
R 
R 
R 
R 
R 
R 
R 
D 
D 
D 
R 
R 
20th (1827-1829) 
23rd (1833-1835) 
28th (1843-1845) 
30th (1847-1849) 
31st (1849-1851) 
32nd (1851-1853) 
34th (1855-1857) 
36th (1859-1861) 
44th (1875-1877) 
45th (1877-1879) 
46th (1879-1881) 
48th (1883-1885) 
49th (1885-1887) 
50th (1887-1889) 
52nd (1891-1893) 
54th (1895-1897) 
62nd (1911-1913) 
66th (1919-1921) 
72nd (1931-1933) 
80th (1947-1949) 
84th (1955-1957) 
85th (1957-1959) 
86th (1959-1961) 
91st (1969-1971) 
92nd (1971-1973) 
93rd (1973-1974) 
93rd (1974-1975) 
94th (1975-1977) 
97th (1981-1983) 
98th (1983-1985) 
99th (1985-1987) 
100th (1987-1989) 
101st (1989-1991) 
102nd (1991-1993) 
104th (1995-1997) 
105th (1997-1999) 
106th (1999-2001) 
107th (2001-2003) 
109th (2005-2007) 
Jackson 
D 
D 
W 
D 
D 
R 
R 
D 
D 
D 
D 
D 
D 
D 
R 
D 
R 
D 
R 
D 
D 
D 
D 
D 
D 
D 
D 
D 
D 
D 
D 
D 
D 
R 
R 
R 
R 
D 
Jackson 
Opposition 
W 
D 
D 
D 
D 
D 
R 
D 
D 
R 
R 
R 
R 
R 
R 
R 
R 
R 
D 
D 
D 
D 
D 
D 
D 
D 
R 
R 
R 
D 
D 
D 
R 
R 
R 
D*** 
D 
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Note: This table shows history of divided government since 1825, because a comprehensive 
national two-party system developed in the mid-1820s. Legend: D = Democrat, NP = No Party 
Affiliation, NR = National Republican Party, R = Republican, W = Whig 
 
*President Tyler was a former Democrat who ran for Vice President on Whig ticket. He was 
expelled in 1841 by the Whig party after clashing with Whig congressional leaders. 
**Although the Senate was tied 50-50 after the 2000 election, when Senator James Jeffords of 
Vermont left the Republican party in June, 2001, the Senate came under Democratic control. 
 
SOURCE: Adapted from J. H. Silbey. (1996) “Divided Government in Historical Perspective, 
1789-1996.” In P. F. Galderisi, R. Q. Herzberg, & P. McNamara, eds. Divided Government: 
Change, Uncertainty, and the Constitutional Order. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield: 12, and L. T. 
LeLoup & S. A. Shull. (2003) The President and Congress: Collaboration and Combat in 
National Policymaking, second edition. New York: Longman: 9. Figures on 109th Congress 
supplied by author. 
 
Divided government becomes more common after 1945 and endemic since the 
1968 election. While divided government prevailed only 14 percent of the time (for six 
years) from 1901 to 1944, it prevailed 33 percent of the time (for eight years) from 1945 
to 1968. From 1969 to 2002, divided government increased to almost 75 percent of the 
time – for twenty-eight years of the past thirty-eight years (Rosati & Scott, 2007, 342).27
Divided government, of course, is nothing new in American history. In fact, there 
were many instances of divided governments throughout American history since its very 
 
                                                 
27 For detailed party control of the presidency and congress in the twentieth century from 1901 to 2007, see 
the table 11. 3 in Rosati & Scott, 2007, 343. 
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inception. Young & Riley (1990) argued that “even during the one-party “Era of Good 
Feeling,” when presidential candidates were nominated by the congressional caucus, 
government was effectively divided” (as cited in Fiorina, 1996a, 6). Some instances of 
divided government occurred when both houses of Congress were in the hands of a party 
other than the one that controlled the presidency, while others meant only that the 
presidency and one house were in different partisan hands. Some happened at the outset 
of a presidential administration, while others resulted from midterm elections to Congress. 
In the nineteenth century, however, divided governments were mostly created by 
midterm elections. Of the sixteen instances, for example, only three occurred in the first 
years of an administration, while the others occurred in the latter half of a president’s 
term (Silbey, 1996, 10-13). 
For analytic purposes, drawing on the work of Silbey (1996) and DeLaet & Scott 
(2006), we can categorize the whole American political history into four phases in terms 
of divided government. The fourth phase can further be divided into three periods. Table 
5 presents the four phases of divided government in American political history. 
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Table 5. Phases of Divided Government in American History 
 
Phase Presidency Year 
I 
The Primitive Phase 
Jackson – Tyler  1827-1849 
II 
The Party Phase 
Polk – the second Cleveland 1849-1897 
III 
The Progressive Phase 
Taft – Hoover 1911-1933 
 
IV 
The 
Modern 
Phase 
I 
Cold War 
Truman – Eisenhower  1947-1961 
II 
Post-Vietnam 
Nixon – Reagan 1969-1989 
III 
Post-Cold War 
Bush Sr. – Bush Jr. 1989-2009 
 
 
Silbey (1996) separated the premodern eras of divided government—from 1827 to 
1949—into three phases. Phase I (1827-1845) includes the cases of Adams, Jackson, and 
Tyler, where “the primitive and undeveloped state of the political parties resulted in a 
great deal of disarray on the political landscape” (14). Phase I was characterized by “an 
intense policy deadlock… and… the kind of image of divided government that has been 
presented in much of the scholarly literature” (16). Phase II (1847-1897) comprises the 
eleven cases in the rest of the nineteenth century, from Polk to the second Cleveland 
administration. The second phase shows “the power of the partisan structure that had 
emerged to dominate American politics. It was characterized by the full formation and 
acceptance of national political parties with quite marked policy differences between 
them. The idea of legitimate opposition, compromise, and the working out of matters 
through negotiation all became accepted political norms” (17). Each Phase II 
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administration entailed “a familiar variety of experiences associated with divided 
government: much conflict between Congress and the president over policy matters and 
personnel, the failure of legislative initiatives, and, in most cases, the ultimate wearing 
down of an already tired administration in the latter half of its life course. Each contained, 
as well, a range of situations unique to its particular moment in time. Finally, in each case, 
the party holding the presidency lost the next election” (17). 
Divided government was a constant reality in America even before pre-Civil War 
era, and became more commonplace after the Civil War. No president between 1875 and 
1895 enjoyed having his own party in control of both houses of Congress for his full term 
in office (Silbey, 1996, 19). The Phase II cases, therefore, were contextually different 
from those of both earlier and later eras, in the sense that “the whole period was 
dominated by political players who had strong and quite polarized policy views but who, 
unlike those in Phase I, acknowledged and accommodated their differences” (Silbey, 
1996, 21). 
Phase III (1911-1933) includes the final three cases in the premodern period of 
the American political experience, Taft, Wilson, and Hoover, and is distinguished from 
Phase II in a number of important ways. According to Silbey (1996): 
 
In Phase III, the first half of the twentieth century, political parties were 
beginning… to lose their command of the nations’ political process… but they 
still retained much of their sting. This changing partisan condition was coupled 
with the great expansion of the functions and powers of the federal government, 
and of the potential for sharp policy differences, that we associate with 
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Progressivism and the New Deal. The authority of the president expanded as the 
issues of industrialization and economic adjustment moved beyond the capacity of 
existing institutions… In Phase III, elections were much less competitive than 
they had been earlier. One or the other major party dominated the races in 
successive blocs of years. All of these factors made the possibility of divided 
government much rarer than it had been in Phase II. In fact, in Phase III, divided 
government did become much less common than it had ever been on the 
American scene and, therefore, more noticeable when it did occur (21). 
 
From the 1820s to the 1890s, divided government was something more persistent 
than any other periods in its existence in American political history. It is important, 
however, to note that “the incidents of divided government… vary significantly in their 
nature and situation. They occurred on different political terrains with different defining 
and shaping elements at play in each phase” (Silbey, 1996, 23). In fact, the more we 
consider the whole of American history, the clearer it becomes that much about the 
current situation of divided government is mislabeled just because “divided government 
has been, essentially, a time-bound phenomenon, limited in reach and applicability, and 
not a particularly appropriate description of the situation we have in our own time” 
(Silbey, 1996, 24). 
Phase IV includes three distinct periods with varying patterns of congressional 
foreign policy behavior: a Cold War period, a post-Vietnam period, and a post-Cold War 
period. For much of the early post-World War II period, Congress was more deferential 
to presidential leadership on a variety of foreign policy issues, and presidential leadership 
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became more salient. After examining the voting records of Republicans and Democrats 
in Congress from 1945 to 1948, Dahl (1950) concluded that “the record of bipartisan 
proposals between 1945 and 1948 is an excellent one” (228). Holsti & Rosenau (1984) 
and Destler, Gelb, & Lake (1984) also argued that for the two decades following World 
War II, bipartisan consensus on a wide range of foreign policy issues did indeed exist. 
Finally, in his classic article “The Two Presidencies,” Wildavsky (1966) argued: 
 
The United States has one president, but it has two presidencies; one presidency is 
for domestic affairs, and the other is concerned with defense and foreign policy. 
Since World War II, presidents have had much greater success in controlling the 
nation’s defense and foreign policies than in dominating its domestic policies… 
The president’s normal problem with domestic policy is to get congressional 
support for the programs he prefers. In foreign affairs, in contrast, he can almost 
always get support for policies that he believes will protect the nation (reprinted 
in Shull, 1991, 11). 
 
During the pre-Vietnam Cold War period, members of Congress “were presumed 
to set aside political concerns and address foreign policy issues in a more bipartisan 
fashion than domestic policy” (DeLaet & Scott, 2006, 180). Since the Vietnam War, 
however, presidential leadership “has come under increasing scrutiny and members of 
Congress have become more assertive,” as “the Cold War consensus unraveled and 
dissatisfaction with Cold War policies increased” (DeLaet & Scott, 2006, 181). Members 
of Congress no longer trusted presidential leadership in foreign affairs after the disastrous 
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policy failure in Vietnam. Deeping globalization and its consequential increase of 
intermestic issues also played an important role in the revival of congressional activism 
and assertiveness. Finally, members of Congress acquired greater resources for dealing 
with foreign affairs, including increased staff (DeLaet & Scott, 1996, 181). 
Wildavsky’s two-presidencies thesis, therefore, turned out not to be valid after the 
Vietnam War period. The thesis was reconsidered, restricted, or even rejected later by 
many studies including one by Wildavsky himself. A significant body of research 
examining the gap between domestic and foreign success of presidencies shows that there 
has been a decline in the gap since 1970s, particularly presented by “a breakdown of the 
bipartisan consensus after Vietnam and Watergate, reforms in Congress that expanded 
information sources available to members and reduced the president’s informational 
advantage, and reforms in Congress that altered the types of issues that get to the floor for 
a vote” (Fleisher et al, 2000, 6). Destler, Gelb, & Lake (1984) and Brzezinski (1984) also 
pointed out the demise of bipartisanship since the Vietnam War. Wildavsky himself, in a 
study with Duane M. Oldfield, noted that “various studies cast serious doubt on the 
conclusions of “the two presidencies” outside of the period in which the thesis was 
proposed. Only Dwight Eisenhower was clearly more successful in foreign policy… If 
we look at key foreign policy votes from the Eisenhower through the Carter 
administrations, we find that a majority of the opposition party supported only 
Eisenhower more than half the time…” Therefore, “the two presidencies” is time and 
culture bound (Oldfield & Wildavsky, 1991, 182-83). 
In the meantime, numerous studies have found changes in congressional foreign 
policy behavior after the end of the Cold War. While congressional challenges to 
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presidential leadership on foreign policy have dramatically increased, bipartisan support 
for presidential leadership has considerably decreased. In the post Cold-War period, 
intermestic issues and increasing constituency pressures have led to all these changes 
from congressional acquiescence and deference to legislative activism and assertiveness. 
In addition, the risk of challenging presidential leadership diminished, both because of 
more benign international environment and because of a decline in public interest in 
foreign affairs issues after the end of the Cold War (DeLaet & Scott, 2006, 181-182). 
Admittedly, the September 11 terrorist attacks considerably reversed this 
extensive trend of congressional activism and assertiveness since Vietnam. The 
preeminent presidency was revived.28
This chapter examined the structural foundations and the historical trends of the 
interbranch relationship between the presidency and Congress in order to see how 
 However, “how far such congressional deference 
extended beyond national security issues after 9/11 is another matter. Congress was 
willing to challenge President Bush on other issues like trade policy, and it made 
restrictions on civil liberties in the USA Patriot Act temporary, not permanent… 
Moreover, increasing congressional assertiveness after 2003 strongly suggests that 
legislative deference was a temporary response, soon replaced by the more 
confrontational pattern of the previous three decades” (Carter & Scott, 2010, Web). 
 
3.3. Conclusion 
 
                                                 
28 For criticisms on congressional acquiescence and deference to the presidency, see Wolfensberger, 2002; 
Ornstein & Mann, 2006; Ohaegbulam, 2007; Fisher, 2008; Hansen & Friedman, 2009. 
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Congress legally influences U.S. foreign policy and how the different government types 
have traditionally affected U.S. foreign policy. Constitutionally, Congress has a variety of 
means to exert influence on U.S. foreign policy. For this reason, in part, divided 
government has historically had a great impact on U.S. foreign policy. 
The U.S. Constitution distributes power between the legislative and executive 
branches and stipulates a balanced relationship between the president and Congress in 
U.S. foreign policy making. Still, many important foreign policy matters fall in a 
“twilight zone,” and the result is “an invitation to struggle.” Divided government makes 
this problem more complicated. Furthermore, divided government in U.S. politics has 
occurred about two-thirds of the time since 1945. It has become so common that it seems 
to be the norm rather than the exception. Divided governments, however, are nothing new 
in American history. There were many instances of divided governments throughout the 
history and these divided governments have always had a great impact on U.S. foreign 
policy. Nevertheless, one of the most obvious characteristics of interbranch relations in 
the United States has been the cyclical pattern of power. The pendulum of power has 
fluctuated throughout the American history. 
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IV. THE PRESIDENCY, THE CONGRESS, AND U.S. POLICY TOWARD NORTH 
KOREA DURING THE CLINTON ADMINISTRATION 
 
President William J. Clinton was in office in 1993-2000. In 1993-4, President 
Clinton embraced a more conciliatory policy toward North Korea under a unified 
government and tried to solve the North Korea nuclear problem by negotiation, notably 
through the 1994 Geneva Agreed Framework with Pyongyang. In 1995-2000, however, 
President Clinton adopted a status quo policy toward North Korea under a divided 
government, failing to take further steps to improve U.S.-North Korean relations and to 
conclude the denuclearization of North Korea. To understand why President Clinton took 
up two different policy approaches toward North Korea, this chapter examines the 
interbranch relationship between the presidency and Congress, its impact on the U.S. 
policymaking toward Pyongyang, and the policy outcomes on the North Korea nuclear 
issue from 1993 through 2000. 
 
4.1. The Clinton Administration under unified government (1993-1994) 
 
In 1993-4, President Clinton was in a strong position to pursue a conciliatory 
policy toward North Korea because, as Putnam (1988) might put it, Clinton could expand 
the win-set with strong support from Congress in negotiating with Pyongyang on its 
nuclear issue. That is to say, at the time, Clinton had some room for maneuver with both 
Congress and North Korea. This finally led to a negotiated settlement of the first nuclear 
crisis with the conclusion of the Geneva Agreement in 1994. 
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4.1.1. U.S. Policy toward North Korea during the Clinton Administration (1993-1994) 
 
The first crisis between the United States and North Korea over the North Korean 
nuclear program began not long before the Clinton administration in 1989, when the CIA 
reportedly obtained evidence proving North Korea’s capability of developing nuclear 
weapons on its own. However, the crisis did not escalate until 1993-4, when Pyongyang 
threatened that it would withdraw from the NPT, decided to pull the fuel rods from a 
reactor, and announced its withdrawal from the IAEA. As both sides prepared for a 
possible war, former President Jimmy Carter visited Pyongyang and brokered a deal with 
Kim Il Sung that defused the crisis by freezing activities at Yongbyon in exchange for the 
resumption of negotiations between the United States and North Korea. 
President William J. Clinton took office when the United States had become a 
triumphant world leader, or “lonely superpower,” without a true hegemonic rival since 
the end of the Cold War. The collapse of the Soviet Union and the subsequent demise of 
the communist system particularly in East Europe provided the United States a new 
opportunity and responsibility to reconstruct the international order. The U.S. pre-
eminence was not only military, but also ideological, political, economic, and cultural 
(Brooks & Wohlforth, 2002; Ikenberry, 2002; Kapstein & Mastanduno, 1999; Nye, 2002). 
In the Asia-Pacific region, however, the historical legacy of the Cold War 
remained. Communist regimes such as China, North Korea, and Vietnam were still 
confrontational and standoffish with American political and military regional allies, 
including Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan. On the Korean peninsula, in particular, 
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“expectations for North-South reconciliation and cooperation were overshadowed by 
escalating tensions and mistrust between Seoul and Pyongyang. Hence the new Clinton 
administration was saddled with a complicated and seemingly contradictory mixture of 
global and regional trends in the strategic, diplomatic, and economic fields” (Lee, 2006, 
159). 
Under these regional political circumstances, when Clinton took office in the 
early 1990s, he thought that new security threats to the United States and its allies would 
be caused mainly by evil dictators, international terrorists, and transnational criminal 
organizations, and by the local armed conflicts that could destabilize the peace of entire 
regions. In addition, the incoming secretary of defense, Les Aspin, also thought that 
regional threats to U.S. interests from Korea, Iraq, and Africa would replace the former 
Soviet Union as the major focus of U.S. foreign and defensive policy. The Clinton 
administration, in addition, expressed its determined commitment to stopping the spread 
of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction, to strengthening the 
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and to implementing strong diplomatic and 
economic sanctions against governments violating international agreements. The new 
secretary of state, Warren Christopher said, “One of the main security problems of this 
era will be the proliferation of very deadly weapons—nuclear, chemical, biological, and 
enhanced conventional weapons—as well as their delivery systems… We must work 
assiduously with other nations to discourage proliferation through improved intelligence, 
export controls, incentives, sanctions, and even force when necessary” (as cited in Lee, 
2006, 159-60). 
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The first challenge to these foreign policy principles came from North Korea 
when it rejected the request by the IAEA for special inspections of suspected nuclear 
facilities at Yongbyon in 1993. Pyongyang announced on March 12, 1993, that it would 
withdraw from the NPT after the required waiting period of three months. In response, 
the Clinton administration decided not to use military force against North Korea but to 
seek a diplomatic solution through the IAEA and the United Nations. This policy toward 
Pyongyang signified the modification of the traditional U.S. policy of military 
containment and diplomatic isolation toward North Korea during the Cold War. The new 
Clinton administration, instead, decided to pursue a policy of constructive engagement 
with North Korea for the purpose of discouraging nuclear proliferation. This new 
diplomatic gesture from Clinton was based partly on the classic liberal assumption that 
even with dictatorial countries such as North Korea, sincere negotiations could be 
conducted and reasonable agreements could be reached in good faith.29
On April 1, the IAEA Board of Governors declared that North Korea was not in 
compliance with its obligations under its nuclear safeguards agreements with the IAEA 
and demanded North Korea to comply with the IAEA request for a special inspection to 
verify that North Korea was not producing nuclear weapons. Pyongyang rejected the 
IAEA’s demand on the grounds that it impinged upon the principle of state sovereignty 
and was designed to probe North Korea’s military bases and facilities. As a result, the 
 But its 
implementation would have not been possible without support from the Democratic 
majority in Congress. 
                                                 
29 Feffer (2003) characterizes Clinton’s North Korea policy as “congagement” policy which is a hybrid of 
containment and engagement (96). 
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UN Security Council issued a statement on April 8 expressing concern about 
Pyongyang’s provocative behavior. On May 11, the UNSC adopted a resolution 
requesting that North Korea reaffirm its commitment to the NPT, honor its 
nonproliferation obligations under the treaty, and comply with its safeguards agreement 
with the IAEA. 
Pursuant to a request from Pyongyang, the first round of talks between the United 
States and North Korea started in New York on June 2. The talks achieved a surprisingly 
dramatic breakthrough and resulted in a joint statement on June 11, a day before the 
North Korea’s withdrawal from NPT was to become effective. On July 14, the United 
States and North Korea held a second round of talks in Geneva, and in this meeting, the 
United States promised to facilitate construction of light-water moderated reactors 
(LWRs), which North Korea wanted in return for its graphite-moderated reactors. The 
United States rejected the North Korea demand, however, to stop the annual joint military 
exercises between the United States and South Korea. The two parties agreed to have a 
third round of talks in Geneva in September 1993, but this meeting was never held, 
largely because of North Korea’s refusal to permit IAEA inspections. 
On October 1, the IAEA General Conference adopted a resolution against North 
Korea, urging it to cooperate immediately with the IAEA. A month later, on November 1, 
the UN General Assembly also passed a resolution against North Korea. Pyongyang 
simply ignored both resolutions, and criticized the IAEA for being under the control of 
the United States. On November 23, 1993, Clinton announced that he would take “a 
thorough, broad approach” toward North Korea to resolve North Korean nuclear issues, 
which was another expression of “a comprehensive approach” or “package deal” (Lee, 
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2006, 167). Despite Clinton’s hinted willingness to negotiate with Pyongyang, however, 
the situation was continuously aggravated by other developments. On March 21, 1994, 
the IAEA Board of Governors passed a resolution to urge North Korea to comply with its 
safeguards agreement and to refer the issue to the Security Council and the General 
Assembly of the United Nations. 
On March 31, the UNSC issued a presidential statement demanding that North 
Korea allow IAEA inspections. The North denounced the statement as containing 
“unjustifiable demands,” and threatened to regard any sanctions resolution at the UNSC 
as a declaration of war requiring it to take appropriate action (Lee, 2006, 169). 
Meanwhile, the Clinton administration started to intensify diplomatic pressure on North 
Korea through international organizations such as the United Nations. At the UNSC, the 
United States drafted a resolution to impose economic and diplomatic sanctions against 
North Korea. Pyongyang, in response, threatened to wage war rather than yield to 
international condemnation and economic pressure. With the escalation of tension 
between the United States and North Korea, the Korean Peninsula stood on the brink of 
another major war. 
 Under these circumstances, former U.S. President Jimmy Carter was dispatched 
to Pyongyang on June 15. Although Carter characterized his visit as a “private mission,” 
had a significant symbolic meaning since it was the very first visit of a former president 
of the United States to North Korea.30
                                                 
30 On August 4, 2009, former president Bill Clinton also paid a visit to Pyongyang to secure the release of 
two American journalists who had been detained, convicted, and sentenced by the North Korean 
government for illegally entering North Korea. Clinton’s visit marks the second visit of a former president 
of the United States to North Korea. Interestingly enough, Clinton also identified his visit as a private 
mission. 
 In a meeting with Kim Il Sung, Cater obtained an 
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agreement that North Korea would freeze the nuclear program in exchange for a U.S. 
security commitment and the provision of LWRs. President Clinton viewed Carter’s visit 
as “an escape hatch, some way to climb down without losing face” for Kim Il Sung (as 
cited in Lee, 2006, 173). In the meeting, Kim Il Sung also agreed to an inter-Korean 
summit meeting, which was to be held in Pyongyang on July 25 through 27. The Clinton 
administration, as a consequence, suspended its sanctions efforts at the United Nations, 
halted further military deployments, and opened a third round of talks in Geneva on July 
8. On the very next day, however, the sudden death of Kim Il Sung ended the meeting, as 
the North Korea delegation was obliged to leave for Pyongyang to attend the funeral. 
Clinton expressed his sincere condolences, while Kim Young Sam, the president of South 
Korea, refused to do so, but rather criticized the late Kim’s legacy. Kim Jong Il, the son 
of Kim Il Sung and his successor, was enraged and announced that he would not have a 
meeting with Kim Young Sam. 
 On August 12, North Korea and the United States reached a provisional “Agreed 
Statement.” The agreement was possible because “while Clinton was eager for this 
agreement so that he could publicize the success of his foreign policy prior to the 
midterm congressional elections in November—especially in view of the questionable 
record of his policies in Somalia, Haiti, and Bosnia—Kim Jong Il embraced his father’s 
legacy and sought to demonstrate the positive consequences of his political succession” 
(Lee, 2006, 175). After a series of meetings to finalize the agreement, on October 21, 
1994, the United States and North Korea signed the Agreed Framework in Geneva, 
Switzerland. By signing the Agreed Framework, North Korea earned $4.5 billion worth 
of potential economic assistance in return for freezing its nuclear program. The Agreed 
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Framework also allowed North Korea to have an opportunity to break out of its 
international isolation, to normalize diplomatic relations with the United States and other 
countries, and to join key international organizations. Furthermore, Pyongyang received a 
guarantee from Washington that the United States would not use or threaten to use 
nuclear weapons against North Korea as long as Pyongyang abided by the agreement. 
 In retrospect, “The Agreed Framework was a major turning point not only for the 
interests of nuclear nonproliferation on the Korean Peninsula but also for the expansion 
of official contracts between the United States and North Korea” (Lee, 2006, 179). The 
agreement also enhanced Clinton’s status in domestic and foreign affairs. Satisfied with 
the agreement, Clinton said, “This agreement will help to achieve a long-standing and 
vital American objective—and end to the threat of nuclear proliferation on the Korean 
Peninsula… It reduces the danger of the threat of nuclear weapons spreading in the 
region” (as cited in Lee, 2006, 179). Warren Christopher also said that “the Agreed 
Framework stands out as one of the major achievements of our foreign policy… This was 
an occasion on which the United States rose to the challenge of its indispensable 
leadership role” (as cited in Lee, 2006, 179). However, Clinton’s gambit for a negotiated 
settlement with North Korea that finally resulted in the conclusion of the Geneva 
Agreement would not have been possible without the strong support of the Democratic 
majority in Congress. 
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4.1.2. Presidency vs. Congress: Overview 
 
To make sense of the role and the impact of the power struggle between 
presidency and Congress in 1993-4, it is instructive to briefly consider the history of the 
interbranch relationship and the increase of partisan politics at this time. In 1993, 
Congress was exceptionally productive in its lawmaking, particularly because, with the 
new Democratic president, “Congress acted on a broad range of issues that had been 
frozen for 12 years in partisan cross-fire between a Democratic Congress and a 
Republican White House” (1993 CQ Almanac, 3). Under the new unified Democratic 
government, thus, democratic policies, programs, and agendas “flowed freely down the 
legislative sluice for the first time in more than a decade” (1993 CQ Almanac, 3).31
Despite the inclination and desire of Clinton and Democratic members of 
Congress to focus on domestic policy, however, the worsening situations in Somalia, 
Bosnia, and Haiti continuously demanded attention from both the president and Congress. 
 The 
year 1993 was marked particularly by two controversial measures: a deficit-reduction 
“reconciliation” bill passed in August and the North American Free Trade Agreement 
(NAFTA) approved in November. While both were huge political triumphs for Clinton, 
other laws did not require so much political capital to enact, because the Democratic 
majority in Congress easily approved a number of bills that had cleared in previous years 
but had been vetoed. 
                                                 
31 During the first session of the 103rd Congress, there were 6,721 bills and resolutions introduced, 
compared with 4,258 in 1992. A total of 210 bills cleared by the 103rd Congress became public laws. 
President Clinton signed 208 of them. President George H. W. Bush signed the first two before leaving 
office on Jan. 20. During 1993, the House took 615 roll call votes and quorum calls, 227 more than in the 
previous year. The Senate took 395 roll call votes, 125 more than in 1992 (1993, CQ Almanac, 8). 
74 
 
This forced Congress to re-evaluate its relationship with the president on foreign policy. 
Although Congress and the president struggled over their relative powers and 
responsibilities, Congress was more cooperative with Clinton than it had been with Bush 
Senior. Nevertheless, it was impossible to realize all of Clinton’s wishes, and partisan 
politics in Congress was still alive. For example, “when Clinton initiated a tough deficit 
reduction package in 1993, not a single Republican in the House and Senate voted for it” 
(LeLoup & Shull, 2003, 3). “Lots of things got blocked,” according to David Mayhew, 
“It’s not as if there is a free flow down the highway of everything you put on a truck” (as 
cited in 1993 CQ Almanac, 4). 
Among Clinton’s biggest defeats in Congress were the loss of construction and 
social service programs proposed to stimulate the economy, which were blocked in April 
1993 in the Senate, and his efforts to end the prohibition against gays serving in the 
military, which he had to drop because of the strong bipartisan opposition from both 
chambers of the Congress. Although Clinton had begun the year in a weak position as a 
president elected with a minority of the vote and had suffered through numerous mishaps, 
he finally ended the year with major victories on trade, budget policy, and gun control. In 
sum, in 1993, President Clinton still entertained strong support from Democratic majority 
Congress, despite partisan oppositions from the Republican Party. 
The year 1994, however, brought Clinton major legislative setbacks and political 
fiascoes, including the failure of his top priority, the health care initiative. Clinton had 
trumpeted the proposal, as a test of his leadership and control in Congress, yet he never 
had sufficient votes to pass the proposal in either chamber. As a result, the devastating 
loss “sucked the wind out of Clinton’s standing and elbowed out other legislative 
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initiatives, including welfare reform” (1994 CQ Almanac, 3). Democratic members of 
Congress had started the second session with high hopes for their party. Because of the 
laws enacted on budget, trade and social policy during the first session, they were highly 
confident about remaking the health care system, welfare, political campaign laws, 
telecommunications policy, mining law and more. In addition, the economy was 
rebounding and approval ratings for Clinton were rising.32
As a result of continued partisan politics, “numerous measures, some of which 
began the year with broad bipartisan support, fell victim to partisan disagreement or other 
problems and had to be abandoned” (1994 CQ Almanac, 3), mainly because Republicans 
blocked Democratic legislative program at every turn with the increased confidence of 
their midterm election prospects. Many measures and initiatives had to be buried due 
primarily to procedural barriers built by Republicans who became confident in exploiting 
the technical gridlock. Before the end of the session, however, Clinton won a belated, but 
crucial bipartisan victory, approving a bill to implement a new global trade accord under 
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).
 It is no wonder that Clinton 
tried to capitalize on these expectations. He called on Congress to tackle three priorities: 
health care, welfare, and crime. However, none turned into a triumph for Clinton or for 
the Democratic leadership. Congress took no action on welfare. The crime bill was 
enacted in a spirit of rancor that bloodied Clinton and ended any lingering hope of 
passing a health care bill in 1994. 
33
                                                 
32 He went over 60 percent in a January NBC/Wall Street Journal poll (1994 CQ Almanac, 4). 
 
 In sum, in 1994, although 
33 President Clinton became the first president since 1853 to not veto a single bill during an entire Congress. 
The last president to do so was Millard Fillmore, the nation’s 13th president, in the 32nd Congress (1851-53). 
During the second session of the 103rd Congress, there were 3,103 bills and resolutions introduced, 
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Clinton was not as successful as in 1993 in his major reforms mainly because of partisan 
resistances, he still managed to gather enough support from the Democratic majority to 
win crucial victories at the end of the session. 
 
4.1.3. Presidency vs. Congress: North Korea 
 
 During the critical period of crisis between the United States and North Korea 
over Pyongyang’s nuclear ambition, President Clinton “was having an increasingly 
difficult time presenting himself as any kind of international leader” (Barilleaux & Kim, 
1999, 32-33). He “was not very much interested in active involvement in foreign policy, 
and he championed domestic matters during his presidential campaign. Clinton saw 
himself as a domestic president” (Barilleaux & Kim, 1999, 29). The legislative priorities 
described in the preceding section make this clear. Furthermore, his Republican critics 
“focused on his indecisiveness, his endless flexibility, his lack of principle, and his 
willingness to tailor policy to domestic opinion polls” (Barilleaux & Kim, 1999, 33). 
President Clinton “had to convey a convincing portrait of world leadership and 
willingness to do what was necessary to avoid nuclear chaos (Barilleaux & Kim, 1999, 
33). On NBC’s “Meet the Press” program on November 7, 1993, Clinton, whose 
engagement policy toward North Korea had come under harsh criticism from the 
Republican Party, categorically declared that any military attack on South Korea “is an 
attack on the United States” and warned if North Korea produced nuclear weapons and 
                                                                                                                                                 
compared with 6,721 in 1993 and 4,258 in 1992. A total of 465 bills cleared by the 103rd Congress became 
public laws (210 in the first session). During 1994, the House took 507 roll call votes and quorum calls, 
108 fewer than in the previous year. The Senate took 329 roll call votes, 66 fewer than in 1993 (1994 CQ 
Almanac: 5). 
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used them against South Korea, the United States would mobilize its overwhelming 
military power to obliterate North Korea (as cited in Lee, 2006, 166). This rhetoric was 
intended not only to warn North Korea but also to quell criticism of his policy in South 
Korea and in the U.S. Congress. Despite his lack of foreign policy expertise, however, he 
continued to seek bipartisan support in the Congress for his North Korea policy. 
Although Republican legislators agreed with the broad outlines of Clinton’s 
policy on a nuclear-free North Korea, they took an even tougher stance against North 
Korea. In February 1994, the Senate passed the State Department authorization bill. 
During six days of debate on the bill, senators adopted amendments urging administration 
action on issues ranging from nuclear proliferation in North Korea to preferential trade 
status for China. John McCain (R-AZ) vehemently denounced Clinton’s North Korea 
nuclear policy as insufficiently forceful. The amendment called on Clinton to seek an 
international consensus to isolate Pyongyang economically until it had halted its nuclear 
program. Charles S. Robb (D-VA) also urged Clinton to consider reintroducing tactical 
nuclear weapons in South Korea to pressure the North to live up to its nuclear treaty 
obligations (1994 CQ Almanac, 455). 
In June 1994, when Clinton suggested going forward with the sanctions resolution, 
Senator John McCain (R-AZ) again argued that “sanctions should be backed by the 
explicit threat of air strikes against North Korea’s nuclear material reprocessing facilities” 
(as cited in Barilleaux & Kim, 1999). Describing in considerable detail how Pyongyang’s 
nuclear program could be destroyed by U.S. military power, he further said, “to all those 
apologists for the Administration’s appeasement policy who argue that we must refrain 
from responses that might provoke the North into launching a military attack, I ask one 
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question: Would an attack be more or less likely after North Korea acquires a nuclear 
arsenal and after it has completed its production of ballistic missiles capable of delivering 
nuclear warheads to Tokyo? I think the answer is obvious” (as cited in Carpenter & 
Bandow, 2004, 43-44). Senate minority leader Robert Dole (R-KS) also argued that the 
“military option must be kept open” (Carpenter & Bandow, 2004, 45). 
In July 1994, House and Senate conferees agreed to strip the Senate amendment 
prohibiting the United States from providing any aid to North Korea, but they included 
the North on the list of countries specifically barred from receiving aid appropriated 
under the fiscal 1995 foreign operations bill. Warren Christopher, Secretary of State, was 
opposed to the Senate decision and complained that it “could block activities that are 
crucial” in bringing Pyongyang into compliance with its international agreements (as 
cited in 1994 CQ Almanac, 511). In August 1994, an amendment unanimously passed the 
Senate making any U.S. aid to North Korea contingent on a presidential certification that 
North Korea had halted its nuclear weapons program and did not have any nuclear 
weapons. 
In addition, the 1994 Foreign Relations Authorization Act reflected the depth of 
congressional concerns about North Korea’s noncompliance with the IAEA safeguards 
agreement and inspections. The 1994 Act delineated “eighteen non-binding policy 
directives that included an emphasis on regional responsibility, the crucial role of China, 
and the potential use of sanctions as a punitive measure” (Lee & Miles, 2006, 188). The 
act also recommended involving all regional countries in the confrontation with North 
Korea, stating that “the problem posed by North Korea’s nuclear program is not a 
bilateral problem between the United States and North Korea, but a problem in which 
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virtually the entire global community is united against North Korea” (Lee & Miles, 2006, 
188). If international cooperation failed, “the president should employ all unilateral 
means of leverage over North Korea, including, but not limited to, the prohibition of any 
transaction involving the commercial sale of any good or technology to North Korea. 
And If North Korea refused to cooperate with IAEA, the law called for the president to 
seek international consensus to isolate North Korea, including the imposition of sanctions” 
(Lee & Miles, 2006, 188). 
Before the conclusion of the 1994 Geneva Agreement, a group of Republican 
senators including Alfonse D’Amato (R-NY), Mitch McConnell (R-KY), Jesse Helms 
(R-NC), and Frank Murkowski (R-AK), sent a joint letter to the president to urge him to 
back away from the deal. In the letter, they warned that the agreement would only “paper 
over the crisis and delay its resolution” and questioned about “how to distinguish such a 
deal from U.S. submission to North Korean blackmail” (Carpenter & Bandow, 2004, 47). 
Senator Robert Dole (R-KS) also complained that the deal “shows that it is always 
possible to get an agreement when you give enough away” (Carpenter & Bandow, 2004, 
47). 
The 1994 deal was, in fact, called “the Agreed Framework” rather than “the 
Framework Agreement” to avoid the ratification issue (Cossa, 2003). In January 1995, 
with a new Republican majority Congress, Clinton declined the demands from the chairs 
of three Senate committees – Energy and Natural Resources, Foreign Relations, and 
Intelligence – that the agreement be redefined as a formal treaty, which would require the 
advice and consent of the Senate. Instead, the Clinton administration characterized the 
arrangement as an “Agreed Framework,” which was less binding than a formal treaty. 
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Had the Agreed Framework acquired a status of treaty, it might have paved the way for 
much better U.S.-North Korean relations in the last half of the decade. However, Clinton 
did not attempt to do so, mainly because he was afraid that the Senate would reject the 
agreement and force him to return to the bargaining table with Pyongyang. Indeed, many 
members of Congress criticized the negotiation process even before its conclusion. 
In sum, even if Clinton faced partisan opposition and felt under pressure from the 
Republican legislators in both chambers of Congress, he exhibited presidential leadership 
in his dealings with North Korea under the Democratic unified government during 1993-
1994. And even if he did not have overwhelming bipartisan support from both chambers 
of Congress for his North Korea policy, he managed to get enough support to negotiate 
with North Korea. Despite the partisan challenge from the Republican Party, however, 
there were no open efforts from Congress to nullify or modify the agreement during the 
period, in large part because both chambers were still controlled by the Democratic Party. 
Due to his support in Congress, President Clinton was able to pursue a more conciliatory 
policy toward North Korea. 
 
4.2. The Clinton Administration under Divided Government (1995-2000) 
 
In 1995-2000, in contrast with the preceding period, President Clinton adopted a 
status quo policy toward North Korea, failing to take further steps to improve U.S.-North 
Korean relations and to conclude the denuclearization of North Korea. He could not 
expand the win-sets necessary to end Pyongyang’s nuclear ambition mainly due to 
opposition from the Republican majority in Congress. This section examines the 
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interbranch relationship between presidency and Congress, its impact on the U.S. 
policymaking toward Pyongyang, and the policy outcomes on the North Korea nuclear 
issue from 1995 through 2000. 
 
4.2.1. U.S. Policy toward North Korea during the Clinton Administration (1995-2000) 
 
On March 9, 1995, the Clinton administration signed the Agreement on the 
Establishment of the Korean Peninsula Development Organization (KEDO) along with 
South Korea and Japan to carry out the terms of the 1994 Agreed Framework. While the 
United States assumed major responsibility for the funds to supply heavy fuel oil to North 
Korea, South Korea and Japan also pledged to share a significant portion of the funds for 
the LWR projects. In September 1997, the European Atomic Energy Community in the 
European Union became a member of KEDO and joined on KEDO’s executive board 
along with the United States, South Korea, and Japan.34
Although the Clinton administration was eager to open its liaison office in 
Pyongyang, and concluded a “Memorandum of Understanding” with North Korea in 
December 1994, this plan was never realized. In addition, the Clinton administration was 
hesitant to upgrade its fledging diplomatic relations with North Korea too quickly without 
commensurate improvement in inter-Korean relations because South Korea continued to 
insist on “linkages” and “parallelism” in this regard. Clinton achieved a big breakthrough, 
however, in economic relations with Pyongyang. The Clinton administration delivered 
500,000 tons of heavy fuel oil to North Korea every year, facilitated the construction of 
 
                                                 
34 For more detailed discussions on KEDO, see Quinones, 2007a. 
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two LWRs in North Korea by a target date of 2003, and announced its initial measures to 
ease economic sanctions against North Korea on January 20, 1995. 
On April 16, 1996, at a meeting with South Korea President, Kim Young Sam, 
Clinton proposed four-party talks including the United States, North Korea, South Korea, 
and China. This initiative was a significant departure from the earlier U.S. policy toward 
North Korea insisting that issues of peace and reunification must be resolved by the two 
Koreas. In turn, Pyongyang abandoned its earlier position that only the United States and 
North Korea were “the real parties” to the Armistice Agreement, and it agreed to join the 
four-party talks. The prospect of four-party talks was threatened by two unexpected 
events—a North Koran submarine incident in September 1996, and the defection of a 
senior North Korean leader, Hwang Chang Yop, in February 1997, but the first session 
was nevertheless held on December 9, in Geneva. Enthusiasm for the four-party talks 
began to dwindle in South Korea, however, because Seoul was greatly suffering from the 
Asian financial crisis. Pyongyang was not happy about the four-party talks either, 
because they did not directly discuss issues it considered critical such as the withdrawal 
of U.S. forces from South Korea and a peace agreement between the United States and 
North Korea. Despite Chinese enthusiasm, therefore, the four-party talks dissipated by 
the end of 1999. 
Following the recommendations of the Perry report, Clinton invited North Korean 
Vice Marshal, Cho Myong Rok, to Washington in September 2000. This meeting resulted 
in the Joint U.S.-DPRK Statement and an invitation to Secretary of State Madeleine 
Albright to visit Pyongyang, a trip she took a few weeks later. At these and subsequent 
meetings, the two sides undertook discussions to eliminate North Korea’s long-range 
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ballistic missile program.35
A number of Republicans such as Senators Jesse Helms (R-NC) and Trent Lott 
(R-MS) also urged Clinton to defer any further decision on North Korean missiles to the 
 The Clinton administration invited Kim Jong Il to come to 
Washington, but Kim rejected this invitation. North Korea instead wanted President 
Clinton to come to Pyongyang, but U.S. officials were reluctant to send the President 
without finishing the missile deal. In the end, neither trip took place. 
No doubt Clinton hoped to reach a milestone in the search for lasting peace on the 
Korean Peninsula and in the Middle East, leaving a legacy of diplomatic triumph as his 
tenure drew to a close. In returning for lifting economic sanctions, he wanted North 
Korea to commit to a far-reaching agreement on America’s major concerns – its nuclear 
and missile issues (Lee, 2006, 199). In 2000, the United States and North Korea put their 
cooperation on display by exchanging official visits. Jo Myong Rok, North Korean Vice 
Marshal, paid a visit to Washington in September 2000. In a joint communiqué issued on 
October 12, 2000, the two countries agreed to disavow any “hostile intent” against each 
other, to work to build mutual confidence, and to uphold the principles of respect for each 
other’s sovereignty and noninterference in internal affairs. As a response, Madeleine 
Albright, U.S. Secretary of State, took a trip to Pyongyang a few weeks later in October. 
She was the highest-ranking member of the U.S. government ever to pay an official visit 
to North Korea (former president Jimmy Carter went in 1994 as a private citizen). At 
these and subsequent meetings, the two sides issued a joint U.S.-DPRK statement, and 
undertook discussions to eliminate North Korea’s long-range ballistic missile program 
and stop exporting missiles to other countries. 
                                                 
35 For more details on the North Korean ballistic missile program, see Pinkston, 2008. 
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incoming administration. The mass media was against Clinton’s trip as well. The New 
York Times, for example, stated that “Clinton’s visit would lend prestige to the North 
Korean leader, one of the world’s last Stalinist dictators and a brazen violator of his 
people’s human rights” (as cited in Lee, 2006, 207). Finally, the Bush foreign policy team 
was also against the trip. In an effort to salvage a U.S.-North Korean summit meeting, the 
Clinton administration invited Kim Jong Il to Washington, but Kim rejected this 
invitation. Clinton in the end had to urge the new Bush administration to continue his 
engagement policy toward North Korea. Clinton later told William Perry that it was his 
“biggest regret” that he did not visit Pyongyang. 
Clinton’s inaction and indecision resulted in large part from his experiences of 
struggling with the Republican Congress after 1995, experiences that significantly limited 
his initiative and ability for the North Korea policy. He came to realize that “a president 
who wants to take a new approach to some element of American foreign policy can be 
caught between the diplomat’s desire for flexibility and the power of domestic political 
forces. The president can achieve success, but only if the new direction in policy finds 
acceptance on Capitol Hill” (Barilleaux & Kim, 1999). 
 
4.2.2. Presidency vs. Congress: Overview 
 
The historic 1994 midterm congressional elections ended Democratic dominance 
in the Congress, brought divided party control of government back, and reshaped the 
rivalry between the president and Congress. The 1994 election not only brought an 
overwhelming victory for the Republican Party, but it also dramatically changed the 
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balance of power between the president and Congress. Convinced that they had received 
an electoral mandate to implement their legislative program, Republican members of 
Congress confidently began dictating the policy agenda. In contrast, President Clinton 
found that his political power was significantly diminished after the 1994 election when 
the Republicans attempted to constrain the president’s ability to influence Congress 
(Thurber, 2006, 3). 
The midterm elections on Nov. 8, 1993 brought an end to nearly 40 years of 
Democratic control of the House. The voters gave control of both chambers to the 
Republicans for the first time since 1955. The elections swept out the House Speaker, 
Thomas S. Foley, D-Wash., along with legislative powerhouses such House Ways and 
Means Committee Chairman Dan Rostenkowski, D-Ill., while no Republican incumbent 
was defeated in the House or Senate.36
During the 104th Congress in 1995, the 88 bills enacted into law marked the 
lowest legislative output during a session since 1933, when the 20th (or “Lame Duck”) 
Amendment was ratified and the starting date of a Congress was moved from March to 
January.
 
37
                                                 
36 On opening day of the 104th Congress, in the House, Republicans took majority control – 230-204, with 
one independent – for the first time in 40 years. In the Senate, Republicans dominated, 53-47, for the first 
time since 1986 (1995 CQ Almanac, 1-3-4). 
 
37 The first session of the 73rd Congress (the last to convene in March) enacted 93 bills into law, including 
much of President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s New Deal legislation, in an abbreviated session lasting less than 
100 days (1995 CQ Almanac, 1-5). 
 
 Both chambers were populated by a new cadre of lawmakers more intensely 
partisan than any other in contemporary times. “A large group of conservative freshmen, 
especially in the House, displayed remarkable ideological cohesion and became the most 
influential newcomers since fallout from the Watergate scandal swept reformist 
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Democrats into Congress in 1974” (1995 CQ Almanac, 1-3). As a consequence, Congress 
in 1995 became a more active and more partisan institution, and it was more ready and 
willing to defy the president than ever before in the post war period.38
The Republican majority in Congress brought the agenda-setting role from the 
White House to Congress, and Clinton had to contend with their new power and 
assertiveness. Congressional debate centered mostly on Republican issues including 
legislation designed to dismantle multiple layers of domestic programs, overturn 
regulations and attack the growth of entitlement such as Medicare and Medicaid. In other 
words, “Congress itself was transformed from a redoubt of liberalism into the nerve 
center of conservatism” (1995 CQ Almanac, 1-3). As a result, the bipartisan spirit quickly 
gave way to familiar partisan wrangling, as House Republicans began working to enact 
their legislative agenda, “Contract With America.”
 
39
Acknowledging that “I have made my mistakes,” a politically weakened Clinton 
appealed for bipartisanship in his State of the Union address Jan. 24, 1995 and challenged 
 A Congressional Quarterly survey at 
the 100-day mark of 33 votes on bills that incorporated the contract showed a high level 
of party unity. Of the class of 73 Republican freshmen, 53 voted with the party 100 
percent of the time. Thirteen had a score of 97 percent; one, 95 percent; and four, 94 
percent. In addition, a total of 141 of the 230 Republicans had scores of 100 percent 
(1995 CQ Almanac, 1-7). 
                                                 
38 In 1995, the House took 885 roll call votes and quorum calls, 378 more than in the previous year. The 
Senate took 613 roll call votes, 284 more than in 1994 (1995 CQ Almanac, 1-5). 
 
39 The GOP’s “Contract With America” was signed on Sep. 27, 1994, by more than 350 GOP incumbents 
and challengers assembled on Capitol Hill. It was a bold bid by Newt Gingrich to create a national platform 
for Republican candidates in the November 1994 elections. The contract gradually evolved into a holy writ 
that Speaker Gingrich used to foster discipline among House Republicans. For more detailed discussions on 
“Contract With America,” see Bader, 1997. 
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the Republican-controlled Congress to work with him toward a “leaner, not meaner” 
government (as cited in 1995 CQ Almanac, 1-5). However, the speech only provided 
clear evidence that Clinton no longer controlled the congressional agenda and knew it. 
Unlike his threat in 1994 to veto anything short of a comprehensive health care bill, 
Clinton’s warnings in 1995 were delivered in a non-threatening way. In a sharp reversal, 
Clinton even had to endorse the idea of incremental health care legislation centered on 
insurance reforms. 
The early success of several contract items in the House built momentum in the 
Congress. “Each step fed the next,” said Representative Bill Paxon (R-NY) (1995 CQ 
Almanac, 1-6). Although Republican unanimity did not always come easily, the 
opposition of the Democrats often helped to unify Republican moderates and 
conservatives.40
                                                 
40 In several cases, GOP leaders had to use what House Majority Leader Dick Armey (R-TX) called 
“friendly persuasion” to keep their troops in line (1995 CQ Almanac, 1-6). 
 Republican congressional leaders also mobilized outside support to give 
an added push to elements of the contract. For example, at the request of Majority Whip 
Tom DeLay (R-TX), a coalition known as “Project Relief” was set up by Bruce A. Gates, 
vice president of public affairs at the National American Wholesale Grocers’ Association, 
to lobby for regulatory reform. They also worked to back the balanced budget 
amendment. Such various coalitions included the National Federation of Independent 
Business, National Taxpayers Union, Christian Coalition, National Association of 
Manufacturers, American Trucking Association, Americans for Tax Reform, and the U.S. 
Chamber of Commerce. 
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Overshadowed by their counterparts in the House, Republicans in the Senate also 
issued their own agendas from the beginning of the first session of the 104th Congress. 
Signaling a slower, more deliberate pace, the Senate passed the first contract bill, on 
congressional compliance with workplace laws, Jan. 11. The pace reflected Senate rules, 
which allowed virtually limitless amendments. It also was, in part, a product of the role 
played by more senior GOP members, who did not share the House freshmen’s 
enthusiasm for such planks as a middle-class tax cut and a balanced-budget amendment 
to the Constitution. Indeed, Senate Republicans had never endorsed the contract. Instead, 
they produced their own agenda, called “Seven More in ’94,” which included a balanced-
budget amendment, national defense, crime, middle-class tax cuts, welfare reform and a 
relaxation of the earnings test for Social Security recipients. 
Sometimes, Clinton used his veto power as a threat to influence the Republican 
Congress.41
In 1995, there were two government shutdowns as a result of a political standoff 
between Clinton and the Congress. The first shutdown came Nov. 14-19, when Congress 
  More often, however, Clinton solicited cooperation from Congress. “I don’t 
want to have a pile of vetoes,” Clinton said at a Montana town meeting June 1. “So here I 
am – all dressed up and ready to cooperate….. I want to cooperate [with Congress], but it 
takes two to tango” (as cited in 1995 CQ Almanac, 1-8). Furthermore, Clinton did not 
win much help from his congressional Democrats in blunting the GOP agenda. 
Democrats were suffering problems transforming themselves into an effective opposition 
party, and there was little coordination with the White House. 
                                                 
41 Clinton had never used the veto power in his first two presidential years under the Democratic unified 
party control of government. 
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had completed work on just five of the spending bills. The second closure began Dec. 16, 
when three spending bills were still stalled in Congress and three more had been vetoed. 
Republicans were surprised by the government shutdowns, because they underestimated 
Clinton’s willingness to fight. Both sides ended the year with an unusually high level of 
animosity and partisan distrust. “This is the most polarized and embittered I’ve ever seen 
it,” said Judiciary Committee Chairman Henry J. Hyde (R-Il), who had served in the 
House for 20 years (as cited in 1995 CQ Almanac, 1-11).42
However, confrontation gave way to compromise in the second session of the 
104th Congress in 1996, as Republicans abandoned their earlier hard-charging tactics to 
achieve their legislative agendas due to the budget debacle in 1995.
 
43
                                                 
42 The chief demand of Republicans on the balance of budget in seven years ended in humiliating defeat. 
The public blamed the Republicans for the government shutdowns and Clinton refused to concede. Finally, 
in January 1966, they agreed to reopen the government (1996 CQ Almanac, 1-3). 
 
43 Quantitatively, during the second session of the 104th Congress, legislative productivity rate was 
relatively low, thanks in part to its early preoccupation with conservative legislation that stalled in the 
Senate. The 104th Congress cleared 238 bills, compared with an average of 929 bills for the previous 10 
Congresses. Qualitatively however, Congress took on difficult issues and managed to enact significant 
legislation where previous Congresses had failed (1996 CQ Almanac, 1-4). 
 
 If the failed 
Republican shutdown strategy opened the door to a more compromising approach, the 
decision by Senate Majority Leader Bob Dole of Kansas to leave Congress in June to 
campaign full time for the GOP presidential nomination helped push the two parties the 
rest of the way. President Clinton also cooperated with the Republicans on a spate of 
legislation as he sought to become the first Democrat since Franklin D. Roosevelt to win 
a second term. By year’s end, the temporary bipartisanship had worked well, and they 
shared victory. Republicans won the congressional election. They maintained control of 
the House, albeit by a narrower margin, and strengthened their majority in the Senate. 
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Clinton won the presidential election, scoring an overwhelming victory over Republican 
presidential nominee Bob Dole.44
                                                 
44 There were a total of 2,759 bills and resolutions introduced in the session. Combined with the 5,231 
introduced in the first session, the total of 7,990 bills and resolutions introduced in the 104th Congress was 
1,834 fewer than in the 103rd Congress, when 9,824 were introduced. In all, 245 bills were signed into law 
in 1996, bringing the total number of measures enacted during the 104th Congress to 333. President Clinton 
vetoed six bills during the second session, bringing the total number of vetoes in the 104th Congress to 17; 
only one was overridden. During 1996, the House took 455 roll call votes and quorum calls, 430 less than 
in 1995. The Senate took 306 roll call votes, 307 less than the previous year. Combined, however, the total 
of 2,259 roll call votes and quorum calls in the 104th Congress was the highest since the 96th Congress 
(1979-1980), when 2,304 were recorded. In 1996, the Senate broke its record for cloture votes taken in a 
single year. Senators voted 29 times on motions to end debate on a matter before the body, one more time 
than in 1992 (1996 CQ Almanac, 1-5; 1-7). 
 
Despite these successes on both sides of the aisle, partisan politics contributed to a 
large number of retirements. For example, retiring Representative Pete Geren (D-TX) 
said, “You have people on the far left and the far right who tend to have sharp differences 
of opinion, which leads to each party thinking the other is immoral or evil” (as cited in 
1996 CQ Almanac, 1-4). However, the second session of the 104th Congress in 1996 
brought a decline in partisan politics, compared the first session in 1995. The GOP’s 
“Contract With America” in the House of Representatives, which dominated the 
Republican political agenda in 1995, was replaced by the more soothing strategy of a 
“common sense agenda.” In fact, it was rare in 1996 to hear of the contract from 
Republicans. Table 6 shows overall scorecard for the GOP’s “Contract With America.” 
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Table 6. Contract With America Scorecard 
 
“Contract With America” Items 
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End Congressional Exemptions  O  O O O 
Revise House Rules  O    O 
Balanced-Budget Amendment O O O S   
Line-Item Veto O O O O O O 
Crime O O S S S S 
Welfare O O O O O O 
Require Parental Consent for 
Children Surveys 
O O O    
Increase Penalties for Children Sex 
Crimes 
O O O O O O 
Middle-Class Tax Cut O O O O O S 
National Security O O     
Social Security O O S S S S 
Capital Gains and Regulations O O O O O S 
Product Liability O O O O O X 
Term Limits O X O X   
 
Note: O=Approved/Passed Substantially Intact, X=Defeated/Vetoed, S=Some Elements 
Approved/Passed/Enacted 
 
SOURCE: Adapted from CQ Almanac (1996), 1-10. 
 
In 1997, Republican congressional leaders worked to build bipartisan coalitions to 
pass bills. It seemed clear that divided government would force both sides to work with 
each other for at least the next two years and quite likely the next four, given the 
difficulty traditionally experienced by the president’s party in off-year elections. This 
grudging cooperation set the tone for the 105th Congress. Members of Congress looked 
more often for common ground with their adversaries rather than emphasizing different 
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party lines. And controversial leaders such as House Speaker Newt Gingrich (R-GA) 
receded into the background. This new approach came to fruition when a bipartisan 
agreement was reached to balance the budget by 2002 while providing the biggest tax cut 
since the Reagan administration. Republican congressional leaders also got all 13 regular 
appropriations bills enacted, abandoning the take-it-or-leave-it strategy that had triggered 
two government shutdowns and hurt Republicans during their first two years in power. 
Beyond that, however, the first session of the 105th Congress was not so productive.45
The first session of the 105th Congress witnessed the GOP’s priority items 
generally falling by the wayside. Social conservatives met with defeat on a number of so-
called wedge issues. However, Clinton also lost on several issues consequential to his 
administrations. For instance, Congress refused to provide the money he requested to 
underwrite a world currency stabilization program and to pay off U.S. debts to the United 
Nations, after Clinton infuriated conservatives by blocking legislation to ban U.S. aid for 
overseas organizations that performed or advocated abortions. But Clinton’s most 
important defeat was on renewal of fast-track authority to negotiate trade deals.
 
46 Clinton 
became the first American president who did not succeed in getting this authority that had 
always won bipartisan support from the Congress.47
                                                 
45 During the first session of the 105th Congress, 153 public laws were enacted. A total of 5,501 
Bills/Resolutions were introduced. The number of recorded votes including quorum calls was 938 in total. 
The Senate held 24 cloture votes in 1997, slightly fewer than the 29 cloture votes in 1996 and more than the 
21 votes in 1995. Attempts to limit debate succeeded on seven occasions, each time by a wide margin. The 
closest thing to a squeaker was the 69-31 vote to proceed to consideration of the fast-track bill (S 1269) 
(1997 CQ Almanac, 1-4). 
 
46 For more detailed explanations on Clinton’s failure in “fast-track” authority and CTBT, See Destler, 
2001. 
 
47 None of his predecessors was without that authority for more than seven months since it was first granted 
Gerald Ford (Destler, 2001, 324). 
 Clinton also lost several 
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confirmation battles with the Senate. His nominees for ambassador to Mexico, assistant 
attorney general for civil rights, and surgeon general were all blocked. 
Clinton learned to live with divided government. His first major public addresses 
in 1997 were “clearly intended to set a bipartisan tone and extend an olive branch to 
congressional Republicans” (1997 CQ Almanac, 1-5). He began his second term on Jan. 
20 with an Inauguration Day address that was more somber than the one he had given 
four years earlier, when he stressed change and an energetic renewal. His speech seemed 
tempered by the political battles of his first term and by a keener understanding of the 
limits of the presidency and the government. In his State of the Union address on Feb. 4, 
Clinton said, “They want us to be partners, not partisans. They put us all here in the same 
boat, they gave us all oars and they told us row” (as cited in 1997 CQ Almanac, 1-6). 
Despite Clinton’s conciliatory gesture, however, stable bipartisanship was hard to 
achieve under divided government. President Clinton used or threatened to use the veto 
power when he thought it was necessary. Despite repeated veto threats, Republican 
congressional leaders in June tried to force the president to accept two controversial 
policy riders by attaching them to a must-pass disaster relief bill (HR 1469). The first 
provision would have guaranteed continued funding at existing levels to any agency 
whose regular appropriations bill had not become law by the Oct. 1 start of the fiscal year. 
The second would have blocked the use of statistical sampling during the 2000 census. 
Republicans gambled that Clinton would not dare to follow through on his veto threat, or 
that if he did, he would pay a terrible political price for holding up badly needed flood aid 
for the Midwest. However, that turned out to be a serious miscalculation. Clinton vetoed 
the bill immediately after he got it on June 9, and the public directed its anger at 
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congressional Republicans. Republican congressional leaders finally decided to cut their 
losses. On June 12, they sent Clinton a second flood aid bill, which he immediately 
signed into law (HR1871 – PL 105-18). 
Meanwhile, Clinton was having troubles of his own as House Democrats refused 
to support the renewal of his fast-track trade negotiating authority. House Republican 
leaders began using Clinton’s weakness on fast track as leverage to try to seek 
concessions from him on the four stalled appropriations bills. Gingrich warned Clinton, 
who had threatened to veto all four spending bills, that conservative Republicans would 
oppose the fast track authority unless Clinton made concessions on those matters. 
Compared with the tumultuous House, the Senate was calm, because the Senate was 
traditionally more favorably disposed to trade initiatives. On Nov. 4 and Nov. 5, senators 
passed the trade bill by a surprisingly large margin. But the House never acted. Clinton 
was unable to rally Democrats, and the bill was shelved for the year on Nov. 10. 
The final months of the session witnessed rancorous partisan fights over 
campaign finance reform. The legislative compromise in the beginning of the 105th 
Congress had not prevented the parties from going into partisan warfare. The session’s 
final days were most painful for Clinton, because he saw three of his major foreign policy 
initiatives go down in less than a week—the renewal of his fast-track trade negotiating 
authority, a plan to pay off back debts to the United Nations, and a proposed $3.5 billion 
commitment to help underwrite an International Monetary Fund (IMF) program to deal 
with global financial crises. Clinton, in response, made the first use of the new line-item 
veto law, striking individual items in nine appropriations bills and the two reconciliation 
measures. Although he used the power with relative caution, it provoked an angry 
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bipartisan backlash when he struck 38 projects from the military construction spending 
bill. Congress finally ended the year poised to overrule him.  
The 1998 CQ Almanac starts its congressional record of the year by observing, 
“the House took 547 roll call votes and the Senate took 314, but history is likely to take 
note of just two: the House votes Dec. 19 to impeach President Clinton” (1-3). Clinton’s 
affair with former White House intern Monica Lewinsky and his denial under oath of a 
sexual relationship dominated the political agenda of Washington for the whole year. 
From the time the curious details of the relationship began to emerge in January, the 
scandal took center stage for both the administration and Congress. Even when the 
scandal momentarily took a back seat to other urgent initiatives or crucial decisions, 
Republicans and Democrats found themselves asked time and again for their opinions on 
the president’s conduct and possible punishments, not about legislative details. Congress 
created much of the quagmire that ensued, especially when the House voted on Sep. 11 to 
release the sensational details of Independent Counsel Kenneth W. Starr’s report and his 
conclusion that 11 counts of impeachable offenses could be upheld. That action 
significantly intensified the partisan wrangling that lasted until the end of the year. 
The second session of the 105th Congress was notable for what it did not do. It 
failed to pass a budget resolution or a major tax cut bill.48
                                                 
48 In the second session of the 105th Congress, the Senate voted 11 times in 29 attempts to invoke cloture. 
The result was a 38 percent success rate for Majority Leader Trent Lott, R-Miss. In the first session, cloture 
was invoked seven times in 24 attempts, a 29 percent rate. Technically, invoking cloture allows the leaders 
to break off filibusters. But true filibusters – in which opponents hold the floor for hours on end to stymie 
supporters of a bill – have become rare. Now, simply the threat of a filibuster prompts leaders to file a 
cloture motion to gauge support for a measure. The number of cloture votes also speaks to the continued 
level of partisanship in the Senate. Democrats spent all year assailing Republicans for minimal 
accomplishments, and Republicans spent the year declaring that was because the Democrats were thwarting 
the popular will (1998 CQ Almanac, 1-4). 
 
 Many Republican 
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congressional leaders believed that voters’ support for Clinton would eventually decline 
as it became clear that he had at least misled the public and at worst had lied to a grand 
jury, and they thought Republicans would reap the benefits at the next election. With 
these thoughts in mind, they did not push a legislative agenda as strongly as they had in 
previous years. As a result, for the first time since the modern budget process was 
established in 1974, Congress did not pass a fiscal budget resolution. In the meantime, 
Clinton took advantage of the delayed budget negotiations to shift the focus from his own 
troubles to the Democrats’ agenda of 100,000 new teachers and tighter curbs on managed 
care. Democrats scored some important victories in the budget deal, including a $1.1 
billion down payment on Clinton’s new teacher program.49
In 1999, Republican congressional leaders were hard-pressed to lay the 
groundwork for the 2000 presidential election campaigns. But the first session of the 
106th Congress was undermined by the bitter partisanship left over from Clinton’s 
impeachment by the House in December 1998 and his trial and acquittal in the Senate in 
early 1999. Congress made little legislative progress in 1999.
 
50
                                                 
49 Clinton vetoed five bills in 1998, bringing the total for the 105th Congress to eight. Lawmakers did not 
attempt to override any of the 1998 vetoes. However, lawmakers did succeed in overriding one of the three 
1997 vetoes, salvaging a bill (HR 2631) that restored $287 million in military construction spending. An 
attempt to override a second 1997 veto – of a bill (HR 1122) to ban what sponsors describe as “partial birth” 
abortions – failed in the Senate Sept. 18 (1998 CQ Almanac, 1-5). 
 
50 During the first session of the 106th Congress, though lawmakers were busy – they took 985 recorded 
votes, the third-highest number in the decade – bill signings were far less frequent. The number of bills 
enacted into law, 170, was the third-lowest in 10 years. The number of bills and resolutions introduced was 
6,593 in total; 2,352 in the Senate and 4,231 in the House, the third-highest number in the decade (1999 CQ 
Almanac, 1-5). 
 As the CQ Almanac 
summed up the situation: “power between the parties is divided, congressional majorities 
are narrow, civility is on the decline – and a pivotal election is on the horizon” (1999 CQ 
Almanac, 1-3). 
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Clinton had some good news and some bad news in 1999. On the bright side, he 
was acquitted by the Senate on Feb. 12 of charges that he committed perjury and 
obstructed justice. The first article was rejected, 45-55; the second article was rejected, 
50-50. A two-thirds majority would have been required to convict. It was second 
impeachment trial of a United States president. According to Ware (2001), “divided 
government became much more a matter of confrontation between the president and the 
party leaderships in the Congress… In some respects, therefore, the Clinton impeachment 
proceedings can be understood as the culmination of a long-term movement towards 
partisan warfare operating through divided government” (34). 
President Clinton continued to suffer from partisan politics in Congress. The 
Senate’s rejection of a treaty to expand restrictions on nuclear testing was one of 
Clinton’s most embarrassing foreign policy setbacks. Votes in the spring on the military 
deployment in Kosovo were also muddled by partisan sentiment and unwillingness to go 
too far out on a limb. On a tie vote, the House rejected a symbolic resolution (S Con Res 
21) to endorse the air bombing campaign that Clinton had launched five weeks before. A 
month later, the Senate narrowly blocked an amendment to the annual defense 
authorization bill (S 1059 – PL 106-65) that would have required Clinton to get express 
congressional permission before deploying ground troops. In sum, both Republicans and 
Democrats spent much of the year blaming each other for what was not going to pass and 
fighting over credit for the rest. 
  For the second session of the 106th Congress, more turned out to be less. While 
president Clinton has signed more than 370 laws in 2000, dozens of those measures were 
to name post offices and public buildings. Neither Republicans nor Democrats made big 
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scores in enacting key initiatives.51
The budget debate intensified shortly before the scheduled Oct. 6 adjournment, 
when Republicans decided to reverse the pattern of earlier years and refused to give in to 
Clinton’s spending demands. As a result, the two sides battled bitterly over the final 
appropriations measures, passing 22 continuing resolutions while they tried to finish their 
work. Facing hostile partisanship from the majorities in both the House and the Senate, in 
the meantime, Clinton continued to use the presidential veto and veto threat to win major 
concessions from Congress on a range of issues through the end of his term (LeLoup & 
Shull, 2003, 3).
 The presidential election campaign jammed the 
legislative gears a bit, but there were other factors to blame for the unproductive session. 
According to Sarah Binder, “institutional dynamics” wreaked as much havoc as political 
obstacles. For instance, “House and Senate Republicans could not agree how to proceed 
on politically difficult measures such as broader federal regulation of managed-care plans, 
which died in a House-Senate conference. While House Republicans pushed legislation 
they knew could pass with their razor-thin majority, Senate Republicans were less eager 
to engage in the procedural wrangling necessary to move their priorities. Senate 
Democrats mastered the art of the filibuster and used it well” (2000 CQ Almanac, 1-3). 
52
In sum, during the period, President Clinton suffered a serious setback in 
implementing his domestic agenda and his foreign policies as well. His leadership was 
 
                                                 
51 During the second session of the 106th Congress, a total of 410 public laws were enacted. 
Bills/Resolutions were introduced 4,247 in total, 1,546 in the Senate, 2,701 in the House. The number of 
recorded votes was 901 in total, 298 in the Senate, 603 in the House. Clinton vetoed 7 times, and no vetoes 
were overridden by Congress (2000 CQ Almanac, 1-6). 
 
52 Clinton vetoed 37 bills during his two terms, including 14 appropriations bills. Congress overrode him 
only twice, enacting measures to limit shareholder lawsuits (PL 104-67) and to restore military construction 
spending that Clinton had struck using his short-lived, line-item veto power (PL 105-159) (2000 CQ 
Almanac, 1-5).  
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critically weakened and damaged due mainly to partisan opposition from the Republican 
majority in Congress. This troubled interbranch relationship, along with the intensified 
partisan politics, significantly influenced his foreign policy choices toward North Korea. 
 
4.2.3. Presidency vs. Congress: North Korea 
 
Clinton often found it more difficult to deal with the Republican critics of his 
Korea policy in Congress than with North Korean counterparts, particularly under 
divided government. Despite the conclusion of the Agreed Framework in 1994, the 
Clinton administration was either unable or unwilling to abide fully by its terms due in 
large part to the resistance of Congress after the Republican victory in 1994. A number of 
conservative Republican members of Congress attempted to constrain Clinton’s 
flexibility in managing the Agreed Framework and the Korean Energy Development 
Organization (KEDO) operations. 
The Geneva Agreed Framework in 1994 and KEDO Agreement in 1995 both 
immediately triggered intense partisan wrangling between the President Clinton and the 
Republican-controlled Congress. The Republicans, with majorities in both chambers of 
the Congress after the midterm elections in 1994, took advantage of the North Korean 
nuclear issue to criticize Clinton’s foreign policy. They claimed that Clinton had offered 
too many concessions to Pyongyang in return for its compliance with the IAEA’s full-
scope safeguards agreement. 
The Republican Congress labeled the Agreed Framework a product of Clinton’s 
appeasement policy. In January, 1995, Senator Frank Murkowski (R-AK) criticized the 
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agreement in these terms, and Senator John McCain (R-AZ) also declared that the 
Clinton administration “has extended carrot after carrot, concession after concession, and 
pursued a policy of appeasement based, in my view, on the ill-found belief that North 
Koreans really just want to be part of the community of nations and want diplomatic 
relations” (Mathis, 1994). Steven Mufson, Washington Post columnist, appropriately and 
concisely summarized the perception and attitude of Republican lawmakers toward the 
Agreed Framework:  
 
To many Republicans, remedying the flaws in the accord represented more than a 
matter of bargaining. It became a moral crusade. With reports trickling out about 
repression and starvation in North Korea… many Republicans decided that the 
United States should view the Kim Jong Il regime as one of unmitigated evil. 
Rather than look for a reason to reengage North Korea and renegotiate the Agreed 
Framework, they wanted to rip it up completely, not only ending the construction 
of the new, somewhat safer reactors but also cutting off fuel oil shipments to the 
North. After all, they were only propping up an immoral regime (cited in 
Carpenter & Bandow, 2004, 48-49). 
 
Efforts from the Republican Congress to block or modify the agreement followed. 
In March 1995, the Senate adopted an amendment by Murkowski barring the use of new 
funds to implement the Agreed Framework. Republicans said the agreement would not 
succeed in preventing North Korea from developing nuclear weapons. Jesse Helms (R-
NC) also tried to bar use of any other funds for the agreement without congressional 
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approval, but in vain. In June 1995, the House voted on an amendment to the foreign aid 
authorization bill that would have required that Congress be notified of any 
reprogramming of funds within accounts that already were authorized and appropriated 
by Congress for implementing the deal. The Clinton administration objected to the 
restriction. 
In September 1995, the House approved a resolution calling for stricter terms in 
the deal with Pyongyang, urging that South Korea be declared “the only acceptable 
source” for the LWRs. Representative Doug Bereuter (R-NB), Chairman of the 
International Relations Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific, sponsored the resolution 
saying, “North Korea remains an outlaw state that will not easily adapt itself to 
international norms” (as cited in 1995 CQ Almanac, 10-24). But Representative Lee H. 
Hamilton (D-IN), ranking Democrat on the International Relations Committee, argued 
that such a resolution “still amounts to a unilateral rewriting of the U.S.-North Korean 
agreed framework” and “makes the president’s job all the more difficult” (as cited in 
1995 CQ Almanac, 10-24). In the Senate, Mitch McConnell (R-KY), Chairman of the 
Appropriations Subcommittee on Foreign Operations, proposed to bar U.S. energy aid to 
North Korea, unless the North lived up to previous commitments to establish political and 
economic ties with the South. In a letter to senators, the State Department declared that 
enactment of his provision would “greatly hinder, if not destroy” efforts by the Clinton 
administration to implement a nuclear agreement with North Korea (as cited in 1995 CQ 
Almanac, 11-44). 
Congress also made it difficult for Clinton to provide economic aid to North 
Korea. Representative Sonny Callahan, chairman of the House Appropriations 
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Committee, proposed to provide only $3 million of the $22 million sought by the White 
House to live up to the agreement. Clinton used the threat of a veto. As a result, Callahan 
offered an amendment to raise the money to $13 million, still far short of the president’s 
proposal. Likewise, the Senate also recommended cutting funding for the KEDO to $13 
million. Clinton again used the threat of a veto. Finally, the bill was approved to provide 
$22 million (Barilleaux & Kim, 1999). 
In 1996, Clinton even had to use an all-purpose presidential waiver, known as 
614(a) authority, to secure funds for KEDO. In 1998, when Clinton requested $35 million 
to pay KEDO obligations, the House responded with zero funds. The House bill, 
furthermore, prevented the president from using the 614(a) waiver to drum up more 
assistance for KEDO from other sources. The Senate required the president to certify that 
North Korea was not selling ballistic missiles to other rogue states and terrorist groups 
before KEDO funds would be released. After Clinton threatened to veto the legislation, a 
final compromise met the president’s request. However, Congress retained a “Special 
Authorities Amendment” that restricted the executive branch from using the 614(a) 
waiver to authorize more than the $35 million already appropriated by the Congress. 
Finally, Congress warned Clinton that the 614(a) waiver could be repealed, if abused. 
Nonetheless, Clinton had to use the waiver again to secure a total of $65.1 million for 
KEDO—$30.1 million more than Congress had appropriated (Lee & Miles, 2006, 163). 
Thus, presidential budget requests for the delivery of heavy fuel oil to North 
Korea were often not sufficient to meet the cost of the oil. Even in the years that 
Congress fully appropriated the request, however, Clinton had to secure money from 
other sources. By the time the Agreed Framework was nullified in 2002, the Clinton and 
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Bush administrations had together spent almost $90 million more on KEDO than 
Congress had earmarked for the program (Lee & Miles, 2006, 161). 
 
Table 7 shows the executive expenditures on KEDO vs. congressional 
appropriations from FY1996 to FY2002. 
 
Table 7. Executive Expenditures on KEDO vs. Congressional Appropriations, 1996-2002 
 
Fiscal 
Year 
Congressional  
Appropriations for 
KEDO (US$) 
Total U.S. 
Expenditures for KEDO 
(US$) 
Total Expenditures 
above Appropriation 
(US$) 
1996 22,000,000 22,000,000 0 
1997 25,000,000 25,000,000 0 
1998 40,000,000 50,000,000 10,000,000 
1999 35,000,000 65,100,000 30,100,000 
2000 35,000,000 64,400,000 29,400,000 
2001 55,000,000 75,000,000 20,000,000 
2002 95,000,000 95,000,000 0 
1995-2002 307,000,000 396,500,000 89,500,000 
 
Note: The Agreed Framework was signed in October 1994, after the appropriations process for 
the fiscal year 1995 had passed. The Clinton administration informed Congress that 
approximately $5.5 million would be necessary in FY1995 to supply North Korea with the first 
shipment of heavy oil mandated by the agreement. This payment, along with $4 million for 
administrative expenses, was made by reprogramming FY1995 Department of Defense funds. 
(The actual payment was made to KEDO in October 1995, the first month of FY1996.) 
 
SOURCE: Adapted from K. Lee & A. Miles. (2006) “North Korea on Capitol Hill.” In J. Feffer 
(Ed.), The Future of US-Korean Relations: The Imbalance of Power. New York: Routledge, 162. 
 
Thus, the Republican Congress continued to obstruct the implementation of the 
Agreed Framework through its purse power. In 1998, Representative Sonny Callahan (R-
AL) said, “we do not dictate [policy to the administration]. However, I [am] firmly 
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convinced that we ought to move beyond the current policy of the Korean Energy 
Development Corporation” (as cited in Miles, 2005). 
In addition, the presidential certification process became more and more complex, 
narrowing the negotiating space for the executive branch in dealing with Pyongyang, and 
these complications became increasingly salient during the Bush administration. The 
House International Relations Committee approved the American Overseas Interests Act 
(HR 1561 – H Rept. 104-128, Part I) on May 15, 1995, providing authorization for both 
the State Department and foreign aid accounts. The vote was 23-18 on party lines. The 
bill proposed to fold the three independent agencies—U.S. Agency for International 
Development, U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, and the United States 
Information Agency— into an expanded State Department, mandated deep cuts in aid for 
poor countries, and included provisions to require changes in North Korea policy. The 
bill required that even small amounts of aid for North Korea, provided as part of the 1994 
Geneva Agreement, must go through congressional reprogramming procedures, making it 
easier for Republican members of Congress to block the assistance (1995 CQ Almanac, 
10-4). 
The normalization of political and economic relations with North Korea also 
encountered opposition from the Republican Congress. The Clinton administration could 
not proceed rapidly to lift sanctions against North Korea because of the opposition. 
Robert Gallucci, the chief negotiator of the 1994 Agreement, complained that 
“congressional and press skeptics and critics did lead us to take the minimum 
interpretation of sanctions lifting” (as cited in Carpenter & Bandow, 2004, 50). In 1999, 
Representative Benjamin Gilman (R-NY), chairman of the House Committee on 
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International Relations, introduced an amendment to the 1995 American Overseas 
Interests Act in order to require that Clinton take further steps toward upgrading 
diplomatic relations with North Korea only if and when North Korea entered into a 
dialogue with South Korea on several issues.53
A leading Republican candidate for president, Robert Dole (R-KS), declared that 
“a bad deal is often much more worse than no deal at all” and asserted that “the greatest 
immediate security threat in Asia is the Stalinist regime in North Korea, armed to the 
teeth, determined to develop weapons of mass destruction and the means to deliver 
them…. President Clinton failed to hold North Korea to its 1991 commitments to resume 
bilateral North-South talks and to work with South Korea for a nuclear-free Peninsula. 
 The House approved the amendment, 305-
120. The amendment would prevent any U.S.-North Korea agreement on nuclear issues 
from taking effect unless Congress enacted a joint resolution saying that North Korea had 
complied with international non-proliferation agreements. In particular, Gilman’s 
amendment would require Pyongyang to implement the 1994 Geneva Agreement to 
freeze its nuclear weapons program and allow international inspections before receiving 
international aid.  
Other critics also argued that LWRs were not necessarily “proliferation-resistant.” 
James A. Baker III, former secretary of state under President George H. W. Bush 
complained that “our policy of carrots and sticks gave way overnight to one of carrots 
only—fuel oil to help run North Korea’s beleaguered economy, two new nuclear reactors, 
and diplomatic ties” (as cited in Lee, 2006, 181-82). 
                                                 
53 Representative Edward J. Markey of Massachusetts also sponsored this amendment with Gilman (1999 
CQ Almanac, 14-10).  
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His accommodation of North Korea, and his neglect of our ally’s well-founded concerns, 
set a pattern that has continued to this day: appeasing the North, slighting the South, and 
ignoring the strategic consequences” (as cited in Lee, 2006, 185). He also criticized the 
Agreed Framework as a giveway to one of the world’s last hard-line communist outposts 
(1996 CQ Almanac, 10-52). 
Therefore, President Clinton faced a difficult challenge to make the Agreed 
Framework and KEDO work efficiently and effectively. He did not want his North Korea 
policy to become a potentially explosive campaign issue readily exploitable by the 
Republicans. However, heavily constrained by fiscal and legal limits from the 
Republican-controlled Congress, Clinton could not play a decisive leadership role in 
improving U.S.-North Korea relations, especially through KEDO. Because of the lack of 
financial and legal support from Congress, Clinton had to calibrate his North Korea 
policy carefully and often heavily rely on South Korea and Japan for assisting with the 
delivery of heavy oils to North Korea. 
In the meantime, when the Republican Party became a majority in both chambers 
of Congress as a result of the midterm elections in September 1994, the new Republican 
majority requested that the Clinton administration appoint a North Korea Policy 
Coordinator. This was another way for the Congress to criticize Clinton’s North Korea 
policy and was one of the most successful efforts by congressional Republicans to 
constrain Clinton’s leadership and initiative as well. A new provision in the “Omnibus 
Consolidated and Emergency Supplemental Act (PL 105-277)” in October 1998 
mandated that “not later than January 1, 1999, the President shall name a North Korea 
Policy Coordinator, who shall conduct a full and complete interagency review of United 
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States policy toward North Korea, shall provide policy direction for negotiations with 
North Korea related to nuclear weapons, ballistic missiles, and other security related 
issues, and shall also provide leadership for United States participation in KEDO.” This 
bill imposed several stringent conditions on the use of a fund of $35 million available for 
KEDO, and it required the president to certify that “the United States is fully engaged 
efforts to impede North Korea’s development and export of ballistic missiles” (as cited in 
Lee, 2006, 195-96). 
Clinton appointed former Secretary of Defense William J. Perry as the North 
Korea policy coordinator in late 1998. Perry immediately found himself caught between 
the wishes of the president and the interests of the Congress. The views of the Republican 
Party were so sharply divergent from the Clinton administration’s North Korea policy 
that mutual consensus on a new policy was highly unlikely. For example, Representative 
Gilman (R-NY) criticized the Agreed Framework as a “deeply flawed accord that has 
failed to change North Korea’s behavior as it was predicted it would” (as cited in Lee, 
2006, 196). He believed that “North Korea has used the Agreed Framework as a cover for 
their real goal: the ability to deliver nuclear weapons against the United States by the end 
of the century” (as cited in Lee, 2006, 196). He also denounced the four-party talks as “so 
ineffective and so meaningless to North Korea that there has been great difficulty in even 
arranging a date for the next meeting” (as cited in Lee, 2006, 196). 
Representative Dana Rohrabacher (R-CA) also labeled Clinton’s North Korea 
policy “the most nonsensical program he had ever heard of” (as cited in Lee, 2006, 196). 
Furthermore, he declared that “when it comes to North Korea, our goal should not be the 
status quo, it should not be stability; our goal should be the overthrow of that government 
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and the replacement of that government with something that is more consistent with the 
democratic values our country is supposed to represent” (as cited in Lee, 2006, 196). 
Criticism of Clinton’s North Korea policy was not limited to Republicans. A 
group of policy analysts headed by Richard L. Armitage, former Assistant Secretary of 
Defense for International Security Affairs, issued a report on “A Comprehensive 
Approach to North Korea” in March 1999. The report characterized Clinton’s policy as 
“fragmented,” “reactive,” and “politically unsustainable.” The report also recommended 
that if diplomacy failed, the United States should take a more ready and robust posture, 
including a willingness to interdict North Korean missile exports on the high seas. This 
approach was realized as the “Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI)” during the next 
Bush administration, and Armitage further recommended that the United States consider 
the option of preemption, based on “precise knowledge of North Korean facilities, 
assessments of probable success, and clear understanding with our allies of the risks” (as 
cited in Lee, 2006, 196). This approach came to be called “the Bush Doctrine” and was 
declared part of the 2002 National Security Strategy of the United States of America 
during the next Bush administration. 
Perry paid a visit to Pyongyang from May 25 through 28, 1999. On the trip, he 
carried a letter from Clinton addressed to Kim Jong Il. He wanted to see Kim Jong Il, but 
was unsuccessful. In early September 1999, Perry submitted his report to President 
Clinton and the Congress. The Perry Report was based on a “two-path” strategy. If the 
North accepted the path of cooperation, the report recommended that the United States 
should normalize relations with North Korea, relax economic sanctions, and take other 
“positive steps.” If Pyongyang chose the path of confrontation, however, the report 
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recommended that Washington take measures to contain North Korea. The report 
negatively “characterized North Korea as isolated, reprehensible, enigmatic, suspicious, 
and vulnerable and referred to its longstanding record of blackmail, threats, and 
provocations” (Lee, 2006, 198). 
The Perry Report, however, did not mollify the deeply entrenched Republican 
critics of Clinton’s North Korea policy. In November 1999, just a few weeks after the 
release of the Perry Report, the North Korea Advisory Group in the House of 
Representatives consisting of nine leading Republican House members chaired by 
Benjamin Gilman (R-NY) submitted the Gilman Report to Speaker J. Dennis Hastert (R-
IL). The Gilman report criticized Clinton for his soft approach to North Korea, which 
allowed it to be a direct threat to the United States, and concluded that Clinton’s North 
Korea policy did not address this military threat, that food aid was poorly monitored, and 
that the US government did not address other critical issues such as drug trafficking, 
terrorism, counterfeiting, and human rights (North Korea Advisory Group [NKAG], 
1999). 
The food aid issue was a “red flag” for the North Korea Advisory Group, which 
continuously used the issue of monitoring to focus their attack. They NKAG argued that 
if monitoring remained unsatisfactory, the Secretary of State should consider changes in 
U.S. policy on food aid to North Korea. Democrats criticized the report. Representative 
Tony Hall (D-OH), for example, complained that the report had a “negative bias” without 
offering proof. Evoking former Republican president Ronald Reagan, he said, “if we 
refuse to help people who live under brutal regimes, even when we can hide behind the 
excuse that we can’t absolutely guarantee they are getting food, we are betraying 
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President Reagan’s policy that a hungry child knows no politics” (as cited in Lee & Miles, 
2006, 164). The issue of food aid monitoring, however, did not gain sufficient traction 
during the Clinton administration. 
Since the Republicans just wanted to “highlight what they considered deficiencies 
in the Clinton’s administration’s approach” (Hathaway & Tama, 2004, 714), the North 
Korea Advisory Group “did not articulate a coherent alternative to administration policy 
or make a concerted effort to overturn it” (Hathaway & Tama, 2004, 732). But it still had 
a destructive impact on Clinton’s North Korea policy, making him unable for supporting 
the 1994 Geneva agreement, and reluctant to improve diplomatic relations between 
Washington and Pyongyang. 
The Gilman Report clearly contrasted with the Perry Report. The former 
concluded that North Korea’s comprehensive threat to the United States had increased 
since the Agreed Framework was signed. It also claimed that the Perry Report did not 
adequately address other North Korean issues such as human rights, political and 
economic liberalization, terrorism, drug trafficking, political prisoners, and counterfeiting. 
It claimed that U.S. economic assistance had been delivered to help sustain a dictatorial 
regime in North Korea. The result, the Gilman Report declared, was that “North Korea 
can now strike the United States with a missile that could deliver high explosive, 
chemical, biological, or possibly nuclear weapons” (as cited in Lee, 2006, 199). Thus, the 
Perry process was expected to face continuing obstacles and difficulties from the 
Republican Congress. 
The Clinton administration, however, continued to adhere to the Geneva Agreed 
Framework and the KEDO agreement, but its annual delivery of heavy fuel oil to North 
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Korea encountered continuous restrictions and delays because the Republican Congress 
was increasingly skeptical and critical of Clinton’s North Korea foreign and nuclear 
policy. This partisan acrimony intensified when Kumchang-ri in North Korea began to 
emerge as a new suspected nuclear site. It would be a serious violation and breach of the 
Geneva Agreed Framework. Suspicions about Kumchang-ri also arose just when 
partisanship in U.S. politics was culminating in the partisan impeachment of President 
Clinton by the Republican legislators in late 1998. Another crisis also broke out in 1998, 
caused by Pyongyang’s sudden launching of a Taepodong missile, a multi-stage rocket 
that flew over Japan into the Pacific, in apparent response to U.S. accusations regarding 
the suspected nuclear site at Kumchang-ri. 
Not surprisingly, the Republicans immediately capitalized on the missile launch 
as another opportunity to criticize Clinton’s North Korea policy, presenting it as hard 
evidence of the policy’s failure. Representative Robert Livingston (R-LA), chairman of 
the House Appropriations Committee, said, “I just don’t see any reason to proceed with 
this failed policy” (as cited in Carpenter & Bandow, 2004, 51). He further argued that 
funding for the Agreed Framework “should be discontinued” and that the Clinton 
administration “ought to stop talking to them, stop appeasing them,” because it is “a 
pretty good excuse just to get out of this agreement” (as cited in Carpenter & Bandow, 
2004, 51).  Republican Senator Frank Murkowski criticized the 1994 agreement as “folly” 
and added, “our carrot-and-stick approach is all carrots and no stick… We were too quick 
to provide North Korea with the goodies before we knew the truth” (as cited in Carpenter 
& Bandow, 2004, 53). 
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In the House, even Benjamin Gilman (R-NY), Republican moderate, took a hard 
line, arguing that the 1994 agreement was “fatally flawed,” while Representative 
Christopher Cox (R-CA) said, “U.S. policy is conducting a one-sided love affair with the 
regime in North Korea” (as cited in Carpenter & Bandow, 2004, 55). Representative 
Sonny Callahan (R-AL) also proclaimed, “I have said from the beginning that KEDO is 
an irresponsible policy that we never should have entered into in the first place. But the 
administration chose to do it, an we have funded it for the last 4 or 5 years, but it is time 
to take a serious look at KEDO, especially in light of the fact they are now shooting 
missiles over Japan and indications are that they have missiles that very possibly could 
reach Alaska” (as cited in Lee & Miles, 2006, 163). 
Convinced that the Kumchang-ri facility housed a covert nuclear weapons 
program, the Republican Senators also “reacted sharply to these actions and added two 
provisions to the fiscal year 1999 foreign aid bill that had the effect of killing Clinton’s 
nonproliferation policy. One amendment, proposed by John McCain, conditioned aid to 
KEDO on a presidential certification that North Korea had halted its nuclear program (or 
on a waiver on national security grounds). The other amendment, proposed by Senator 
Dan Coats (R-Ind.), required that the administration share intelligence data on North 
Korea’s nuclear program with congressional committees. Congressional Quarterly 
described these two votes as ‘the end of administration plans’” (Barilleaux & Kim, 1999). 
The crisis, however, was finally defused in March 1999, after North Korea 
allowed the U.S. officials to inspect alleged nuclear site at Kumchang-ri, and the U.S. 
inspection team had found no evidence of a clandestine nuclear program there. On March 
6, 1999, the United States and North Korea released a joint statement in which North 
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Korea agreed to allow the U.S. delegations to access and inspect the site at Kumchang-ri. 
After the visits and the inspection, the group of fourteen American technical experts 
concluded that the site did not violate the Geneva Agreed Framework. In order to reward 
Pyongyang for its cooperation with Washington over the Kumchang-ri site and its 
moratorium on long-range missile tests and to support and implement the Perry process, 
the Clinton administration decided on September 17, 1999, to relax the economic 
sanctions against North Korea administered under the Trading with the Enemy Act, the 
Defense Protection Act, and the Export Administration Regulations. However, the rapid 
pace of U.S.-North Korean rapprochement provoked the Republicans to launch another 
partisan attack against Clinton’s North Korea policy, which they took to be an 
“appeasement policy.” This attack clearly and evidently had partisan overtones in the 
context of the presidential contest between Al Gore and George W. Bush. 
Republican congressional leaders continuously maneuvered to increase 
restrictions on the U.S. delivery of heavy fuel oil to North Korea and on the U.S. transfer 
of nuclear facilities and materials necessary for the LWR project in North Korea. On July 
19, 2000, they attempted to pass the “North Korea Nonproliferation Act of 2000” (H.R. 
4860), which was intended to require a mandatory re-imposition of economic sanctions 
against North Korea if Pyongyang launched a long-range missile again or transferred 
missiles or missile technology to any country included on the U.S. list of state sponsors 
of terrorism. A report prepared by the 39-member House Policy Committee chaired by 
Christopher Cox (R-CA) also stated that “North Korea is not merely a dictatorship: it is a 
uniquely monstrous tyranny that has tormented the Korean people for half a century, 
creating the most completely totalitarian and militarized state in human history. Today, 
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even while North Korea is faltering on the edge of economic collapse, it poses one of the 
greatest threats to American and allied interests anywhere around the globe” (Cox, 2000, 
Web). 
The report argued that “enhancements to North Korea’s threatening military 
capabilities, centered on the development of nuclear weapons and long-range delivery 
systems…. are subsidized with U.S. taxpayer funds provided by the Clinton-Gore 
administration” (Cox, 2000, Web). Under the Clinton administration, according to the 
report, “North Korea has become the largest recipient of U.S. foreign aid in the Asia-
Pacific region” (Cox, 2000, Web). It also notes, “along with Clinton-Gore foreign aid, 
North Korea’s long-range missile development continues to this day” (Cox, 2000, Web). 
Like the Gilman Report, this report also criticized the Perry Report as an extension of 
appeasement policy and denounced the Clinton administration’s naivete in using U.S. 
taxpayers’ money to meet the demand of “this despicable Stalinist regime”” (Cox, 2000). 
The House adopted an amendment by Representative Doug Bereuter (R-NB) that would 
“bar the federal government from indemnifying U.S. companies that supplied parts for 
nuclear power plants built in North Korea” (2000 CQ Almanac, 2-77). The same 
provision has been included in the fiscal 2001 defense authorization bill (HR4205). 
In sum, during the period of divided government, both chambers of Congress with 
the Republican majorities challenged, obstructed, and paralyzed Clinton’s North Korea 
policy. In so doing, the Republicans took advantage of all the political weapons given to 
them by the Constitution. Sometimes, they even succeed in effectively reversing U.S. 
policy toward North Korea as stipulated in the agreements already signed by the two 
countries. As a result, President Clinton could not live up to the 1994 Geneva Agreement, 
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and had to give up his travel to Pyongyang for a deal on North Korea’s nuclear and 
missile issue.54
During the period, Congress wielded considerable power to limit Clinton’s ability 
to negotiate with North Korea, to support the 1994 agreement, and to establish a new 
relationship with North Korea. Congress exercised its appropriations power by cutting the 
funding for the construction of the two light-water reactors in North Korea and by 
delaying deliveries of the fuel oil to North Korea on time. Although Congress did not 
always succeed in obstructing Clinton’s leadership on the North Korean issue, “it did 
manage to erect substantial roadblocks. By routinely hammering the administration, 
Congress successfully prevented full implementation of the Agreed Framework. The 
 The result was a pronounced shift away from a conciliatory policy and 
toward a status quo policy on North Korea. 
 
4.3. Conclusion 
 
In 1993-4, President Clinton adopted a more conciliatory policy toward North 
Korea under a unified government, which led to the 1994 Geneva Agreement. Clinton 
was able to do so, because he could expand the win-set with strong support from 
Congress. In 1995-2000, however,  divided government and partisan politics heavily 
constrained President Clinton in his dealings with North Korea. 
                                                 
54 Washington and Pyongyang almost reached a conclusion to end the deal on North Korea’s nuclear and 
missile issue. North Korea wanted President Clinton to come to Pyongyang, but U.S. officials felt it was 
too risky for Clinton to visit Pyongyang without a firm and verifiable agreement on missile issues in 
advance, and were reluctant to send the President without finishing the missile deal before the visit. Clinton 
decided not to go partly because he should have to be prepared in the States for a possible constitutional 
crisis resulted from the prolonged electoral controversies in Florida over the presidential election between 
Al Gore and George W. Bush, and partly because he thought that there was not enough time to finish the 
missile deal with North Korea (Lee, 2006, 206-07). 
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resulting delays and hesitations helped to reinforce a lack of trust between the United 
States and North Korea (Lee & Miles 2006: 160).” 
All of these political challenges made it very difficult for Clinton to live up to the 
agreement, and therefore Clinton was either unable or unwilling to implement other parts 
of the agreement. In other words, the extensive and continuous attacks from the Congress 
mainly deprived the Clinton administration of the opportunity and confidence to take 
bold steps for the diplomatic improvement between the United States and North Korea.  
They largely eliminated the win-set in domestic politics that had existed in the first part 
of his administration. Thus, the shift toward divided government with intensified 
partisanship also led inevitably to a shift in policy toward North Korea—from a more 
conciliatory policy in 1993-1994 to a status quo policy in 1995-2000. 
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V. THE PRESIDENCY, THE CONGRESS, AND U.S. POLICY TOWARD NORTH 
KOREA DURING THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION 
 
President George W. Bush held office from 2001through 2008.55
                                                 
55 For a comprehensive discussion of the Bush presidency, see Rozell & Whitney, 2009; Schier, 2009. And 
for a discussion on President Bush’s national security strategy, see Leffler & Legro, 2008. 
 In 2001-2006, 
he adopted a more aggressive policy toward North Korea under a unified government and 
took a tougher stance on the North Korea nuclear issue. In 2007-2008, however, 
President Bush accepted a more conciliatory policy toward North Korea under a divided 
government, adopting measures from the Six-Party Talks such as “the Initial Actions for 
the Implementation” and “the Second-Phase Actions for the Implementation,” and 
removing North Korea from the list of state sponsors of terrorism. This chapter seeks to 
explain why President Bush, like his predecessor, took two different policy approaches 
toward North Korea during his term of office. 
 
5.1. The Bush Administration under unified government (2001-2006) 
 
In 2001-6, President Bush moved to adopt a far more aggressive policy toward 
North Korea than his predecessor. He chose not to negotiate with Pyongyang on the 
nuclear issue, and he received strong support from Congress in this stance. The result, 
however, was Pyongyang’s first nuclear test in 2006. Then, in Bush’s second term, the 
U.S. gradually adopted a more conciliatory approach. It is impossible to understand this 
pattern without attention to domestic politics within the United States. 
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5.1.1. U.S. Policy toward North Korea during the Bush Administration (2001-2006) 
 
Giving a very good grade to Clinton’s foreign policy record, Stephen M. Walt 
(2000) predicted that no matter who won the 2000 presidential election, his successor 
would follow much the same course. On policy toward North Korea, at least, this 
prediction turned out to be wrong. The Bush foreign policy team criticized the 1994 
Agreed Framework as “a reward for bad behavior,” and characterized Clinton’s policy 
toward North Korea as an appeasement policy and a submission to extortion, even during 
the 2000 presidential election campaign. Such a hard-line position suggested that the 
incoming Bush administration would reverse Clinton’s policy of constructive 
engagement toward North Korea. In fact, the foreign policy of the Bush administration in 
its initial term, particularly toward North Korea, could be described as “ABC”— 
“Anything But Clinton.”56
The changes in the United States’ North Korea policy resulted, in part, in from 
President Bush’s perceptions on Pyongyang that were quite different from the ones of 
those of his predecessor. After the inauguration, President Bush ordered a complete 
policy review. The new administration’s perceptions of North Korea were revealed in the 
terminology they employed: “a failed stated,” “a rogue state,” “an axis of evil,” and “an 
outpost of tyranny.” When Representative John F. Tierney (D-MA), for example, 
criticized the Bush administration for rushing work on missile defense silos, the 
 
                                                 
56 Even after the inauguration of the president Bush, the Bush foreign policy team continuously criticized 
Clinton’s North Korea policy as “deeply, profoundly misguided and wrong” (as cited in Martin, 2007, 85).  
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administration replied that the test interceptors in the five Fort Greely silos could provide 
a rudimentary defense against a missile fired from North Korea (CQ Almanac 2002, 2-
11). Since its inception, the policy of the Bush administration toward North Korea was 
grounded in a preference for “asphyxiation” rather than “oxygen,” for diplomatic 
pressure and economic isolation rather than for rewards for cooperation (Martin, 2007, 
65). 
Bush himself bluntly stated that he was skeptical about the North Korean leader 
and that any negotiation with North Korea would require complete verification of a 
potential agreement (Lee, 2006, 211). In the 2002 National Security Strategy of the 
United States of America, North Korea was placed among the rogue states with ballistic 
missiles and weapons of mass destruction. Although the “rogue state” was one of the new 
threat images of the United States after the Cold War, rogue states were particularly 
demonized after the September 11 terrorist attacks. Such Manichaean phraseology, which 
dominated foreign policy during the Cold War, was given renewed prominence by 
President Bush’s (The White House, 2001; Bush, 2001) declaration, “you are either with 
us or against us.” This logic makes rogue states incomprehensible and irrational, which 
inhibits negotiations and compromise (Litwak, 2000). 
This dualism is also reflected in phrases such as “axis of evil” and “outposts of 
tyranny.” The phrase “axis of evil” was first introduced in the President’s state of the 
Union address in January 29, 2002. In the address, President Bush (The White House, 
2002b) lumped together North Korea, Iran, and Iraq, and declared that the United States 
will never stop fighting against such regimes. The “axis of evil” reference conjured up 
popular memories of the “Axis Powers” during World War II and Ronald Reagan’s 
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condemnation of the Soviet Union as the “Evil Empire” during the Cold War (Lee, 2006, 
219). In her opening statement before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 
Condoleezza Rice also designated North Korea as one of the “outposts of tyranny,” along 
with Cuba, Burma, Iran, Belarus, and Zimbabwe. She continued to say that the United 
States would not stop until “every person living in a ‘fear society’ has finally won their 
[sic] freedom” (Rice, 2005, Web). 
President Bush also frequently spoke about the North Korean leader in harsh 
terms. From the beginning of his Presidency, Bush condemned Kim Jong Il as an 
untrustworthy madman, a pygmy, and an evildoer (Cumings, Abrahamian, & Ma’oz, 
2004, 72). In a discussion with Bob Woodward, he said, “I loathe Kim Jong Il! I’ve got a 
visceral reaction to this guy, because he is starving his people” (as cited in Woodward, 
2002, 340). Former Defense Secretary William Perry said, “I think he [Bush] has come to 
the conclusion that Kim Jong Il is evil and loathsome and it is immoral to negotiate with 
him” (as cited in Cumings, Abrahmian, and Ma’oz, 2004: 73). In one press conference, 
President Bush (The White House, 2005) referred to Kim Jong Il as a dangerous person 
and tyrant. In response, North Korea labeled Bush “a half-baked man in terms of morality 
and a philistine” and “world’s dictator” (Kessler, 2005). 
Based on these perceptions of North Korea and its leadership, President Bush 
introduced new issues to his agenda for a comprehensive approach to North Korea. The 
Bush administration called on Pyongyang to stop selling missiles to countries such as 
Iraq and Iran, even though such exports did not violate any international agreements. 
While Clinton centered on stopping North Korea’s nuclear program and its missile 
program, Bush widened the focus to include all weapons of mass destruction, troop 
121 
 
concentrations, and even internal policy changes (Feffer, 2003, 105). In this way, he 
actually raised the bar much higher than before and clearly showed his mistrust of North 
Korea’s conventional military behavior as well. 
In contrast with the Republican hardliners in Congress, however, Bush did not 
repudiate the Geneva Agreed Framework altogether. Rather, he clarified that he would 
not offer material incentives to Pyongyang prior to seeing tangible evidence of its 
affirmative response and appropriate action. Bush was to rely heavily on sticks in a new 
North Korea policy that would go by different names such as “hawk engagement” and 
“tailored containment” (Feffer, 2003, 105). Bush’s simplistic, moralistic, Manichaean 
approach means that any compromise between good and evil was inconceivable and 
repugnant (Lee, 2006, 219-20). 
The terrorist attacks on September the 11th intensified these already 
uncompromising tendencies.57
                                                 
57 The September 11th terrorist attacks definitely had a real effect on President Bush and his foreign policies 
(Barilleaux & Zellers, 2009). Some even argue that they radically changed the Bush administration’s North 
Korea policy as well (Hwang, 2004). As this section shows, however, the September 11 rather intensified 
its previous uncompromising tendencies toward Pyongyang. 
 
 The 2001 Nuclear Posture Review identified North Korea 
as a state that might be attacked by U.S. nuclear weapons in the near term. According to 
the Nuclear Posture Review, “North Korea, Iraq, Iran, Syria, and Libya are among the 
countries that could be involved in immediate, potential, or unexpected contingencies. All 
have longstanding hostility toward the United States and its security partners; North 
Korea and Iraq in particular have been chronic military concerns. All sponsor or harbor 
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terrorists, and all have active WMD and missile programs” (Department of Defense, 2001, 
16).58
                                                 
58 In a UN conference on nuclear nonproliferation in May 2005, the Bush administration rejected the 
proposal that called for nuclear states to make a legally binding pledge not to attack countries that do not 
possess nuclear weapons (Stockman, 2005). 
 Furthermore, the 2002 National Security Strategy of the United States stated that: 
 
The United States has long maintained the option of preemptive actions to counter 
a sufficient threat to our national security. The greater the threat, the greater is the 
risk of inaction—and the more compelling the case for taking anticipatory action 
to defend ourselves, even if uncertainty remains as to the time and place of the 
enemy’s attack. To forestall or prevent such hostile acts by our adversaries, the 
United States will, if necessary, act preemptively (The White House, 2002a, 15). 
 
The September 11th terrorist attacks might have sparked a rapprochement between 
the United States and North Korea. Immediately after the attacks, North Korea expressed 
its condolences to the victims, announced its intention to cooperate with the United States 
to counter global terrorism, and “was clearly trying to distance itself from any association 
with terror tactics, and the idea that it was connected to Islamist terrorist networks, or 
participated in anything like an ‘Axis’ with Iraq and Iran” (Armstrong, 2006, 17). It was 
hard, however, for the Bush administration to imagine North Korea as an ally in the “war 
on terror.” By associating North Korea with global terrorism, instead, the Bush 
administration invited a hostile response from Pyongyang, aggravated the U.S.-North 
Korean conflict, and wiped out what remained of progress in relations with North Korea 
(Feffer, 2003, 106). 
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The second nuclear crisis on the Korean peninsula nonetheless came as a shock 
when North Korea admitted its covert highly-enriched uranium (HEU) program in 
October, 2002. After visiting Pyongyang from October 3 to 5, 2002, Assistant Secretary 
of State for Asia and the Pacific James Kelly announced that North Korea had not only 
admitted the existence of a secret nuclear program, but it justified the program as a 
response to hostile Bush Administration policies. According to Kelly, when he presented 
intelligence reports on North Korea’s secret program to enrich uranium for nuclear 
weapons on October 3, Kim Gye Gwan, vice minister of foreign affairs of North Korea, 
had completely denied the accusation. But, on the following day, Kang Sok Ju, first vice 
minister of foreign affairs of North Korea, has apparently admitted that North Korea 
possessed not only the highly enriched uranium (HEU) program but more powerful 
things as well, and he blamed the hostile U.S. policy for North Korea’s self-defense 
measures. He reportedly added that the Geneva Agreed Framework had been nullified.59
The Bush administration then asserted that North Korea had violated the 1994 
Agreed Framework, the NPT, the safeguards agreement with the IAEA, and the North-
South Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. President Bush 
called on North Korea to dismantle its HEU program immediately. Events began 
spiraling downward immediately. The following month, the United States, Japan, and 
South Korea decided to suspend further oil shipments to North Korea, and to reassess a 
program for constructing two LWRs at Kumho. Bush’s unprecedented victories in the 
midterm congressional elections in November also strengthened his political position in 
 
                                                 
59 Jeong Se Hyun, South Korean Minister of Unification, reportedly suggested that Kelly had 
misunderstood Kang Sok Ju’s remarks and Kang had not actually admitted the existence of an HEU 
program in North Korea (Lee, 2006, 223). 
124 
 
dealing with North Korea while weakening the Democratic Party’s opposition to his 
North Korea policy in Congress. 
In response, Pyongyang declared the Agreed Framework dead. On 10 January 
2003, furthermore, it announced its withdrawal from the NPT and stated that it was no 
longer bound by its IAEA safeguards agreement. The first round of the Six-Party Talks 
including North Korea, South Korea, China, Japan, Russia, and the United States, began 
in August 2003 to resolve the North Koran nuclear weapons issue. The meeting 
adjourned earlier than expected, however, without bearing any fruit. Although a second 
round of the Six-Party Talks was held in February 2004, the talks once again failed to 
achieve even a joint press release. President Bush demanded the “complete, irreversible 
and verifiable” dismantlement of the North’s nuclear weapons program (the CIVD 
policy). In 2003, in order to support Bush’s CIVD policy and “dismantle first” policy, the 
House proposed the Missile Threat Reduction Act that suggested sanctions on North 
Korea and any state buying ballistic missiles or related technology from Pyongyang. The 
House also proposed prohibiting the transfer of nuclear technology to North Korea in an 
effort to halt the light-water reactor program that had been a part of the Agreed 
Framework.60
                                                 
60 The light-water reactor program is crucial both for the denuclearization of North Korea and for the 
improved relationship between Washington and Pyongyang. North Korea has long insisted on energy 
assistance in the form of light-water moderated reactors in exchange for giving up the graphite-moderated 
reactors in Yongbyon. The day after the 2005 September Joint Statement was issued, the North Korean 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a statement of its own: “A physical groundwork for building bilateral 
confidence is none other than the U.S. provision of light water reactors to North Korea. We strongly 
demand that the United States remove the very cause that compelled North Korea to withdraw from the 
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty by providing light water reactors to it” (as cited in Goldstein, 2009). 
While, the Clinton administration decided to provide North Korea with two light-water reactors in 
exchange for the freezing of North Korea nuclear program, the Bush administration insisted the complete 
shutdown of the LWR project. For a recent discussion on the LWR issue, see Goldstein, 2009. 
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Beginning with the third round of the Six-Party Talks held in Beijing in June 2004, 
however, the Bush administration started to adopt a more flexible policy than in the 
earlier rounds. Due mainly to the changed U.S. stance, the fourth round of the Six-Party 
Talks was finally able to issue the Beijing Joint Statement on September 19, 2005. 
Shortly after the Joint Statement, however, the Bush administration accused North Korea 
of counterfeiting of U.S. dollars and money laundering, and froze North Korean bank 
accounts at Banco Delta Asia. Arguing that the financial sanctions on the bank in Macao 
showed the reluctance of the United States to change its hostile policy toward North 
Korea, Pyongyang continued to demand that Washington unfreeze the bank accounts in 
Macao. Washington’s refusal to do so scuttled the Six-Party Talks and finally led to 
missile launches in July 2006 and a nuclear test in October 2006.61
Based on its new foreign policy principles after the terrorist attacks on September 
11th, the Bush administration narrowed its policy toward North Korea down to three 
options: military action with a preemptive strike (the most aggressive option), 
containment with malign neglect (the status quo option), and engagement with diplomatic 
negotiations (the most conciliatory option). Some neoconservatives clearly preferred a 
preemptive strike. They opposed any political and economic incentives that would help to 
sustain North Korean regime. Following Jeane Kirkpatrick’s views on totalitarian 
 In sum, as seen in the 
passing and signing of the North Korean Human Rights Act in 2004, the united 
government under Republican leadership substantially aggravated U.S.-North Korean 
relations and finally led to a North Korea armed with nuclear weapons. 
                                                 
61 For more detailed discussions on the missile launches in 2006, see Cotton, 2006; Koh, 2006; T. Kim, 
2006; Sigal, 2006; Hayes, 2006a; Hayes, 2006b; Lim, 2006; Feffer, 2006; Cheong, 2006; Pinkston, 2006. 
And for more detailed discussions on the Banco Delta Asia issue, see Hauben, 2007; K. Kim, 2007; T. Kim, 
2007; Cowie, 2006.  
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regimes, neoconservatives believed that the North Korean system could not be reformed 
from within. They were ready and willing to risk a major military conflict with North 
Korea, if it was necessary to stop the spread of WMDs and to change the totalitarian 
regime in Pyongyang. Richard Perle said that “the United States would have to consider a 
surgical air strike to eliminate the nuclear plant at Yongbyon, which he said was a 
relatively easy target” (Schifferes, 2003). When John R. Bolton, former U.S. Ambassador 
to the United Nations, was asked what the Bush policy was toward the North, he 
reportedly answered by pointing at a book entitled The End of North Korea (Cumings, 
Abrahamian, & Ma’oz, 2004, 71-2). In June, 2003, Bolton declared that the United States 
would use all means necessary to eliminate weapons of mass destruction in all rogue 
states (emphasis added, Feffer, 2003, 112). 
Although not all neoconservatives preferred the military option, all of them 
evidently opposed to the engagement policy toward North Korea. Later, Bolton called the 
2007 Initial Actions for the Implementation of the Joint Statement “a bad deal” that 
violated principles that were strongly held in the beginning of the Bush administration 
(Kessler, 2007). Dan Blumenthal and Aaron Friedberg, furthermore, argued that the Six-
Party Talks were “a step in the wrong direction,” rewarding “the world’s worst regime” 
for its bad behavior, and Nicholas Eberstadt expressed his discontent with the deal, 
complaining that “the Bush administration’s North Korean climb-down has been almost 
dizzying to watch… it was proffering a zero-penalty return to the previous nuclear deals 
Pyongyang had flagrantly broken – but with additional new goodies, and a provisional 
free pass for any nukes produced since 2002, as sweeteners” (as cited in McCormack, 
2007, 9). All of them were worried that if it were not stopped any time soon, North Korea 
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would be able to produce about sixty nuclear devices annually and could then easily sell 
them to other rogue states and the international terrorist organizations. They thus argued 
that, if necessary in the face of an imminent threat, the United States should launch a 
unilateral, surgical strike against North Korea nuclear facilities, even without South 
Korean consent. 
There were three main reasons, however, why Washington could not choose this 
military option. First, the United States did not know how many nuclear weapons North 
Korea had already produced and where any North Korean nuclear weapons might be 
located. Second, the surgical strike by Washington might have caused a full-scale 
military conflict on the Korean Peninsula that the United States could not afford, because 
a large portion of the United States military capabilities were already committed to 
Afghanistan and Iraq. Finally, most neighboring countries including South Korea, Russia, 
and China, strongly opposed the military option. 
The administration’s second option was the containment policy of “malign 
neglect,” which was chosen by President Bush for most his term. Many neoconservatives 
preferred this policy. Georgy Bulychev (2007) has noted that the idea of “the 
neoconservatives in 2002-2006 was that regime change was the solution to the WMD 
threat, and that no concessions were to be made to the North Korean regime, which was 
about to collapse anyway and should be assisted by in that by sanctions, isolation and 
subversive activities. Such an approach also fitted nicely with US geopolitical aims – 
containing China (and Russia) and strengthening its alliance with Japan” (Web). 
In pursuit of these goals, the Bush administration refused to negotiate with North 
Korea, declaring that it would “talk” but not “negotiate” until the 4th Six-Party Talks held 
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in Beijing, China, in July 2005. U.S. officials said that such “talks” would in no way 
constitute “negotiations” (Carpenter & Bandow, 2002, 81). Bush simply demanded that 
North Korea follow the CVID principle. During the Beijing Six-Party Talks in 2003, 
James Kelly was “forbidden from making any offers or suggesting even the possibility of 
direct negotiations” (Kaplan, 2004, 41). President Bush “let Kelly talk, but didn’t let him 
say anything meaningful; he went to the table but put nothing on it” (Kaplan, 2004, 41). 
In protest, Charles Pritchard resigned from the Bush administration, saying that “my 
position was the State Department’s envoy for North Korean negotiations, yet we were 
prohibited from having negotiations” (Kaplan, 2004, 42). His retirement indicated that 
the hard-liners were firmly in control of the administration’s North Korea policy 
(Carpenter & Bandow, 2004, 85).62
Graham Allison (2007) has summarized several key elements of the Bush 
administration. First, it demanded CVID as a precondition for anything else. Second, it 
did not want to provide any reward for bad behavior. Third, it refused any bilateral 
negotiations. The Bush administration chose this approach for the following four reasons. 
First, it did not want to be distracted from the war in Iraq by North Korea. Second, some 
neoconservatives in the Bush administration preferred this approach in the hope that 
North Korea would collapse quickly due to its political and economic failures. They 
thought that the time was not on North Korea’s side. Third, the Bush administration 
wanted to give the impression to the rest of the world that it did not reward bad behavior. 
Finally, the administration believed that giving in to blackmail would lead only to more 
 
                                                 
62 See Pritchard (2007) for his “personal, first-hand account of the development and implementation of U.S. 
policy toward North Korea during the first term of President George W. Bush” (ix). 
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blackmail. The Bush approach did not work, however, because Pyongyang ignored 
Washington’s behavior and perceptions. North Korea likes to act rather than to react, a 
preference that may have resulted from the North Korean Juche ideology of self reliance 
(Park, 2002, 148). The North Korean nuclear test epitomizes this self reliance. 
Lastly, there was the option of engagement through diplomatic dialogue and 
negotiations for the Bush administration, which Clinton chose in his presidency in the 
1990s. As seen above, until the 4th Six-Party Talks in 2005, the Bush administration was 
not willing to negotiate with North Korea in earnest. The Bush administration 
demonstrated its changed attitude in the 4th Six-Party Talks, however, which resulted in 
an agreement with a joint statement in September 2005. This attitude change resulted 
from the combined political pressures from inside such as the decline of presidential job 
approval ratings and a power shift from hawks to moderates in the second Bush 
administration, and from outside, such as the worsening situation in Iraq and pressures 
for sincere negotiation from China and South Korea. 
Immediately after the Beijing Joint Statement, however, the Bush administration 
accused North Korea of counterfeiting of U.S. dollars and money laundering and froze 
North Korean bank accounts at Banco Delta Asia in order to make the agreement invalid. 
These accusations “added another layer of complications that detracted from progress in 
the Six-Party Talks tasked with engaging North Korea in a productive dialogue” (Olsen, 
2007, 48). North Korea responded to the accusations by withdrawing from the Six-Party 
Talks, by launching missiles on the fourth of July 2006, and by finally conducting a 
nuclear test in October 2006. 
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In sum, U.S. policy toward North Korea changed, during the first six years of the 
Bush Presidency, from the status quo policy that characterized the last Clinton years to a 
policy of outright hostility. Bush backed away from all negotiations and issued a series of 
strong threats. In response, North Korea implemented more hostile actions of its own. By 
2006, relations between the U.S. and North Korea were at one of the lowest points since 
the conclusion of the Geneva Agreement in 1994.  
 
5.1.2. Presidency vs. Congress: Overview 
 
The 107th Congress opened with an evenly divided Senate, a House that 
Republicans controlled by just six votes, and a president put in office by the Supreme 
Court after an election that was too close to call.63 The session began with Republicans in 
control of both White House and Congress for the first time since president Dwight D. 
Eisenhower. Though their majority was slim, they managed to push through a massive 
tax cut (PL 107-16), Bush’s first top priority, and take significant steps on a rewrite of the 
1965 Elementary and Secondary Education Act, Bush’s second top priority. By the time 
the session ended, however, the Senate had shifted to a Democratic majority, and 
Congress’ agenda had been turned upside down by the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks.64
                                                 
63 In the Senate, the even split of 50 Republicans and 50 Democrats left the tie-breaking vote of Vice 
President Dick Cheney as the GOP’s only edge. 
 
64 During the first session of the 107th Congress in 2001, a total of 136 public laws were enacted. A total of 
6,521 bills/resolutions were introduced (2,203 in the Senate and 4,318 in the House). The number of 
recorded votes was 892 (380 in the Senate and 512 in the House). There were no vetoes by President Bush 
(2001 CQ Almanac, 1-7). 
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The year can be divided into three phases. The first phase was a period of one-
party government, with Republicans narrowly controlling Congress and President Bush 
making the most of his tentative mandate in the early months of his presidency. During 
the period, it was conventional wisdom that, given his narrow electoral victory, Bush 
lacked a mandate for sweeping changes and would have to limit his agenda to proposals 
that had bipartisan support. From the start, however, Bush made it clear he would ask as 
much from Congress as he would if he had won a landslide victory. In June, the defection 
of moderate Republican James M. Jeffords of Vermont abruptly turned the Senate over to 
the Democrats, ending the short-lived period of Republican control of Congress and the 
White House.65 The switch allowed Senate Democrats to challenge the GOP agenda and 
press forward on some of their own issues.66
The final phase began on Sept. 11.
 
67
                                                 
65 Jeffords left the Republican Party saying that he foresaw many disagreements with Bush over issues such 
as tax and spending decisions, the direction of the judiciary, abortion, missile defense, energy and the 
environment. But the biggest, he said, was education – mainly because Bush was not willing to put more 
funding behind the education overhaul, particularly special education (2001 CQ Almanac, 1-6). 
 
66 It took the Senate until the end of June to adopt a new organizing resolution to replace the power-sharing 
agreement Trent Lott and Tom Daschle had worked out for the 50-50 Senate (2001 CQ Almanac, 1-6). 
 
67 For a short chronology of the September 11th terrorist attacks, see the 2001 CQ Almanac, 1-10. For a long 
version, see The New York Times, The 9/11 Report (2004, New York: St. Martin’s Press). 
 After a period of uncertainty and paralysis, 
members of Congress regrouped to rewrite their agenda and search for ways to retain 
their party identities while rallying around the flag. Foreign and defense policy came to 
the fore again for the first time since the end of the Cold War. Senators Tom Daschle (D-
SD) and Trent Lott (R-MS) delivered a bipartisan joint response. “We want President 
Bush to know, we want the world to know, that he can depend on us,” Daschle said. “We 
will take up the president’s initiatives with speed. We may encounter differences of 
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opinion along the way, but there is no difference in our aim. We are resolved to work 
together” (as cited in 2001 CQ Almanac, 1-9). 
Gradually, however, the bipartisan stance all congressional leaders adopted after 
the September 11th attacks began to break down. With an election that could determine 
the control of both chambers less than a year away, both parties looked for ways to win 
the approaching midterm elections. Daschle started using a two-track strategy for his 
party: supporting Bush on the war on terrorism on one hand, while challenging 
Republicans on domestic issues on the other hand. “I agree with what the president is 
doing right now on the international front. I strongly disagree with him on many of the 
economic questions,” he said on Dec. 6 (as cited in 2001 CQ Almanac, 1-11). In response, 
Republicans started calling Daschle an “obstructionist” who was blocking Bush’s agenda 
and could not get anything done. 
Despite the midyear change in the Senate, Bush was able to shape much of what 
Congress accomplished in 2001. However, the most precious lesson from the first session 
of the 107th Congress was that a narrowly divided Congress did not necessarily guarantee 
the bipartisan cooperation that the American public wanted from the Congress. After the 
near tie in the 2000 elections, congressional leaders from both parties said the results 
represented a mandate for cooperation. But the result was just the opposite. With control 
of the House and Senate within reach for either side in 2002, the parties spent most of 
their energy trying to satisfy their political bases and strengthen their congressional 
position. 
In 2002, the second session of the 107th Congress approved the biggest 
reorganization of government since World War II, and it opened the door to a 
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fundamental shift in U.S. foreign policy by authorizing President Bush to launch pre-
emptive strikes to overthrow Saddam Hussein and disarm Iraq.68
From the moment Bush delivered his first official State of the Union address on 
Jan. 29, it was evident that foreign affairs issues would take a top priority. Bush spent the 
 Most of the year was 
shaped by the ongoing impact of the terrorist attacks of Sept. 11, 2001, which continued 
to redraw the political landscape at home and abroad. In an effort to help the government 
do a better job of preventing future attacks, Congress voted to pass legislation creating 
the Cabinet-level Department of Homeland Security. And to eliminate the possibility that 
Iraq could launch attacks against the United States or its neighbors with weapons of mass 
destruction, or give such weapons to terrorist organizations such as al Qaeda, Congress 
also authorized Bush to take military action against Iraq. The resolution encouraged Bush 
to seek the support of the United Nations first, but it authorized the United States to go to 
war with or without U.N. approval as well. 
In the Senate, the session was dominated by the political struggle, because the 
change of just one seat in the November midterm elections would be sufficient to shift 
the majority from the Democrats to the Republicans. With 50 Democrats, 49 Republicans 
and one independent, the margin of control was so close that the neither party could avoid 
fighting over it. The power struggle exposed the dual political reality of the second 
session of the 107th Congress: lawmakers generally were unified on the war against 
terrorism, but divided on domestic issues. Moreover, the fight for control of the Senate 
guaranteed gridlock on almost all legislation that was not urgent. 
                                                 
68 During the second session of the 107th Congress in 2002, a total of 241 public laws were enacted. The 
number of bills/resolutions introduced was 4,274 in total, 1,563 in the Senate, and 2,711 in the House. The 
number of recorded votes was 739 in total, 253 in the Senate, and 484 in the House. No vetoes were used 
by the president Bush (2002 CQ Almanac, 1-6). 
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first half of his speech on the fight against al Qaeda and other terrorist groups to make 
Americans more secure at home. Bush specifically singled out Iraq, Iran, and North 
Korea as an “axis of evil” that was arming to threaten the security of the United States 
and world peace, more generally. It was no wonder, therefore, that protecting the 
homeland was the underlying theme of the second session of the 107th Congress. In 
addition to passing the homeland security bill and authorizing the U.S. war in Iraq, 
Congress created an independent commission to investigate the Sept. 11 attacks. 
On another front, lawmakers sought to address the issue of corporate scandals 
such as those surrounding Enron Corp. and WorldCom Inc.69
The Iraq issue played a pivotal role in the November midterm elections. The 
debate was a boost to Republicans, while it proved damaging to Democrats. Not only did 
 In order to prevent the same 
problems from happening again, Congress voted to pass a bill overhauling the nation’s 
campaign finance laws on the theory that lax oversight was connected to cozy patronage 
relationships. Congress also granted fast-track trade negotiating authority to Bush, passed 
a six-year farm bill that reversed a 1996 policy of limiting federal price supports, and 
responded to the turmoil of the 2000 presidential election by creating new standards for 
federal elections and authorizing $3.9 billion in grants to the states over three years to 
meet them. But the second session of the 107th Congress also left a long list of unfinished 
business. For example, Congress failed to produce a budget resolution. Efforts to pass a 
stimulus bill to address the nation’s economic slump bogged down in deep partisan and 
ideological divisions. 
                                                 
69 Both were fueled by accounting fraud that forced massive layoffs, devastated workers’ retirement 
savings, and added to the stock market turmoil that played havoc with the finances of millions of 
Americans (2002 CQ Almanac, 1-3-4). 
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foreign policy issues tend to favor the Republicans, but they also directed attention away 
from Democratic efforts to talk about the economy and domestic issues. After the 
election, Republicans held the House, and with a net shift of two seats, they recaptured 
the Senate. 
In 2003, the opening session of the 108th Congress marked the first time in 50 
years that Republicans had clear control of both chambers and the White House. They 
used the opportunity to implement Bush’s top legislative agendas.70 All of this came 
against the backdrop of the war in Iraq, the fall of Saddam Hussein’s government, and the 
triumphant capture of Saddam Hussein by year’s end. Having authorized the president to 
launch the war in 2002, Congress was reduced to the role of bystander when the fighting 
broke out, with little authority to do anything but pay the bills.71
Yet congressional Republicans did not always succeed with their agendas. Six of 
Bush’s judicial nominations were held up by filibusters in the Senate. Against Democrats’ 
charges that that Bush was nominating conservative extremists, Republicans were unable 
to round up the votes to break the deadlock. Some of Bush’s second-tier priorities – such 
as limiting medical malpractice awards, redesigning Head Start, and rewriting clean air 
standards – were also sidetracked or left to an uncertain fate in the second session of the 
108th Congress. However, Republicans were convinced that they were building a solid 
 
                                                 
70 During the first session of the 108th Congress in 2003, a total of 198 public laws were enacted. The 
number of bills/resolutions introduced was 7,014 in total, 2,398 in the Senate, and 4,616 in the House. The 
number of recorded votes was 1,136 in total, 459 in the Senate, and 677 in the House. President Bush 
issued no vetoes (2003 CQ Almanac, 1-6). 
 
71 For criticisms of congressional inactivity during the war in Iraq, see Ohaegbulam, 2007; Hansen & 
Friedman, 2009. 
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record of accomplishments for the presidential election of the following year on the 
biggest issues such as the war on terrorism, the economy, and health care. 
This year also was one of increasingly bitter partisanship even by the standards of 
the previous several years. When Senate Democrats blocked six of Bush’s judicial 
nominations, Senate Republicans responded by shutting all Democrats out of the House-
Senate conference committee that wrote the energy bill, and excluded all but two centrist 
Democrats from the conference committee that wrote the final Medicare bill. In 
retaliation, Senate Democrats blocked attempts to begin conference negotiations on two 
other bills. The signs of such partisanship were not only anecdotal. Congressional 
Quarterly’s analysis of “party unity” votes in 2003 clearly showed that “Congress was 
more polarized than it had been in the five decades that CQ had analyzed the annual 
voting patterns on Capitol Hill” (2003 CQ Almanac, 1-4). According to the CQ analysis: 
 
Democrats and Republicans in both chambers stuck together tightly. The average 
House Republican voted with his party on 91 percent of the party unity votes, 
while the average Senate Republican did so 94 percent of the time –– the highest 
unity score ever for Senate Republicans. Senate Democrats, meanwhile, stuck 
together 85 percent of the time, while House Democrats did so 87 percent of the 
time, their highest unity score since 1960 (2003 CQ Almanac, 1-4). 
 
Meanwhile, Bush enjoyed almost complete control of the Congress. He won the 
second major tax cut of his presidency and a Medicare overhaul. He got every penny he 
requested for the war in Iraq. While Congress staged some resistance to Bush’s second-
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tier policies, the president was usually able to get Congress to back down with few 
concessions.72
In 2004, election-year politics and relentless partisan wrangling dominated the 
second session of the 108th Congress. With the exception of a groundbreaking overhaul 
of the intelligence community, no major legislative themes dominated Congress.
 “There were drawbacks, but the president certainly got what he wanted,” 
said George C. Edwards III, political scientist at Texas A&M University (as cited in 2003 
CQ Almanac, 1-4). 
73
The impact of the election went beyond campaigning. Members of Congress from 
both parties used the machinery of Congress and their votes to improve their images with 
voters. Party leaders also worked hard to sharpen distinctions between the parties and to 
 
Instead, the year was mostly about positioning for the November presidential elections. 
Hanging over the entire session was President Bush’s campaign for re-election and 
Massachusetts Democratic Sen. John Kerry’s attempt to unseat him. The race was so 
tight for so much of the year that lawmakers from both parties became active participants. 
The partisan wrangling that characterized the year certainly reflected the heated 
presidential campaign, but it also reflected the increasing tendency for members of 
Congress to play to their core constituencies. Congressional Quarterly’s annual study of 
party-unity votes showed that 2004 was the second-most partisan year in the five decades 
the voting studies had been done, surpassed only by 2003 (2004 CQ Almanac, B-8). 
                                                 
72 The partisan unity also explains why the Bush administration received such a favorable hearing on its 
Iraq policy in Congress from 2001-2006 (Howell & Pevehouse, 2007). 
 
73 During the second session of the 108th Congress in 2004, a total of 300 public laws were enacted. The 
number of bills/resolutions introduced was 3,655 in total, 1,317 in the Senate, and 2,338 in the House. The 
number of recorded votes was 760 in total, 216 in the Senate, and 544 in the House. President Bush issued 
no vetoes (2004 CQ Almanac, 1-6). 
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rally their troops to vote in ways that highlighted those distinctions. They also sought 
votes that they believed would put their opponents in a bad light. The November 
presidential election returned Bush to the White House with 51 percent of the popular 
vote and increased Republican control of both chambers of Congress. Senate Republicans 
picked up four seats, expanding their majority for the next Congress to 55. House 
Republicans ended up 232 seats – a net gain of three, their largest elected majority since 
1995. 
In 2005, when the first session of the 109th Congress opened, Representative 
David Dreier (R-CA), Chairman of the House Rules Committee, said, “We begin the new 
Congress with a sense of purpose and optimism. It’s been a long time since Republicans 
have had this much power in Washington” (as cited in 2005 CQ Almanac, 1). 
Emboldened by the party’s increased control in the Senate, Majority Leader Bill Frist (R-
TN) used his opening speech on Jan. 4 to warn Democrats: “exercise self-restraint and do 
not filibuster judicial nominees” (as cited in 2005 CQ Almanac, 1). Furthermore, 
Republican House leaders made it clear they would punish party members who were not 
sufficiently loyal.74
                                                 
74 Representative Christopher H. Smith (R-NJ) was removed as chairman of the Veterans’ Affairs 
Committee on the first day of the session. The position was to be replaced by Representative Steve Buyer 
(R-IN). Smith had frequently clashed with Republican congressional leaders in his bid to increase funding 
levels for veterans’ programs. It was the first time since Republicans took power a decade before that they 
deposed a sitting chairman (2005 CQ Almanac, 1-4). 
 
 Republicans had competently maintained party unity in the control of 
Congress. In the House, their party loyalty increased a bit over 2004, though not quite 
matching the record high in 1995. But in the Senate, the level of party unity and cohesion 
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of the Republicans dropped well below the level they had reached in the highly partisan 
2003 session.75
In 2006, with the November midterm elections approaching, the second session of 
the 109th Congress was a time of partisan standoff and limited accomplishments.
 
In the meantime, Democrats were demanding strict adherence to party discipline. 
As a result, House Democrats were more unified in 2005 than at any time in the previous 
half-century. In a similar vein, Senate Democrats were almost as united as they had been 
at their high point in 1989. Overall, congressional Republicans maintained a 90 percent 
unity rate on party unity votes, while Democrats were close behind at 88 percent (2005 
CQ Almanac, B-8). As a result, Republicans could not automatically translate their larger 
majority into victory, particularly in the Senate. With Democrats united in opposition, 
Republican congressional leaders had to keep their caucus in tight lockstep to maintain 
cohesive party unity. They could not always accomplish this level of party loyalty, 
however, especially when the Republican caucus was badly fragmented toward the end of 
the year. 
76
                                                 
75 During the first session of the 109th Congress in 2005, a total of 147 public laws were enacted. The 
number of bills and resolutions introduced was 8,319 in total, 2,616 in the Senate, and 5,703 in the House. 
The number of recorded votes was 1,037 in total, 366 in the Senate, and 671 in the House. No presidential 
vetoes were issued (2005 CQ Almanac, 1-8). 
 
76 During the second session of the 109th Congress, a total of 313 public laws were enacted. The number of 
bills and resolutions introduced was 4,753 in total, 2,302 in the Senate, and 2,451 in the House, The 
number of recorded votes was 822 in total, 279 in the Senate, and 543 in the House. President Bush used 
his veto power once (2006 CQ Almanac, 1-8). 
 
President Bush used his first veto in July when the Senate cleared a bill (HR810) that 
would have lifted restrictions on federal funding for embryonic stem cell research. The 
House had passed the measure in 2005. Bush had strongly warned that he would veto the 
embryonic stem cell bill, which was anathema to social conservatives who equated the 
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destruction of embryos with abortion. It was also clear that neither chamber had the votes 
to override his veto. In a carefully planned series of events, therefore, Bush vetoed the 
bill on July 19. The embryonic stem cell bill died that day, because it fell 51 votes short 
of the two-thirds majority needed to override the president. 
As the year went on, Republican congressional leaders increasingly suffered 
because of the unpopularity of the president, the deepening public dismay over the Iraq 
War, and sometimes their own missteps. As a result, Republican members of Congress 
became more independent and divided as they looked to their own needs in advance of 
the election. Democrats, on the other hand, were united. That was particularly noticeable 
in the House. Although Republicans still prevailed most of the time in party unity votes, 
Democrats in both chambers voted as a unanimous bloc more often than did Republicans. 
It was the first time that had happened in the House since 1986. 
The Republican electoral defeat in November 2006 finally ended an era of 
Republican control of the Capitol – one that had lasted a dozen years, except for 18 
months in 2001 and 2002 when the Democrats held the narrow edge in the Senate. It also 
ended the Speakership of J. Dennis Hastert of Illinois, who held the job longer than any 
House Republican in history. The verdict in the midterm elections on Nov. 7 was worse 
for the Republicans than most of them had feared, and far better for the Democrats than 
most of them had hoped. Democrats claimed outright control of Congress for the first 
time since 1994. They picked up 30 seats to take back the House after a dozen years in 
the minority and gained six seats to win back control of the Senate, which Republicans 
had held since the 2002 midterm elections. Democrats also won 20 of the year’s 36 
gubernatorial contests. 
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The dismay and anger of voters over the war in Iraq, Bush’s unpopularity, the 
scandals and the shortage of congressional accomplishments all contributed to the 
Republican’s crushing defeat. The decision of Democrats to accuse Republicans of 
creating a “culture of corruption” in Washington proved timely. In addition, although 
Democrats lacked consensus on how to end the Iraq War, they presented a mainly united 
and vocal front in criticizing Bush’s handling of the war. They also successfully recruited 
some centrist Democrats who were able to win in mildly GOP-leaning districts or states. 
Two-thirds of the seats gained by the Democrats in both chambers in this election were in 
districts or states that jut two years earlier had favored Bush for president over Kerry. 
In sum, however, President Bush enjoyed strong support from Congress during 
his first six years in office. After the terrorist attacks on September 11th,  in particular, 
both chambers of Congress lent unprecedented bipartisan support to President Bush in the 
name of national security. Although partisanship and partisan politics gradually 
intensified as the September 11 terrorist attacks receded into the past, challenges from 
Democratic legislators were never substantial or far-reaching during these days. Under 
unified government from 2001 through 2006, President Bush was able to enjoy a quasi-
imperial presidency (Schlesinger, 1973). 
 
5.1.3. Presidency vs. Congress: North Korea 
 
During Bush’s first six years under unified government with Republican majority 
in Congress, Republicans had shifted away from resisting the full implementation of the 
Agreed Framework and the KEDO agreements toward a more aggressive stance on issues 
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such as North Korea’s role in international terrorism, drug trafficking, and counterfeiting, 
as well as humanitarian concerns such as food aid, human rights, and refugees. During 
the period, Congress created obstacles to U.S. aid to North Korea, not only because of the 
North Korean nuclear proliferation issue, but also because of Pyongyang’s record on 
human rights and refugees.77
Senator Jesse Helms (chairman, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations), 
Representative Henry Hyde (chairman, House Committee on International Relations), 
Representative Christopher Cox (chairman, Republican Policy Committee), and other 
participants in the Gilman Report in 1999 exerted enormous influence over President 
Bush. President Bush could not ignore their policy recommendations, partly because he 
was not experienced in the foreign policy area, and partly because he needed their help 
 
In Bush’s first six years, the administration’s North Korea policy showed a strong 
resemblance to the arguments and strategies initiated and developed by Republican 
members of Congress during the Clinton administration. After conducting a guerrilla war 
in 1994  against the Agreed Framework, which it regarded as “deeply flawed” and a case 
of “appeasement and bribery” (Martin 2007, 87), the Republican Congress continued to 
shape and constrain any efforts to cooperate with North Korea. Furthermore, encouraged 
by the Bush administration to widen its focus beyond the nuclear issue, Congress used 
hearings, resolutions, and legislation to play a critical role in determining how the United 
States would resolve both the nuclear issue and its human rights issues during the first six 
years of the Bush presidency (Lee & Miles, 2006, 160-61). 
                                                 
77 Early in the Bush presidency, it was assumed among conservatives that North Korea could be collapsed 
by a mass exodus of refugees. For more details, see Lee & Miles, 2006, 165.  
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and support to pass his legislative agenda in Congress. On the eve of the summit meeting 
between Bush and South Korean President Kim Dae Jung in 2001, Representative Hyde, 
Cox, and Edward J. Markey even signed a joint letter to the president in which they 
pointed out the deficiencies of the Geneva Agreed Framework. In the letter, they urged 
the president “to avoid making any commitments to foreign governments that would 
prejudice your ability to refine U.S. policy toward North Korea” (as cited in Lee, 2006, 
214). The Bush administration could not disregard such strong anti-North Korean 
sentiments in the Congress. 
Just as Republicans during the Clinton administration attempted to take advantage 
of every major turn of events on North Korea, Democrats during the Bush administration 
were not reluctant to make use of the opportunities that came their way. In Spring 2003, 
the Democrats criticized the contradiction in Bush’s policies toward Iraq and North 
Korea, accusing Bush of being obsessed with the removal of Saddam Hussein while 
disregarding the North Korean nuclear issue. They warned that North Korea posed a 
more direct and imminent threat to the interests of the United States and its allies and the 
sustainment of the nuclear nonproliferation regime than Iraq did. They urged Bush to 
play an active role in addressing the threat from Pyongyang. Senate Minority Leader Tom 
Daschle (D-SD) complained, “We have repeatedly urged the administration to get off the 
sidelines and face up to the developing crisis. The White House continues to sit back and 
watch, playing down the threat, and apparently playing for time. But time is not on our 
side” (as cited in Lee, 2006, 230). Senator Robert C. Byrd (D-WV) also pointed out that 
the North “presents a far more imminent threat than Iraq to the security of the United 
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States” (as cited in Lee, 2006, 230). And Senator Biden complained that Bush’s policy 
toward North Korea was paralyzed by interbureaucratic infighting. 
Meanwhile, Republicans “maneuvered to block U.S. assistance for the KEDO 
operations and LWR projects in Kumho, to condemn the violations of human rights in 
North Korea, to admit North Korean refugees to the United States, to seek the return of 
the Pueblo, and to increase Radio Free Asia’s broadcasting with respect to North Korea 
to twenty-four hours a day” (Lee, 2006, 230).78
                                                 
78 In 1968, North Korea seized the Pueblo, a U.S. Navy intelligence ship monitoring Soviet traffic. North 
Korea has not returned the ship ever since. 
 In particular, the North Korea Democracy 
Act of 2003 (S. 145) cosponsored by Senators Jon Kyl (R-AZ) and John McCain (R-AZ), 
Elizabeth H. Dole (R-NC), and five other Republican colleagues prescribed a wide range 
of restrictions, requirements, and sanctions in U.S. relations with North Korea. It 
stipulated, “It is the sense of Congress that the United States, in conjunction with the 
Republic of Korea and other allies in the Pacific region, should take measures, including 
military reinforcements, enhanced defense exercises and other steps as appropriate, to 
ensure—(1) the highest possible level of deterrence against the multiple threats North 
Korea poses; and (2) the highest level of readiness of the United States and allied forces 
should military action become necessary (quoted in Lee 2006: 230-1).” Furthermore, 
Senator Jon Kyl (R-AZ) introduced a measure requiring an annual report from the 
president describing North Korea’s role in international drug trafficking, which was not 
enacted (Lee & Miles, 2006, 170). Representative Porter Goss (R-FL) even 
recommended using undercover agents to penetrate North Korean government (Martin, 
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2007, 88). These proposed acts clearly reflected the prevailing views of Republican 
members of Congress. 
On October 18, 2004, President Bush finally signed the North Korean Human 
Rights Act (PL 108-333) sponsored by Representative James Leach (R-IA), Chairman of 
the House International Relations Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific. This law was a 
revised version of 2003 North Korea Democracy Act. The law contained a long list of 
human rights abuses perpetrated by the North Korean government and a variety of 
recommendations to support human rights and democracy in North Korea. The law also 
called for the appointment of a Special Envoy for Human Rights in North Korea within 
the State Department. The Special Envoy was expected to provide an annual report on the 
activities of the office and was given a budget of $24 million for four years to support to 
the programs for human rights and democracy in North Korea. In August 2005, President 
Bush appointed Jay Lefkowitz as Special Envoy for Human Rights in North Korea. 
The law appeared to be a punitive measure. It also sent a mixed message to North 
Korea. At the time the act was passed, the Six-Party Talks has been suspended for several 
months with little hope of breaking the deadlock soon. South Korea, in particular, 
expressed strong reservations about the law. Chung Dong-young, South Korean 
Unification Minister, argued that the law would ruin South Korea’s “quiet diplomacy” 
approach. As he put it, “human rights problems in communist countries have never been 
solved by way of applying pressure” (as cited in Lee & Miles, 2006, 167). Lee Boo-
young, Chairman of the governing Uri Party, also expressed his concern about the law, 
saying it would have a negative impact on Pyongyang’s foreign policy making. 
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Despite recommendations that the North Korean human rights issue be separated 
from the nuclear weapons issue, the law linked them together and thereby caused further 
deterioration of the U.S.-North Korean relationship. Representative James Leach (R-IA) 
stated that “the NKHRA is motivated by a genuine desire for improvements in human 
rights, refugee protection, and humanitarian transparency. It is not a pretext for a hidden 
strategy to provoke regime collapse or to seek collateral advantage in ongoing strategic 
negotiations” (as cited in Lee & Miles, 2006, 167). Nevertheless, Pyongyang 
immediately used the Human Rights Act as evidence of hostile U.S. intent toward North 
Korea, making the law a pretext for its boycott of the Six-Party Talks. In this way, the 
passage of the North Korean Human Rights Act compounded the difficulty of dealing 
with the North Korean nuclear issue (Olsen, 2007, 48). 
After the passage of the North Korean Human Rights Act, Congress continued to 
exert strong influence on the Bush Administration’s North Korea policy. The May 2005 
remarks of Representative James Leach (R-IA), at a speech at the Conference on 
“Prospects for U.S. Policy toward the Korean Peninsula in the Second Bush 
Administration,” clearly sum up the common Republican perceptions of North Korea. 
Leach declared, “With each passing month, North Korea increases its nuclear weapons 
capabilities. As a consequence, the odds may have increased that Pyongyang could export 
nuclear weapons or fissile material to foreign governments, shadowy middlemen, or even 
terrorists… [T]he party that threatens stability in Northeast Asia is North Korea” (Leach, 
2005). The End Dictatorship, Assist Democracy Act of 2005, furthermore, set a goal of 
transforming the North Korean government, along with 44 other dictatorial governments, 
through nonmilitary means. Congress also condemned the September 2005 Joint 
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Statement. Finally, in October 2006, the North Korea Non-Proliferation Act urged “all 
governments to comply with the United States Security Council Resolution 1695.” 
However, the stunning Democratic victory in the 2006 midterm elections dramatically 
weakened Republican congressional control over North Korea policy, and compelled the 
Bush administration to take a more conciliatory approach (Martin, 2007, 88). 
In sum, during the period from 2001 through 2006, the Republican majority in 
Congress wielded every possible institutional weapon to change Clinton’s North Korea 
policy by resisting the implementation of the Agreed Framework and the KEDO 
agreements. Despite persistent opposition from Democratic legislators, the Bush 
administration successfully changed the U.S. policy toward North Korea from 
conciliation to confrontation. The consequences of this transformation are described in 
the next section. 
 
5.2. The Bush Administration under Divided Government (2007-2008) 
 
Beginning in 2007, President Bush retreated toward a status quo policy on North 
Korea, primarily because he could not gain enough support from the Democratic majority 
in Congress to continue his preferred, more aggressive North Korea policy. In all but 
name, Bush began to do what he had vowed not to do: to negotiate with Pyongyang. In 
response, relations between the two countries slowly began to retreat from the brink. 
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5.2.1. U.S. Policy toward North Korea during the Bush Administration (2007-2008) 
 
On February 13, 2007, by agreeing on the Initial Actions for the Implementation 
of the 2005 Joint Statement in the third session of the fifth round of Six-Party Talks, the 
Bush administration finally decided to negotiate with North Korea.79
In addition, several changes in domestic politics also required the Bush 
administration to adopt a more conciliatory policy toward North Korea. First, since the 
Bush administration had diplomatically failed in Iraq and Afghanistan, it needed to find 
major foreign policy achievement somewhere else for the purposes of the 2008 
 Several changes in 
the international environment compelled President Bush to choose the engagement policy 
toward North Korea. First, it was difficult, if not impossible, to use the military option 
since North Korea already had become a nuclear power, and considerable U.S. military 
capabilities were already committed in Iraq and Afghanistan. Second, Iran’s increasingly 
confrontational policy toward the United States forced the Bush administration to think 
that Mahmoud Ahmadinejad had become more dangerous than Kim Jong Il, that Iran had 
become the greater threat than North Korea, and that dealing with Tehran on its nuclear 
issue had become more urgent than dealing with North Korea. The Bush administration 
wanted to resolve the North Korean issue through diplomacy in order either to put 
pressure on Iran to negotiate away its nuclear program, or to prepare for the possible 
expansion of the battlefield in the Middle East to Iran by neutralizing North Korea, in 
case the negotiation with Tehran were to fail. 
                                                 
79 Many North Korea experts have indeed argued that this option is the only way to achieve a peaceful 
diplomatic solution to the North Korean nuclear issue. For example, see Quinones, 2007b. 
149 
 
presidential election campaign. North Korea was a good target because the North Korean 
problem, for all its complexity, was nevertheless easier than the Middle East issue. Above 
all, however, after the loss of majorities in both chambers of the U.S. Congress in the 
2006 midterm elections, President Bush could not ignore the demand both by moderate 
Republicans and by most Democrats to negotiate with Pyongyang in earnest for the 
denuclearization of North Korea. Historically, presidents after midterm election defeats 
have been less likely to respond to foreign policy issues aggressively (Howell & 
Pevehouse, 2007). In short, President Bush had no choice but to change and adjust his 
North Korea policy. Under the circumstances, the Bush administration “took an abrupt 
about-face in North Korean policy… when the Neocons lost influence in Washington as a 
result of Congressional power shift from Republicans to Democrats. Since then the Bush 
administration has engaged North Korea intensely to resolve the nuclear issue” (Kim, 
2008, Web). 
Since North Korea conducted its nuclear test on October 9, 2006, the relationship 
between Washington and Pyongyang had experienced a swift change. In the midst of 
efforts by the international community to seek specific measures to meet the United 
Nations Security Council Resolution 1718 condemning Pyongyang’s nuclear test, North 
Korea returned to the Six-Party Talks. On February 13, 2007, unexpectedly, in the third 
session of the fifth round of the Six-Party Talks, all agreed on the Initial Actions for the 
Implementation of the 2005 Joint Statement, which was regarded as the first concrete step 
for the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula. This agreement was possible because 
President Bush had sent Assistant Secretary of State Christopher Hill to Beijing and 
Berlin to have bilateral talks with his North Korean counterpart Kim Kye Gwan to 
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discuss the return of North Korea to the Six-Party Talks and the conclusion of the Initial 
Actions Joint Statement.80
                                                 
80 The critics of the agreement denounced it as simply “the revival of the logic and scope of the old Agreed 
Framework” in 1994 (Hayes, 2007). 
 
On October 3, 2007, “the Second-Phase Actions for the Implementation of the 
September 2005 Joint Statement” was announced at the end of the second session of the 
six round of the Six-Party Talks. The Second-Phase Actions Joint Statement was the 
result of the meetings on September 1-2, 2007. Despite the suspected Syria-North Korea 
nuclear link, Bush once again authorized Assistant Secretary of State Christopher Hill to 
meet his North Korean counterpart Kim Gye Gwan for a series of bilateral talks. In the 
“Second-Phase Actions” Joint Statement, Pyongyang agreed to disable the reactor, 
reprocessing facilities, and fuel fabrication plant at Yongbyon and list the nuclear 
material and equipment. It also undertook not to transfer nuclear materials, technology, or 
know-how to third parties. Washington, in return, would fulfill its commitment to 
terminate the Trading with the Enemy Act and remove North Korea from the list of state-
sponsor terrorism. 
On June 26, 2008, by reporting its nuclear programs to participants in the Six-
Party Talks, and by destroying the cooling tower at its nuclear site with financial help 
from Washington, Pyongyang dramatically showed the world its determination to 
dismantle its nuclear weapons program. In return, the White House removed North Korea 
from the list of state sponsors of terrorism and lifted some economic sanctions imposed 
under the Trading with the Enemy Act (Department of State, 2008). 
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In sum, during the final two years of the Bush Presidency, the divided U.S. government 
produced more status quo policies toward North Korea than a unified U.S. government 
had in 2001-6. Because President Bush could no longer receive strong support from 
Congress, he had to change his policy toward North Korea from aggression to 
conciliation. Although this represented an important change in U.S. policy toward North 
Korea, the result was essentially status quo. Not only was the Bush administration in a 
lame duck situation after the 2006 mid-term elections, but it no longer had the time to 
conclude a deal with Pyongyang. 
 
5.2.2. Presidency vs. Congress: Overview 
 
In 2007, the first session of the 110th Congress opened with Democrats in control 
of both chambers for the first time in 12 years. Invigorated by their victory in the 2006 
midterm elections, the Democrats immediately laid out an ambitious agenda that included 
setting a time-table for ending the war in Iraq, revving up spending on domestic programs 
such as education and health care, and cleaning up what they had characterized during the 
campaign as a “culture of corruption” on Capitol Hill under the Republicans. While 
Democratic Representatives passed a resolution condemning a proposed “surge” of U.S. 
troops in Iraq, Democrats Senators debated a series of resolutions against the war in Iraq. 
The spring 2007 supplemental appropriations debate resulted in a House bill calling for a 
phased withdrawal from Iraq. Democratic leaders in both chambers of Congress launched 
hearings and investigations into a variety of foreign policy issues (Howell & Pevehouse, 
2007). As a result of the Democratic Party’s slim majority and the refusal of President 
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Bush and Republican members of Congress to yield ground, the efforts of Democrats to 
extract significant concessions from Republicans were often blocked and frustrated. For 
example, President Bush, who had vetoed only one bill during his first six years in the 
White House, rejected seven in 2007.81
The partisan acrimony and ideological disputes in the narrowly divided Congress 
were intensified by the 2008 presidential campaign. Both parties forced votes they knew 
they could not win, in hopes of making life miserable for their opponents, shaping issues 
for the election, and polishing their own political images. The year was one of the most 
partisan in Congress in at least a half-century. Congressional Quarterly’s annual study of 
party unity votes showed that 62 percent of House votes fell into that category, the 
highest percentage since 1995. Partisan voting was almost as frequent in the Senate as in 
the House, with the parties split on 60 percent of the votes (2007 CQ Almanac, B-3). 
According to the analysis, House Democrats on average voted with the party on 92 
percent of the party unity votes, while Senate Democrats on average voted with the party 
on 87 percent of the party unity votes. Republicans stuck together less often on party 
unity votes, but they did so when it counted. House Republicans were able to obstruct, 
and occasionally effectively halt, the Democratic agenda, succeeding on a remarkable 21 
occasions in ordering bills returned to committee for changes more to their liking. The 
 
                                                 
81 During the first session of the 110th Congress, a total of 138 public laws were enacted. The number of 
bills and resolutions introduced was 9,227 in total, 3,033 in the Senate, and 6,194 in the House. The 
number of roll call votes was 1,628 in total, 442 in the Senate, and 1,186 in the House. President Bush 
issued 7 vetoes (2007 CQ Almanac, 1-8). 
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House held a record 1,177 roll call votes during the year, in part as a result of GOP 
attempts to amend and recommit bills.82
But it was in the Senate that Republicans had the greatest clout. Minority Leader 
Mitch McConnell (R-KY) became adept at using the Senate’s procedures to kill or force 
major revisions to Democratic bills, particularly at using amendments and prolonged 
debate to force Reid to hold cloture votes, a method of limiting debate that required 60 
votes to succeed. With a narrow majority of 51-49, Democrats won just half the 62 
cloture votes held during the year. With their narrow majorities, Democrats scored some 
of their high-profile achievements only after they made significant concessions to 
Republicans. Senate Republicans skillfully used their ability to block cloture motions to 
force changes in legislation to their liking. In the House, where the minority was more 
tightly constrained by the majority’s control of the rule process, Republicans made 
creative use of an arcane procedure to recommit or return bills to committee – essentially 
requiring that certain changes be made, or in some instances killing the bill (2007 CQ 
Almanac, 1:6-7).
 
83
Nevertheless, with a majority in Congress, Democrats had the opportunity to 
probe executive branch activities that had been subject to virtually no congressional 
oversight while Republicans were in control. Democrats undertook the job immediately 
and enthusiastically. The most dramatic outcome of the committee investigations was the 
 
                                                 
82 When quorum calls are included, in which members record only whether they are present, the number of 
roll call votes in the House was 1,186 in 2007. 
 
83 Under House rules, the minority cannot be denied the right to offer a motion to recommit with 
instructions on a bill or joint resolution that is on the floor. As the minority in the House for the first time in 
12 years, House Republicans exercised considerable procedural prowess. For more details, see the 2008 CQ 
Almanac, 1-11. 
 
154 
 
resignation of Attorney General Alberto R. Gonzales in September. Gonzales had lost 
credibility with members of Congress from both parties due to embarrassing revelations 
about his involvement in the administration’s firing of nine U.S. attorneys and a probe of 
the National Security Agency’s warrantless wiretapping program. The House Oversight 
and Government Reform Committee looked into corruption in the Iraqi government and 
waste and fraud in the reconstruction of Iraq, while the House Armed Services 
Committee probed the readiness of military forces strained by continuing deployments in 
Iraq. Numerous committees held hearings on the Iraq War and the impact of the troop 
surge. The first session of the 110th Congress ended, as it had begun, with partisanship in 
full swing. 
In 2008, Democratic members of Congress were less ambitious than the previous 
year in achieving their legislative agenda.84
                                                 
84 During the second session of the 110th Congress, a total of 285 public laws were enacted. The number of 
bills and resolutions introduced was 4,815 in total, 1,590 in the Senate, and 3,225 in the House. The 
number of roll call votes was 905 in total, 215 in the Senate, and 690 in the House. The president Bush 
vetoed 4 times during the session (2008 CQ Almanac, 1-8). 
 They did not press the president on domestic 
and foreign issues, with the expectation that the Democratic presidential candidate would 
win the upcoming 2008 presidential election and the Democratic Party would control the 
both chambers of Congress. In addition, they had to cooperate with President Bush and 
the Republic Party to address the worsening economic and financial crisis. However, this 
did not necessarily mean that partisan wrangling disappeared in the second session of the 
110th Congress. Partisanship was as high as it had been in any recent year, reflected in the 
high percentage of party unity votes. The year 2008 presented “the capstone for an era 
under Bush that was the most polarized period since Congressional Quarterly began 
examining partisan voting in 1953” (2008 CQ Almanac, 1-3). 
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The pre-election partisanship, however, was overshadowed by an increasingly 
urgent and severe economic recession involving the collapse of the housing market, the 
possible breakdown of credit market, declining consumer spending, and increasing 
unemployment. With a national economy on the verge of collapse, the partisan lines 
between the two parties were blurred. In October, Congress granted the Department of 
Treasury the bipartisan authority “to use a staggering $700 billion in an effort to rescue 
the financial services industry, after allowing up to $800 billion to salvage mortgage 
finance giants Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac” (2008 CQ Almanac, 1-3). 
Because of the economic and financial crisis coupled with the unpopularity of 
President Bush, Republicans lost both the presidential and congressional elections on the 
fourth of November. Democrats added to their majorities in both houses of Congress, and 
Barack Hussein Obama, the Democratic presidential candidate, was elected as the 
nation’s first African-American president.85
In sum, during this period, President Bush lost the vital political leverage in 
Congress that was necessary for him to keep pushing his domestic foreign policies. His 
 Many other factors, no doubt, contributed to 
the election victory of Obama, including his “appeal to the youth vote, his tactical 
flexibility and highly organized grass-roots campaign, and his obvious command of the 
issues” (2008 CQ Alamanc, 1-11). Immediately after the election, president-elect Obama 
began to lay out his ambitious plans for his new administration. 
                                                 
85 Although Democrats failed to achieve their long-shot quest for the 60 seats needed to dominate the 
Senate in the 2008 elections, their net gain of at least seven seats brought their number to 58, counting the 
two independents. The Minnesota senatorial race was undecided at the end of the year 2008 (2008 CQ 
Almanac, 1-11). In 2009, however, as a result both of the victory of Al Franken (D-MN) in Minnesota and 
of the decision of Senator Arlen Specter (R-PA) to switch his party from the Republican to the Democratic 
Party, the Democratic Party finally achieved the magic 60 seats needed to stop Republican filibusters in the 
Senate. In the House, Democrats strengthened their control with a net gain of 21 seats, making it the second 
consecutive election where the party gained a significant number of House seats (2008 CQ Almanac, 1-11). 
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confidence and leadership were seriously undermined, and the partisan resistance from 
the Democratic majority in Congress was greatly intensified. President Bush also had to 
learn to live with divided government and to change his approach toward North Korea. 
 
5.2.3. Presidency vs. Congress: North Korea 
 
In 2007, when the Democratic Party became a majority in both chambers, the 
dynamics changed. The Bush administration and the defeated Republican Party had no 
choice but to adjust their North Korea policy. In December 2007, in accordance with the 
2007 National Defense Authorization Act, President Bush appointed as North Korea 
Policy Coordinator Christopher Hill, who was also Assistant Secretary of State for East 
Asian and Pacific Affairs and Head of the U.S. delegation to the Six-Party Talks on the 
North Koran nuclear issue. The North Korea Policy Coordinator was expected to review 
President Bush’s North Korea Policy, and submit a report on the investigations. In May 
2008, the House passed the Nuclear Proliferation Bill (HR5916) that would allow the 
president to waive the so-called 1994 Glenn amendment (PL 103-236) to the Arms 
Export Control Act, which prohibited many U.S. dealings with countries that illegally 
develop nuclear weapons. The passage of the bill allowed the use of U.S. equipment and 
funding in dismantling North Korea’s nuclear reactor at Yongbyon and disposing of its 
radioactive material (2008 CQ Almanac, 2-27). The House actions coincided with 
progress in U.S.-North Korean disarmament negotiations (Graham-Silverman, 2008). The 
more important is the changed policy toward Pyongyang of the Bush administration. 
Immediately after the victory of the Democratic Party in the 2006 midterm elections, 
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President Bush was forced by the new Democratic majority Congress to change his 
coercive and confrontational diplomacy to more cooperative policy based on diplomacy 
and negotiation. 
Republican members of Congress, however, continued to be opposed to the 
changes in Bush’s North Korea policy. They forced President Bush to “stay the course,” 
and called on the president to set the parameters within which the Six-Party Talks took 
place. Even on the eve of the February 2007 session of the Six-Party Talks, for example, 
Senator Richard Lugar (R-IN) expressed his concern by complaining that officials were 
creating “countervailing situations” that were undermining US diplomacy (Martin, 2007, 
85). Democratic members of Congress, on the other hand, generally welcomed and 
supported Bush’s new North Korea policy. 
The removal of North Korea from the list of state sponsors of terrorism in 2008 
would have been impossible, had the Republicans controlled Congress. A Republican 
majority Congress would undoubtedly have voted against the delisting (Kim, 2008). 
Especially after the defeat in the 2006 mid-term elections, therefore, the Bush 
administration had no choice but to adjust its North Korea policy. As a result, U.S.-North 
Korean disarmament negotiations were resumed and a series of negotiations produced a 
significant development in the denuclearization of North Korea. Without a doubt, 
Democratic legislators welcomed and supported the Bush administration’s new North 
Korea policy. 
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5.3. Conclusion 
 
In 2001-2006, President Bush adopted a more aggressive policy toward North 
Korea under a unified government and took a tougher stance on the North Korea nuclear 
issue. Bush was able to pursue such an aggressive policy because he could expand his 
own win-set with strong support from Congress. This ultimately led to Pyongyang’s first 
nuclear test in 2006. In 2007-2008, however, President Bush accepted a more 
conciliatory policy toward North Korea under a divided government that gave him less 
room to maneuver. 
Congress began to limit Bush’s policy to North Korea after the 2006 midterm 
elections, and the divided government considerably undermined President Bush’s 
predominance in his dealings with North Korea. The democratic majority in Congress 
compelled him to agree with “the Initial Actions for the Implementation” and “the 
Second-Phase Actions for the Implementation,” to remove North Korea from the list of 
state sponsors of terrorism, and to lift some economic sanctions imposed under the 
Trading with the Enemy Act. President Bush had to give up the “CVID” policy and the 
“dismantle first” policy that were uncompromising North Korea policy principles during 
his first term of office. Thus, the shift toward divided government with intensified 
partisanship also led inevitably to a shift in policy toward North Korea—from a more 
aggressive policy in 2001-2006 to a status quo policy in 2007-2008. 
 
 
 
159 
 
VI. CONCLUSION 
 
Most studies of U.S. policy toward North Korea have explained tension in US-
North Korea relations in terms either of Pyongyang’s intractable and provocative nature 
or of Washington’s misguided approaches (President Clinton’s appeasement policy or 
President Bush’s coercive diplomacy). In other words, many studies have tended to 
blame leaders (Kim, Clinton, or Bush) for the policy breakdown that led to a nuclear 
North Korea. 
Another possible explanation for the failure of the Agreed Framework and 
Pyongyang’s nuclearization is that the rise of neoconservative ideology during the Bush 
administration led to provocative U.S. policies toward Pyongyang that made these 
outcomes inevitable (Feffer, 2003; Armstrong, 2006; Pritchard, 2007; Chinoy, 2008). In 
general, it is true that the rise of the neoconservative movement in the U.S. was 
associated with a deterioration of U.S.-D.P.R.K. relations, and its decline in the latter 
years of the Bush administration helped to defuse some of the tension. 
Yet, neither successes nor failures have been limited to single administration or 
party in the United States. Moreover, the neoconservative movement itself should be 
understood within the broader context of domestic politics, and interbranch competition, 
within the United States. North Korea’s responses must also be considered, although 
neither Pyongyang’s intransigence nor a general predilection for strategic extortion can 
explain the roller coaster ride of the past two decades. 
The structural realist (neorealist) perspective may also provide some insights, 
particularly insofar as it stresses Pyongyang’s vulnerabilities and bargaining objectives. 
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Precisely because the structural realist perspective dominates the field of International 
Relations, domestic sources of foreign policy have typically been disregarded or ignored. 
As a result, studies emphasizing the significance of domestic variables in US policy 
making have not been systematically developed or tested. Although the international 
factor is certainly a necessary condition for the explanation of US foreign policy, it is not 
a sufficient condition. It must be complemented by the explanations that consider 
domestic factors. 
Domestic politics in the U.S. are, in fact, central to any convincing explanation of 
the advances and retreats in the U.S. relationship with North Korea. Executive-legislative 
relations in the United States take on a different character in periods of unified 
government than in periods of divided government. And since the U.S. Constitution 
distributes power over foreign policy between the executive and legislative branches, this 
internal balance of power turns out to be crucial. Because many important foreign policy 
matters fall into a zone of negotiation between Congress and the president, “an invitation 
to struggle” is inevitable. Simply put, the branches are “too evenly matched” (Ware, 2001, 
35). 
Divided government makes this problem more problematic. According to Ware 
(2001): 
 
If we exclude the exceptional case of Ford, and the Reagan experience of having 
to deal with only one chamber controlled by the opposition, we are left facing the 
conclusion that divided government tends to produce confrontation, unless the 
president has limited public policy objectives. The experience of Truman (1947-
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8), Nixon (1969-74), Reagan (1987-8), Bush (1989-92), and Clinton (from 1995) 
suggests that there is an inherent tension between the separation of powers and 
party power when government is divided… Divided government  in the post-New 
Deal era has added significantly to the difficulty of governing a country that was 
already difficult to govern—partly because of its size and diversity, and partly 
because of the dispersion of political power created by the Constitution (Ware, 
2001, 35-6).86
Under circumstances of divided party control of government, furthermore, ideological 
differences and partisan politics easily escalate into institutional warfare between the 
president and the Congress. Divided government converts intrinsic partisan tension into more 
overt conflict.
 
 
87
As the framers of U.S. Constitution apparently intended, divided government has 
served, in the case of U.S. policy toward North Korea, to slow down or hold back activist 
policy. The result has mostly been the status quo. On the other hand, a unified 
government lets a president take up a more active foreign policy. Moreover, parties also 
 During the Clinton and Bush administrations, in fact, the routinization of 
partisanship, the politicization of foreign policy, and the intensification of interbranch rivalry 
became “the rule rather than the exception” (Mann, 1990, 2-3). In other words, politics did 
not stop at the water’s edge. As a consequence, different government types significantly 
affected the United States’ North Korea policy during the Clinton and Bush administrations.  
                                                 
86 However, “divided government may well persist… since the prospects for that kind of reform are slim, the 
problems associated with divided government will surely persist well into this century” (Ware, 2001, 39). 
 
87 Usually ideological differences are more conducive to partisanship.  Sometimes, however, even “an 
enormous amount of partisan conflict in Congress occurs on issues that are not identifiably ideological” 
(Lee, 2009, 19). 
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clearly had an impact, which was not intended by the framers. When it comes to U.S. 
North Korea policy, divided governments produced more status quo policies and fewer 
upheavals in U.S.-North Korea relations. Unified governments, on the other hand, 
produced more radical changes, and the direction of the changes depended on the party in 
power. 
 
Table 8 summarizes the relations between U.S. government types and U.S. North 
Korea policy. 
 
Table 8. U.S. Government Types and U.S. North Korea Policy 
 
 
President 
 
Unified Government Divided Government  
Democratic 
 
Conciliatory Engagement 
(Geneva Agreement, 1994) 
 
 
Status Quo/Passive Engagement 
(Cancelled Summit, 2000) 
 
Republican 
 
Confrontational Engagement 
(North Korea Nuclear Test, 2006) 
 
 
Status Quo/Passive Engagement 
(Gradual Rapprochement, 2007) 
 
 
 
A unified U.S. government with a Democratic President produced a more 
conciliatory policy toward North Korea, while a unified U.S. government with a 
Republican President produced a more aggressive policy. In both cases, however, the 
unified government allowed a form of presidential activism. President Clinton embraced 
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an active policy (conciliatory engagement) under Democratic unified government (1993-
1994), while President Bush adopted an active policy in the opposite direction 
(confrontational engagement) under Republican unified government (2001-2006). 
The findings in this dissertation extend those of other studies on the role of 
different U.S. government types in U.S. foreign policy. Typically, these studies argue that 
divided governments have played pivotal roles, and that different government types 
produce different policy choices and approaches. These studies also argue that partisan 
politics plays a crucial role. In this sense, North Korea is a hard case: if any policy is 
likely to attract bipartisan support, preventing North Korea from obtaining nuclear 
weapons is surely such a policy.  
At the same time, the findings in this dissertation challenge those of earlier studies 
on the role of Congress in U.S. foreign policy, which argue that presidential power has 
significantly grown over the past century, whereas congressional power has considerably 
declined (Wildavsky, 1966; Schlesinger, 1973; Hinckley, 1994; Peterson, 1994a; 
Weissman, 1995; Ohaegbulam, 2007; Hansen & Friedman, 2009). The findings also 
dispute the notion that Congress is “all talk,” and that members of Congress are much 
more interested in paying lip service to their audience than in producing substantial 
policies. As in U.S. domestic policy (Mycoff & Pika, 2008), Congress has clearly played 
an important role in U.S. foreign policy, sometimes complementing presidential actions, 
and at other times complicating those efforts. When it comes to U.S. foreign policy 
toward North Korea, Congress never provided a rubber stamp for administration 
initiatives. 
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Many questions, however, remain to be explored. One is whether Republicans 
adopt more aggressive foreign policies and Democrats more conciliatory foreign policies 
in general. It is clear that the Republican President and party were more confrontational 
in their North Korea policy, while the Democratic President and party were more 
conciliatory during the Clinton and Bush administrations. It is sometimes assumed that 
Republican foreign policy is generally more aggressive because it is based on the notion 
of national defense through self-reliance, while Democratic foreign policy is more 
conciliatory because it places more emphasis on international cooperation. 
The Democratic Party, however, has been as aggressive as the Republican Party 
in other circumstances. Woodrow Wilson was active, ambitious, and aggressive in his 
dealings with Central Powers, including Germany, Austria-Hungary, the Ottoman Empire, 
and Bulgaria, during and after WWI. During his term of office, President Harry S. 
Truman also took an aggressive stance against the expansion of Communism. It was also 
Truman, of course, who authorized use of atomic bombs against Japan to end WWII, and 
who dispatched U.S. troops to Korea. Presidents John F. Kennedy and Lyndon B. 
Johnson expanded and escalated the Vietnam War. President Clinton, despite his 
conciliatory policy toward North Korea, took a very tough stance on international human 
rights violations. He authorized aircraft strikes against Bosnian Serbs in 1995 and the use 
of U.S. troops in a NATO bombing campaign against Yugoslavia in 1999. 
Conversely, the Republican Party was often as conciliatory as the Democratic 
Party. Republicans historically disapproved of interventionist foreign policy. They 
opposed President Woodrow Wilson’s intervention in WWI and his enthusiastic effort to 
create the League of Nations. They were also opposed to intervention in WWII before 
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Pearl Harbor. In the 1970s, President Richard Nixon, through his historic visit to the 
People’s Republic of China, opened a new era of U.S.-China relations, which 
subsequently paved the way for détente. In the 1980s, even President Ronald Reagan 
adopted more conciliatory foreign policies during his second term. In the 1990s, 
Republicans opposed U.S. intervention in Somalia and in the Balkans. In sum, it would 
be hard to sustain the claim that Democrats are conciliatory and Republicans are 
aggressive. The question thus remains: why were Republicans more confrontational, and 
Democrats less so, in U.S. North Korea policy during the Clinton and Bush 
administrations? 
A related question is whether the same pattern will exist in U.S. policy toward 
other so-called rogue states. Countries like Iran and Cuba have also been described as 
members of “Axis of Evil” or “State Sponsors of Terrorism.”88
For a complete study of bilateral relations between the United States and North 
Korea in the 1990s and 2000s, furthermore, it will be essential to examine North Korea’s 
policy toward the United States in the same period. This dissertation has generally 
assumed that North Korea was consistent in its policy toward the United States during the 
 Comparative studies of 
such cases would put the findings of this dissertation in a broader context. One might also 
ask whether the pattern identified here will persist in the Obama administration’s policy 
toward North Korea. Like his two predecessors, President Obama took his office with a 
unified government. So far, however, his policy toward North Korea is not notable for 
engagement of either type: conciliatory or coercive. 
                                                 
88 Currently there are four countries designated as state sponsors of terrorism: Cuba, Iran, Sudan and Syria 
(Department of State, 2010). 
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period. Although Pyongyang might have been consistent in its policy goals and strategies, 
however, it adopted different tactics and reactions to different U.S. policy approaches. 
Exploring the dyadic and dynamic interactions between the United States and North 
Korea will tell another important side of the story. 
 To understand Pyongyang’s foreign policy behavior, as with the United States, the 
major domestic determinants of North Korea’s policy making toward the United States 
should be considered. Although North Korea is an authoritarian state and the leader’s power 
is paramount, its foreign policy nevertheless has a domestic context. Due to its authoritarian 
nature and military-first policy, relations between the executive branch and the military 
(instead of relations between the executive and legislative branches)—and, more specifically, 
relations between Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the National Defense Commission— are 
central to this part of the story. 
Finally, one should not forget the role of other East Asian states, including South 
Korea, Japan, Russia, and China, in U.S.-North Korea relations. In particular, foreign 
policies of the participants in the Six-Party Talks are of great consequence. However, the 
Six-Party Talks are another story in themselves. 
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AGREED FRAMEWORK BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
AND THE DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF KOREA 
 
Geneva, October 21, 1994 
 
Delegations of the governments of the United States of America (U.S.) and the 
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) held talks in Geneva from September 23 
to October 21, 1994, to negotiate an overall resolution of the nuclear issue on the Korean 
Peninsula. 
 
Both sides reaffirmed the importance of attaining the objectives contained in the August 
12, 1994 Agreed Statement between the U.S. and the DPRK and upholding the principles 
of the June 11, 1993 Joint Statement of the U.S. and the DPRK to achieve peace and 
security on a nuclear-free Korean peninsula. The U.S. and the DPRK decided to take the 
following actions for the resolution of the nuclear issue: 
 
I. Both sides will cooperate to replace the DPRK’s graphite-moderated reactors and 
related facilities with light-water reactor (LWR) power plants. 
 
1) In accordance with the October 20, 1994 letter of assurance from the U.S. President, 
the U.S. will undertake to make arrangements for the provision to the DPRK of a LWR 
project with a total generating capacity of approximately 2,000 MW(e) by a target date of 
2003.  
 
– The U.S. will organize under its leadership an international consortium to finance 
and supply the LWR project to be provided to the DPRK. The U.S., representing 
the international consortium, will serve as the principal point of contact with the 
DPRK for the LWR project. 
 
– The U.S., representing the consortium, will make best efforts to secure the 
conclusion of a supply contract with the DPRK within six months of the date of 
this Document for the provision of the LWR project. Contract talks will begin as 
soon as possible after the date of this Document. 
 
– As necessary, the U.S. and the DPRK will conclude a bilateral agreement for 
cooperation in the field of peaceful uses of nuclear energy. 
 
2) In accordance with the October 20, 1994 letter of assurance from the U.S. President, 
the U.S., representing the consortium, will make arrangements to offset the energy 
foregone due to the freeze of the DPRK’s graphite-moderated reactors and related 
facilities, pending completion of the first LWR unit. 
 
– Alternative energy will be provided in the form of heavy oil for heating and 
electricity production. 
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– Deliveries of heavy oil will begin within three months of the date of this Document 
and will reach a rate of 500,000 tons annually, in accordance with an agreed 
schedule of deliveries. 
 
3) Upon receipt of U.S. assurances for the provision of LWR’s and for arrangements for 
interim energy alternatives, the DPRK will freeze its graphite-moderated reactors and 
related facilities and will eventually dismantle these reactors and related facilities. 
 
– The freeze on the DPRK’s graphite-moderated reactors and related facilities will be 
fully implemented within one month of the date of this Document. During this 
one-month period, and throughout the freeze, the International Atomic Energy 
Agency (IAEA) will be allowed to monitor this freeze, and the DPRK will 
provide full cooperation to the IAEA for this purpose. 
 
– Dismantlement of the DPRK’s graphite-moderated reactors and related facilities 
will be completed when the LWR project is completed. 
 
– The U.S. and the DPRK will cooperate in finding a method to store safely the spent 
fuel from the 5 MW(e) experimental reactor during the construction of the LWR 
project, and to dispose of the fuel in a safe manner that does not involve 
reprocessing in the DPRK. 
 
4) As soon as possible after the date of this document U.S. and DPRK experts will hold 
two sets of experts talks. 
 
– At one set of talks, experts will discuss issues related to alternative energy and the 
replacement of the graphite-moderated reactor program with the LWR project. 
 
– At the other set of talks, experts will discuss specific arrangements for spent fuel 
storage and ultimate disposition. 
 
II. The two sides will move toward full normalization of political and economic 
relations. 
 
1) Within three months of the date of this Document, both sides will reduce barriers to 
trade and investment, including restrictions on telecommunications services and financial 
transactions. 
 
2) Each side will open a liaison office in the other’s capital following resolution of 
consular and other technical issues through expert level discussions. 
 
3) As progress is made on issues of concern to each side, the U.S. and the DPRK will 
upgrade bilateral relations to the Ambassadorial level. 
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III. Both sides will work together for peace and security on a nuclear-free Korean 
peninsula. 
 
1) The U.S. will provide formal assurances to the DPRK, against the threat or use of 
nuclear weapons by the U.S. 
 
2) The DPRK will consistently take steps to implement the North-South Joint Declaration 
on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. 
 
3) The DPRK will engage in North-South dialogue, as this Agreed Framework will help 
create an atmosphere that promotes such dialogue. 
 
IV. Both sides will work together to strengthen the international nuclear non 
proliferation regime. 
 
1) The DPRK will remain a party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear 
Weapons (NPT) and will allow implementation of its safeguards agreement under the 
Treaty. 
 
2) Upon conclusion of the supply contract for the provision of the LWR project, ad hoc 
and routine inspections will resume under the DPRK’s safeguards agreement with the 
IAEA with respect to the facilities not subject to the freeze. Pending conclusion of the 
supply contract, inspections required by the IAEA for the continuity of safeguards will 
continue at the facilities not subject to the freeze. 
 
3) When a significant portion of the LWR project is completed, but before delivery of 
key nuclear components, the DPRK will come into full compliance with its safeguards 
agreement with the IAEA (INFCIRC/403), including taking all steps that may be deemed 
necessary by the IAEA, following consultations with the Agency with regard to verifying 
the accuracy and completeness of the DPRK’s initial report on all nuclear material in the 
DPRK. 
 
__________________________                    __________________________________                              
Robert L. Gallucci    Kang Sok Ju  
Head of Delegation of the   Head of the Delegation of the  
United States of America,   Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, 
Ambassador at Large of the              First Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs of the  
United States of America   Democratic People’s Republic of Korea 
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US – DPRK JOINT COMMUNIQUE 
 
U.S. Department of State, October 12, 2000 
 
As the special envoy of Chairman Kim Jong Il of the D.P.R.K. National Defense 
Commission, the First Vice Chairman, Vice Marshal Jo Myong Rok, visited the United 
States of America from October 9-12, 2000. 
 
During his visit, Special Envoy Jo Myong Rok delivered a letter from National Defense 
Commission Chairman Kim Jong Il, as well as his views on U.S.-D.P.R.K. relations, 
directly to U.S. President William Clinton. Special Envoy Jo Myong Rok and his party 
also met with senior officials of the U.S. Administration, including his host Secretary of 
State Madeleine Albright and Secretary of Defense William Cohen, for an extensive 
exchange of views on issues of common concern. They reviewed in depth the new 
opportunities that have opened up for improving the full range of relations between the 
United States of America and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. The meetings 
proceeded in a serious, constructive, and businesslike atmosphere, allowing each side to 
gain a better understanding of the other's concerns. 
 
Recognizing the changed circumstances on the Korean Peninsula created by the historic 
inter-Korean summit, the United States and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea 
have decided to take steps to fundamentally improve their bilateral relations in the 
interests of enhancing peace and security in the Asia-Pacific region. In this regard, the 
two sides agreed there are a variety of available means, including Four Party talks, to 
reduce tension on the Korean Peninsula and formally end the Korean War by replacing 
the 1953 Armistice Agreement with permanent peace arrangements. 
 
Recognizing that improving ties is a natural goal in relations among states and that better 
relations would benefit both nations in the 21st century while helping ensure peace and 
security on the Korean Peninsula and in the Asia-Pacific region, the U.S. and the D.P.R.K. 
sides stated that they are prepared to undertake a new direction in their relations. As a 
crucial first step, the two sides stated that neither government would have hostile intent 
toward the other and confirmed the commitment of both governments to make every 
effort in the future to build a new relationship free from past enmity. 
 
Building on the principles laid out in the June 11, 1993 U.S.-D.P.R.K. Joint Statement 
and reaffirmed in the October 21, 1994 Agreed Framework, the two sides agreed to work 
to remove mistrust, build mutual confidence, and maintain an atmosphere in which they 
can deal constructively with issues of central concern. In this regard, the two sides 
reaffirmed that their relations should be based on the principles of respect for each other's 
sovereignty and noninterference in each other's internal affairs, and noted the value of 
regular diplomatic contacts, bilaterally and in broader fora. 
 
The two sides agreed to work together to develop mutually beneficial economic 
cooperation and exchanges. To explore the possibilities for trade and commerce that will 
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benefit the peoples of both countries and contribute to an environment conducive to 
greater economic cooperation throughout Northeast Asia, the two sides discussed an 
exchange of visits by economic and trade experts at an early date. 
 
The two sides agreed that resolution of the missile issue would make an essential 
contribution to a fundamentally improved relationship between them and to peace and 
security in the Asia-Pacific region. To further the efforts to build new relations, the 
D.P.R.K. informed the U.S. that it will not launch long-range missiles of any kind while 
talks on the missile issue continue. 
 
Pledging to redouble their commitment and their efforts to fulfill their respective 
obligations in their entirety under the Agreed Framework, the US and the D.P.R.K. 
strongly affirmed its importance to achieving peace and security on a nuclear weapons 
free Korean Peninsula. To this end, the two sides agreed on the desirability of greater 
transparency in carrying out their respective obligations under the Agreed Framework. In 
this regard, they noted the value of the access which removed U.S. concerns about the 
underground site at Kumchang-ri. 
 
The two sides noted that in recent years they have begun to work cooperatively in areas 
of common humanitarian concern. The D.P.R.K. side expressed appreciation for 
significant U.S. contributions to its humanitarian needs in areas of food and medical 
assistance. The U.S. side expressed appreciation for D.P.R.K. cooperation in recovering 
the remains of U.S. servicemen still missing from the Korean War, and both sides agreed 
to work for rapid progress for the fullest possible accounting. The two sides will continue 
to meet to discuss these and other humanitarian issues. 
 
As set forth in their Joint Statement of October 6, 2000, the two sides agreed to support 
and encourage international efforts against terrorism. 
 
Special Envoy Jo Myong Rok explained to the US side developments in the inter-Korean 
dialogue in recent months, including the results of the historic North-South summit. The 
U.S. side expressed its firm commitment to assist in all appropriate ways the continued 
progress and success of ongoing North-South dialogue and initiatives for reconciliation 
and greater cooperation, including increased security dialogue. 
 
Special Envoy Jo Myong Rok expressed his appreciation to President Clinton and the 
American people for their warm hospitality during the visit. 
 
It was agreed that Secretary of State Madeleine Albright will visit the D.P.R.K. in the 
near future to convey the views of U.S. President William Clinton directly to Chairman 
Kim Jong Il of the D.P.R.K. National Defense Commission and to prepare for a possible 
visit by the President of the United States. 
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NORTH KOREAN HUMAN RIGHTS ACT OF 2004: AN EXCERPT 
 
A BILL 
To promote human rights and freedom in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, 
and for other purposes. 
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of 
America in Congress assembled, 
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 
This Act may be cited as the `North Korean Human Rights Act of 2004'. 
SEC. 3. FINDINGS. 
Congress makes the following findings: 
(1) According to the Department of State, the Government of North Korea 
is `a dictatorship under the absolute rule of Kim Jong Il' that continues to 
commit numerous, serious human rights abuses. 
(2) The Government of North Korea attempts to control all information, 
artistic expression, academic works, and media activity inside North 
Korea and strictly curtails freedom of speech and access to foreign 
broadcasts. 
(3) The Government of North Korea subjects all its citizens to systematic, 
intensive political and ideological indoctrination in support of the cult of 
personality glorifying Kim Jong Il and the late Kim Il Sung that 
approaches the level of a state religion. 
(4) The Government of North Korea divides its population into categories, 
based on perceived loyalty to the leadership, which determines access to 
employment, higher education, place of residence, medical facilities, and 
other resources. 
(5) According to the Department of State, `[t]he [North Korean] Penal 
Code is [d]raconian, stipulating capital punishment and confiscation of 
assets for a wide variety of `crimes against the revolution,' including 
defection, attempted defection, slander of the policies of the Party or State, 
listening to foreign broadcasts, writing `reactionary' letters, and possessing 
reactionary printed matter'. 
(6) The Government of North Korea executes political prisoners, 
opponents of the regime, some repatriated defectors, some members of 
underground churches, and others, sometimes at public meetings attended 
by workers, students, and schoolchildren. 
(7) The Government of North Korea holds an estimated 200,000 political 
prisoners in camps that its State Security Agency manages through the use 
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of forced labor, beatings, torture, and executions, and in which many 
prisoners also die from disease, starvation, and exposure. 
(8) According to eyewitness testimony provided to the United States 
Congress by North Korean camp survivors, camp inmates have been used 
as sources of slave labor for the production of export goods, as targets for 
martial arts practice, and as experimental victims in the testing of chemical 
and biological poisons. 
(9) According to credible reports, including eyewitness testimony 
provided to the United States Congress, North Korean Government 
officials prohibit live births in prison camps, and forced abortion and the 
killing of newborn babies are standard prison practices. 
(10) According to the Department of State, `[g]enuine religious freedom 
does not exist in North Korea' and, according to the United States 
Commission on International Religious Freedom, `[t]he North Korean 
state severely represses public and private religious activities' with 
penalties that reportedly include arrest, imprisonment, torture, and 
sometimes execution. 
(11) More than 2,000,000 North Koreans are estimated to have died of 
starvation since the early 1990s because of the failure of the centralized 
agricultural and public distribution systems operated by the Government 
of North Korea. 
(12) According to a 2002 United Nations-European Union survey, nearly 
one out of every ten children in North Korea suffers from acute 
malnutrition and four out of every ten children in North Korea are 
chronically malnourished. 
(13) Since 1995, the United States has provided more than 2,000,000 tons 
of humanitarian food assistance to the people of North Korea, primarily 
through the World Food Program. 
(14) Although United States food assistance has undoubtedly saved many 
North Korean lives and there have been minor improvements in 
transparency relating to the distribution of such assistance in North Korea, 
the Government of North Korea continues to deny the World Food 
Program forms of access necessary to properly monitor the delivery of 
food aid, including the ability to conduct random site visits, the use of 
native Korean-speaking employees, and travel access throughout North 
Korea. 
(15) The risk of starvation, the threat of persecution, and the lack of 
freedom and opportunity in North Korea have caused many thousands, 
perhaps even hundreds of thousands, of North Koreans to flee their 
homeland, primarily into China. 
(16) North Korean women and girls, particularly those who have fled into 
China, are at risk of being kidnapped, trafficked, and sexually exploited 
inside China, where many are sold as brides or concubines, or forced to 
work as prostitutes. 
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(17) The Governments of China and North Korea have been conducting 
aggressive campaigns to locate North Koreans who are in China without 
permission and to forcibly return them to North Korea, where they 
routinely face torture and imprisonment, and sometimes execution. 
(18) Despite China's obligations as a party to the 1951 United Nations 
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and the 1967 Protocol 
Relating to the Status of Refugees China routinely classifies North 
Koreans seeking asylum in China as mere `economic migrants' and returns 
them to North Korea without regard to the serious threat of persecution 
they face upon their return. 
(19) The Government of China does not provide North Koreans whose 
asylum requests are rejected a right to have the rejection reviewed prior to 
deportation despite the recommendations of the 1951 United Nations 
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and the 1967 Protocol 
Relating to the Status of Refugees that such a right be granted. 
(20) North Koreans who seek asylum while in China are routinely 
imprisoned and tortured, and in some cases killed, after they are returned 
to North Korea. 
(21) The Government of China has detained, convicted, and imprisoned 
foreign aid workers attempting to assist North Korean refugees, including 
the Reverend Choi Bong Il and Mr. Kim Hee Tae, in proceedings that did 
not comply with Chinese law or international standards. 
(22) In January 2000, North Korean agents inside China allegedly 
abducted the Reverend Kim Dong-shik, a United States permanent 
resident and advocate for North Korean refugees, whose condition and 
whereabouts remain unknown. 
(23) Between 1994 and 2003, South Korea has admitted approximately 
3,800 North Korean refugees for domestic resettlement, a number small in 
comparison with the total number of North Korean escapees, but far 
greater than the number legally admitted by any other country. 
(24) Although the principal responsibility for North Korean refugee 
resettlement naturally falls to the Government of South Korea, the United 
States should play a leadership role in focusing international attention on 
the plight of these refugees, formulating international solutions to that 
profound humanitarian dilemma, and making prudent arrangements to 
accept a credible number of refugees for domestic resettlement. 
(25) In addition to infringing the rights of its own citizens, the 
Government of North Korea has been responsible in years past for the 
abduction of numerous citizens of South Korea and Japan, whose 
condition and whereabouts remain unknown. 
SEC. 4. PURPOSES. 
The purposes of this Act are-- 
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(1) to promote respect for and protection of fundamental human rights in 
North Korea; 
(2) to promote a more durable humanitarian solution to the plight of North 
Korean refugees; 
(3) to promote increased monitoring, access, and transparency in the 
provision of humanitarian assistance inside North Korea; 
(4) to promote the free flow of information into and out of North Korea; 
and 
(4) to promote progress toward the peaceful reunification of the Korean 
peninsula under a democratic system of government. 
 
TITLE I--PROMOTING THE HUMAN RIGHTS OF NORTH KOREANS 
SEC. 101. SENSE OF CONGRESS REGARDING NEGOTIATIONS WITH 
NORTH KOREA. 
SEC. 102. SUPPORT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS AND DEMOCRACY PROGRAMS. 
SEC. 103. RADIO BROADCASTING TO NORTH KOREA. 
SEC. 104. ACTIONS TO PROMOTE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION. 
SEC. 105. UNITED NATIONS COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS. 
TITLE II--ASSISTING NORTH KOREANS IN NEED 
SEC. 201. REPORT ON UNITED STATES HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE. 
SEC. 202. ASSISTANCE PROVIDED INSIDE NORTH KOREA. 
SEC. 203. ASSISTANCE PROVIDED OUTSIDE OF NORTH KOREA. 
TITLE III--PROTECTING NORTH KOREAN REFUGEES 
SEC. 301. UNITED STATES POLICY TOWARD REFUGEES AND DEFECTORS. 
SEC. 302. ELIGIBILITY FOR REFUGEE OR ASYLUM CONSIDERATION. 
SEC. 303. REFUGEE STATUS. 
SEC. 304. PURSUIT OF FIRST ASYLUM POLICY. 
SEC. 305. UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES. 
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SEC. 306. HUMANITARIAN PAROLE. 
SEC. 307. NORTH KOREAN STATUS ADJUSTMENT. 
SEC. 308. TEMPORARY PROTECTED STATUS. 
SEC. 309. RIGHT TO ACCEPT EMPLOYMENT. 
SEC. 310. ANNUAL REPORTS. 
END 
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JOINT STATEMENT OF THE FOURTH ROUND OF THE SIX-PARTY TALKS 
 
Beijing, September 19, 2005 
 
The Fourth Round of the Six-Party Talks was held in Beijing, China among the People's 
Republic of China, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Japan, the Republic of 
Korea, the Russian Federation, and the United States of America from July 26th to 
August 7th, and from September 13th to 19th, 2005. 
 
Mr. Wu Dawei, Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs of the PRC, Mr. Kim Gye Gwan, Vice 
Minister of Foreign Affairs of the DPRK; Mr. Kenichiro Sasae, Director-General for 
Asian and Oceanian Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan; Mr. Song Min-soon, 
Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade of the ROK; Mr. Alexandr Alekseyev, 
Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation; and Mr. Christopher Hill, 
Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs of the United States 
attended the talks as heads of their respective delegations. 
 
Vice Foreign Minister Wu Dawei chaired the talks. 
 
For the cause of peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula and in Northeast Asia at 
large, the Six Parties held, in the spirit of mutual respect and equality, serious and 
practical talks concerning the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula on the basis of 
the common understanding of the previous three rounds of talks, and agreed, in this 
context, to the following: 
 
1. The Six Parties unanimously reaffirmed that the goal of the Six-Party Talks is the 
verifiable denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula in a peaceful manner. 
 
The DPRK committed to abandoning all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programs 
and returning, at an early date, to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear 
Weapons and to IAEA safeguards. 
 
The United States affirmed that it has no nuclear weapons on the Korean Peninsula and 
has no intention to attack or invade the DPRK with nuclear or conventional weapons. 
 
The ROK reaffirmed its commitment not to receive or deploy nuclear weapons in 
accordance with the 1992 Joint Declaration of the Denuclearization of the Korean 
Peninsula, while affirming that there exist no nuclear weapons within its territory. 
 
The 1992 Joint Declaration of the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula should be 
observed and implemented. 
 
The DPRK stated that it has the right to peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The other parties 
expressed their respect and agreed to discuss, at an appropriate time, the subject of the 
provision of light water reactor to the DPRK. 
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2. The Six Parties undertook, in their relations, to abide by the purposes and principles of 
the Charter of the United Nations and recognized norms of international relations. 
 
The DPRK and the United States undertook to respect each other's sovereignty, exist 
peacefully together, and take steps to normalize their relations subject to their respective 
bilateral policies. 
 
The DPRK and Japan undertook to take steps to normalize their relations in accordance 
with the Pyongyang Declaration, on the basis of the settlement of unfortunate past and 
the outstanding issues of concern. 
 
3. The Six Parties undertook to promote economic cooperation in the fields of energy, 
trade and investment, bilaterally and/or multilaterally. 
 
China, Japan, ROK, Russia and the US stated their willingness to provide energy 
assistance to the DPRK. 
 
The ROK reaffirmed its proposal of July 12th 2005 concerning the provision of 2 million 
kilowatts of electric power to the DPRK. 
 
4. The Six Parties committed to joint efforts for lasting peace and stability in Northeast 
Asia. 
 
The directly related parties will negotiate a permanent peace regime on the Korean 
Peninsula at an appropriate separate forum. 
 
The Six Parties agreed to explore ways and means for promoting security cooperation in 
Northeast Asia. 
 
5. The Six Parties agreed to take coordinated steps to implement the afore-mentioned 
consensus in a phased manner in line with the principle of "commitment for commitment, 
action for action". 
 
6. The Six Parties agreed to hold the Fifth Round of the Six-Party Talks in Beijing in 
early November 2005 at a date to be determined through consultations. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
197 
 
JOINT STATEMENT FROM THE THIRD SESSION OF THE FIFTH ROUND 
OF THE SIX-PARTY TALKS 
 
- Initial Actions for the Implementation of the Joint Statement 
The Third Session of the Fifth Round of the Six-Party Talks was held in Beijing among 
the People's Republic of China, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Japan, the 
Republic of Korea, the Russian Federation and the United States of America from 8 to 13 
February 2007. 
Mr. Wu Dawei, Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs of the PRC, Mr. Kim Gye Gwan, Vice 
Minister of Foreign Affairs of the DPRK; Mr. Kenichiro Sasae, Director-General for 
Asian and Oceanian Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan; Mr. Chun Yung-woo, 
Special Representative for Korean Peninsula Peace and Security Affairs of the ROK 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade; Mr. Alexander Losyukov, Deputy Minister of 
Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation; and Mr. Christopher Hill, Assistant Secretary 
for East Asian and Pacific Affairs of the Department of State of the United States 
attended the talks as heads of their respective delegations. 
Vice Foreign Minister Wu Dawei chaired the talks. 
I. The Parties held serious and productive discussions on the actions each party will take 
in the initial phase for the implementation of the Joint Statement of 19 September 2005. 
The Parties reaffirmed their common goal and will to achieve early denuclearization of 
the Korean Peninsula in a peaceful manner and reiterated that they would earnestly fulfill 
their commitments in the Joint Statement. The Parties agreed to take coordinated steps to 
implement the Joint Statement in a phased manner in line with the principle of "action for 
action". 
II. The Parties agreed to take the following actions in parallel in the initial phase: 
1. The DPRK will shut down and seal for the purpose of eventual abandonment the 
Yongbyon nuclear facility, including the reprocessing facility and invite back IAEA 
personnel to conduct all necessary monitoring and verifications as agreed between IAEA 
and the DPRK. 
2. The DPRK will discuss with other parties a list of all its nuclear programs as described 
in the Joint Statement, including plutonium extracted from used fuel rods, that would be 
abandoned pursuant to the Joint Statement. 
3. The DPRK and the US will start bilateral talks aimed at resolving pending bilateral 
issues and moving toward full diplomatic relations. The US will begin the process of 
removing the designation of the DPRK as a state-sponsor of terrorism and advance the 
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process of terminating the application of the Trading with the Enemy Act with respect to 
the DPRK. 
4. The DPRK and Japan will start bilateral talks aimed at taking steps to normalize their 
relations in accordance with the Pyongyang Declaration, on the basis of the settlement of 
unfortunate past and the outstanding issues of concern. 
5. Recalling Section 1 and 3 of the Joint Statement of 19 September 2005, the Parties 
agreed to cooperate in economic, energy and humanitarian assistance to the DPRK. In 
this regard, the Parties agreed to the provision of emergency energy assistance to the 
DPRK in the initial phase. The initial shipment of emergency energy assistance 
equivalent to 50,000 tons of heavy fuel oil (HFO) will commence within next 60 days. 
The Parties agreed that the above-mentioned initial actions will be implemented within 
next 60 days and that they will take coordinated steps toward this goal. 
III. The Parties agreed on the establishment of the following Working Groups (WG) in 
order to carry out the initial actions and for the purpose of full implementation of the 
Joint Statement: 
1. Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula 
2. Normalization of DPRK-US relations 
3. Normalization of DPRK-Japan relations 
4. Economy and Energy Cooperation 
5. Northeast Asia Peace and Security Mechanism 
The WGs will discuss and formulate specific plans for the implementation of the Joint 
Statement in their respective areas. The WGs shall report to the Six-Party Heads of 
Delegation Meeting on the progress of their work. In principle, progress in one WG shall 
not affect progress in other WGs. Plans made by the five WGs will be implemented as a 
whole in a coordinated manner. 
The Parties agreed that all WGs will meet within next 30 days. 
IV. During the period of the Initial Actions phase and the next phase - which includes 
provision by the DPRK of a complete declaration of all nuclear programs and 
disablement of all existing nuclear facilities, including graphite-moderated reactors and 
reprocessing plant - economic, energy and humanitarian assistance up to the equivalent of 
1 million tons of heavy fuel oil (HFO), including the initial shipment equivalent to 50,000 
tons of HFO, will be provided to the DPRK. 
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The detailed modalities of the said assistance will be determined through consultations 
and appropriate assessments in the Working Group on Economic and Energy 
Cooperation. 
V. Once the initial actions are implemented, the Six Parties will promptly hold a 
ministerial meeting to confirm implementation of the Joint Statement and explore ways 
and means for promoting security cooperation in Northeast Asia. 
VI. The Parties reaffirmed that they will take positive steps to increase mutual trust, and 
will make joint efforts for lasting peace and stability in Northeast Asia. The directly 
related parties will negotiate a permanent peace regime on the Korean Peninsula at an 
appropriate separate forum. 
VII. The Parties agreed to hold the Sixth Round of the Six-Party Talks on 19 March 2007 
to hear reports of WGs and discuss on actions for the next phase. 
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JOINT STATEMENT FROM THE SIX-PARTY TALKS 
- "Second-Phase Actions for the Implementation of the September 2005 Joint Statement" 
The Foreign Ministry of the People's Republic of China released the following joint 
statement on October 3, 2007: 
The Second Session of the Sixth Round of the Six-Party Talks was held in Beijing among 
the People's Republic of China, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Japan, the 
Republic of Korea, the Russian Federation and the United States of America from 27 to 
30 September 2007. 
Mr. Wu Dawei, Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs of the PRC, Mr. Kim Gye Gwan, Vice 
Minister of Foreign Affairs of the DPRK, Mr. Kenichiro Sasae, Director-General for 
Asian and Oceanian Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, Mr. Chun Yung-woo, 
Special Representative for Korean Peninsula Peace and Security Affairs of the ROK 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Mr. Alexander Losyukov, Deputy Minister of 
Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, and Mr. Christopher Hill, Assistant Secretary 
for East Asian and Pacific Affairs of the Department of State of the United States, 
attended the talks as heads of their respective delegations. 
Vice Foreign Minister Wu Dawei chaired the talks. 
The Parties listened to and endorsed the reports of the five Working Groups, confirmed 
the implementation of the initial actions provided for in the February 13 agreement, 
agreed to push forward the Six-Party Talks process in accordance with the consensus 
reached at the meetings of the Working Groups and reached agreement on second-phase 
actions for the implementation of the Joint Statement of 19 September 2005, the goal of 
which is the verifiable denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula in a peaceful manner. 
I. On Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula 
1. The DPRK agreed to disable all existing nuclear facilities subject to abandonment 
under the September 2005 Joint Statement and the February 13 agreement. 
The disablement of the 5 megawatt Experimental Reactor at Yongbyon, the 
Reprocessing Plant (Radiochemical Laboratory) at Yongbyon and the Nuclear 
Fuel Rod Fabrication Facility at Yongbyon will be completed by 31 December 
2007. Specific measures recommended by the expert group will be adopted by 
heads of delegation in line with the principles of being acceptable to all Parties, 
scientific, safe, verifiable, and consistent with international standards. At the 
request of the other Parties, the United States will lead disablement activities and 
provide the initial funding for those activities. As a first step, the US side will lead 
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the expert group to the DPRK within the next two weeks to prepare for 
disablement. 
2. The DPRK agreed to provide a complete and correct declaration of all its nuclear 
programs in accordance with the February 13 agreement by 31 December 2007. 
3. The DPRK reaffirmed its commitment not to transfer nuclear materials, 
technology, or know-how. 
II. On Normalization of Relations between Relevant Countries 
1. The DPRK and the United States remain committed to improving their bilateral 
relations and moving towards a full diplomatic relationship. The two sides will 
increase bilateral exchanges and enhance mutual trust. Recalling the commitments 
to begin the process of removing the designation of the DPRK as a state sponsor 
of terrorism and advance the process of terminating the application of the Trading 
with the Enemy Act with respect to the DPRK, the United States will fulfill its 
commitments to the DPRK in parallel with the DPRK's actions based on 
consensus reached at the meetings of the Working Group on Normalization of 
DPRK-U.S. Relations. 
2. The DPRK and Japan will make sincere efforts to normalize their relations 
expeditiously in accordance with the Pyongyang Declaration, on the basis of the 
settlement of the unfortunate past and the outstanding issues of concern. The 
DPRK and Japan committed themselves to taking specific actions toward this end 
through intensive consultations between them. 
III. On Economic and Energy Assistance to the DPRK 
In accordance with the February 13 agreement, economic, energy and humanitarian 
assistance up to the equivalent of one million tons of HFO (inclusive of the 100,000 tons 
of HFO already delivered) will be provided to the DPRK. Specific modalities will be 
finalized through discussion by the Working Group on Economy and Energy Cooperation. 
IV. On the Six-Party Ministerial Meeting 
The Parties reiterated that the Six-Party Ministerial Meeting will be held in Beijing at an 
appropriate time. 
The Parties agreed to hold a heads of delegation meeting prior to the Ministerial Meeting 
to discuss the agenda for the Meeting. 
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